THE FOREIGN POLICY OF
WOODROW WILSON
1913-1917

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THE FOREIGN POLICY OF WOODROW WILSON 1913-1917

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PREFACE

It has been the aim of the authors to present an account of the development of the policy followed by Woodrow Wilson in dealing with the foreign relations of the United States during the years 1913-1917, and to provide in convenient form the more important statements of President Wilson and his Secretaries of State in announcing and carrying forward that policy. No attempt has been made to write a history of the diplomacy of the period or to discuss with any thought of finality the multitude of questions that fill it. The paramount problems, the fundamental principles, the great decisions, — these only have been given extended treatment. Because the period was so filled with rapid changes it seemed essential to append a carefully selected chronology of the significant events in American foreign relations.

In public discussions great stress has been put upon the events which preceded the entrance of the United States into the Great War and upon President Wilson's addresses and proclamations thereby called forth. The full understanding of the meaning of those utterances and of the implications of President Wilson's policy is to be found in the examination of the earlier and in some respects more significant period of his administration which preceded the opening of the Great War.

Leland Stanford Junior University,
September 1, 1917.

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PART I

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF WOODROW WILSON

1913-1917

CHAPTER I

FOUNDATIONS

New Forces in Control of the Government of the United States — Existing Problems in Foreign Relations — Previous Record of the Democratic Party — Attitude of the New Administration — Relations with Latin-America & United States and China — Japanese in America — Policy of President Wilson upon the Problem of Government in Mexico — Dependencies of the United States — Peace Projects of the Wilson Administration.

WOODROW WILSON did not refer to foreign policy in his first inaugural address. Although this silence was generally expected, it served to emphasize at the outset of a Democratic administration the domestic character of the interests and pledges of the Democratic party. Foreign policies had not been debated in the campaign for the presidency in 1912.¹ Except for a veiled reference to a

¹ The Democratic party platform for 1912 had planks calling for an immediate declaration of American purpose respecting the independence of the Philippines, favouring an exemption from tolls of American coast-wise ships, and upholding the action of the Congress in a recent dispute with Russia, but none of these matters were in controversy and the Democratic victory brought none of them to the fore.

withdrawal from the Philippines,¹ the president-elect in the interval prior to inauguration had given no indication of a program or a policy in respect to the relations of the government of the United States with the nations of the world.

Yet there were not lacking persons who pointed out that the Democratic party and its leader were by record and word opposed to the tendency and much of the content of the foreign policy pursued by the Republican administrations.² Particularly was this true of the spirit of the Knox diplomacy and, had not the voters and political parties been absorbed in matters of domestic interest, it is certain that much would have been said of foreign policy, especially of "dollar diplomacy," in the campaign of 1912.³ There had been expectation in certain quarters, both at home and abroad, that the coming of the new administration would mark especially a change in the attitude of the government of the United States in matters relating to the Central and South American

¹ President-elect Wilson had said in a public address on December 28, 1912, "The Philippine Islands are at present our frontier, but I hope we presently are to deprive ourselves of that frontier." *Chicago Record-Herald*, December 29, 1912.

² Summary of expected changes may be found in "Will the Democrats Reverse our Foreign Policy?" *American Review of Reviews*, XLVII, 83 (January, 1913).

³ The term "dollar diplomacy" was applied to the activities of Secretary Knox in securing opportunities for the investment of American capital abroad, particularly in Latin America and China. The policy was severely criticized not only by the Democratic party, but by a progressive element in the Republican party. See *La Follette's Weekly*, March 22, 1913; March 29, 1913. President Taft defended the policy of his Secretary in his message to Congress, December 3, 1912. *Congressional Record*, XLIX, 8.

republics. But whatever the anticipation, the public was not to be long in doubt, for there were issues at hand to test at once the purpose of the incoming administration.¹

Events in China and Mexico had been so shaping themselves in 1912 as to bring forward problems for an immediate consideration on the part of the United States. The increasing strain in the relations with Colombia, a result of the part played by the United States in the Panama revolt of 1903, demanded relief.² The exemption, by the Panama Canal Act of 1912, of American coast-wise shipping from the payment of tolls had called forth protests from Great Britain which remained to be satisfied.³ To forestall any possibility of a rival canal it was necessary to bring to success the negotiations with Nicaragua for the control of the only other routes.⁴

¹ For review of events in 1912, see P. S. Reinsch, "Diplomatic Affairs and International Law, 1912," *American Political Science Review*, VII, 63 (February, 1913).

² The Taft administration had attempted to settle the controversy by proposing to purchase from Colombia certain privileges in that country and to award preferential treatment to its ships in the use of the Panama Canal. Colombia peremptorily refused to accept these proposals, February 15, 1913.

³ The British government claimed that the provision of the Act of Congress, August 24, 1912, authorizing this exemption and denying the use of the canal to ships owned by trans-continental railways, violated the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. President Taft expressed his willingness to submit the whole matter to arbitration, but the Department of State in its note of January 17, 1913, contended that there was neither violation of the treaty nor substantial injury to foreign shipping. The reply of the British ambassador was received February 27, 1913.

⁴ A proposed treaty with Nicaragua, signed February 3, 1913, would have granted to the United States exclusive rights over Nicaraguan canal routes and for the establishment of a naval base. Before this treaty had been acted upon by the United States Sen-

The Taft administration had refused to renew a commercial treaty with Russia, because of the discrimination by that government against American citizens of the Jewish race, and trade between the two nations depended on the mutual good will of the respective governments, until a new treaty should be arranged.¹

Perhaps President Wilson had some of these matters in mind when he said in his inaugural address that the nation sought to use the Democratic party "to interpret a change in its own plans and point of view." But this is doubtful. He was at that time referring to such matters as tariff and currency, which he went on to discuss. It is significant, however, that before measures on either of these subjects had been launched in Congress, in fact before the Congress had assembled in special session, the President had found it necessary to state the position of the administration upon certain matters of foreign policy in such terms as to show that there were, indeed, to be decided changes in the plans and point of view of the government of the United States in dealing with foreign nations.

LATIN AMERICA

Upon taking office President Wilson faced at once the question of recognition of General Victoriano Huerta,

ate, it was withdrawn because amendments had been suggested which would have established a protectorate over Nicaragua.

¹The treaty of commerce and navigation between the United States and Russia, ratified in 1832, expired January 1, 1913. The Taft administration had notified the Russian government December 17, 1911, that it desired to terminate the treaty on its expiration.

who had become provisional president of Mexico thirteen days earlier. This marked the climax of a series of events in Mexico in 1912 when that country had been the scene of the greatest disorder. Insurrection had broken out in many quarters and the Madero government had been unable to cope with it. In this situation the Taft administration had followed a policy of non-interference. Citizens of the United States were warned to refrain from entering Mexico and from taking part in the disturbances there; those already in that country were urged to leave the danger areas; shipment of war materials into Mexico was forbidden; and the government of that state was informed that if American life and property within the boundaries of Mexico were not adequately protected the United States would be forced to intervene. But while troops were sent to the border no intervention had taken place in spite of the increasing uncertainties of life in Mexico. In February of 1913 President Madero was deposed and, while in the custody of Huerta's troops, was killed under circumstances that indicated a deliberate assassination. Huerta assumed a virtual dictatorship over the country, though under cover of legal right based on an election by the Mexican Congress. The American ambassador at Mexico City strongly advised the incoming administration to accord formal recognition to the authority of Huerta. This President Wilson refused to do, thus departing from our usual practice.¹

¹ A similar case of non-recognition was that concerning Nic-

His motive and purpose in this new departure were indicated when, on March 11, 1913, he issued a statement outlining his administration's attitude toward Latin America. (*Statement No. I.*)¹ He declared that a chief object of his endeavour would be the cultivation of friendship with the republics of Central and South America. He wished to deserve their confidence and to co-operate with them. However, it seemed to him that co-operation was possible "only when supported at every turn by the orderly processes of just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force." He promised to use every influence of the administration to the establishment of these principles.

This marked definitely the stand of the administration upon the question of government in Mexico. But the President went on to say with general application to all Central and South American states that the favour of the administration was to be granted to "no special group or interest" in these countries. He was concerned with trade relationships between the two continents which should "redound to the profit and advantage of both and interfere with the rights and liberties of neither."

As the first three paragraphs of this statement embodied the substance of his Mexican policy, so the last paragraph foreshadowed his Mobile speech in which he was to draw the line between "concessions" and "investments"

aragua in 1855. See J. B. Moore, *Digest of International Law*, I, 140. For instances of delayed recognition see *ibid.*, 119-164.

¹ *Infra*, p. 179. This and subsequent references in parentheses are to the numbered statements in Part III of this volume.

in Latin American countries. This was, however, as much of the policy of his government as he cared to forecast at that time.

THE FAR EAST

A week after his statement respecting his attitude toward Latin America the President was impelled to issue another statement, this time in response to a request by a group of American bankers that he signify the position of the administration upon their participation in a Six Power loan to China.¹ (*Statement No. 2.*) Representatives of the banking houses concerned had called upon Secretary Bryan on March ninth and had stated explicitly that they would not participate unless expressly requested to do so by the administration.² President Wilson declined to make such a request, disapproving of the conditions of the loan and consequently of the implied imposition of a responsibility upon the government of the United States. It might lead to an interference in the political affairs of China. Responsibility for such a possible result was "obnoxious to the principles upon which the government of our people rests." But the American people did wish to aid the people of China, particularly in view of their

¹ The participants were bankers of Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Russia and the United States.

² An American group of bankers, consisting of J. P. Morgan & Co., Kuhn, Loeb & Co., First National Bank of New York City and National City Bank, had been formed in the spring of 1909, upon the request of the Department of State that a financial backing be given for participation by the United States in the railway loan agreement then under negotiation between China and groups of British, French and German bankers.

recent awakening.¹ Here also the United States was interested in trade relationships but, said he, "our interests are those of the open door — a door of friendship and mutual advantage. This is the only door we care to enter."²

Within two weeks of taking office, President Wilson had made public the basic principles upon which he was to conduct relations of the United States with less powerful nations. Detailed programs developed in due time. The principles remained the same. He next was faced with the necessity of dealing with a diplomatic question involving one of the Great Powers and touching upon matters within the boundaries of the United States.

JAPANESE IN AMERICA

On April 4, 1913, the Japanese ambassador at Washington called the attention of the Department of State to legislation pending in the California state legislature, the purport of which, he averred, was discrimination against the Japanese in the owning or leasing of lands. The proposed act did discriminate against aliens not eligible to citizenship, and in fact was designed to strike at the ownership of land by Japanese subjects.

President Wilson attempted to prevent the development of a controversy with Japan by appealing to the California

¹ Revolution in China culminated on February 12, 1912. The Republican government of China was recognized by the United States on May 2, 1913.

² The official announcement of the withdrawal of the American group, issued March 19, 1913, may be found in *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, XCVI, 825.

authorities, if they thought action necessary at all, to exclude from the privileges of land ownership all aliens who had not declared their intention to become citizens. (*Statement No. 3.*) This was of course not the object of the proposed legislation nor would it meet the Japanese charge of discrimination. But it was state legislation that the President thought should be such as could not be "fairly challenged or called in question." His purpose was plainly to put the burden and responsibility upon the national government.

A week following this appeal the President requested Secretary Bryan to go to California for a conference with the legislature and Governor Johnson. The mission was not a success. On May third the legislature passed the bill without material change and Governor Johnson signed it on the nineteenth.¹

In the interim between passage and the governor's action the Japanese ambassador, on May ninth, laid an "urgent and explicit protest" before the Department of State, and this led the administration to dispatch a second appeal to Governor Johnson in which national responsibility was again stressed and delay was requested that an attempt might be made to settle the matter through diplomatic channels. (*Statement No. 5.*) Governor Johnson's action made such effort impossible, but on the day of the signature the Department of State

¹ California Statutes, (1913) p. 206. The law may be found also in J. H. Deering, *General Laws of California* (1916 ed.), Act 129, p. 40, and in *American Journal of International Law*, VIII, Supplement, 177.

made formal reply to the Japanese protest.¹ (*Statement No. 6.*)

In stating its position the government of the United States admitted that beyond protesting it could do nothing to prevent legislative action by one of the states. It was pointed out, however, that the legislation in question was not political in the sense that it was part of any general national policy inconsistent with complete friendship between the two nations. It was asserted that it was wholly economic. The people of the State of California desired "to avoid certain conditions of competition in their agricultural activities."

Secretary Bryan took pains to assure the Japanese government that his government desired to further the understanding that bound the nations together. Besides the attempts to induce California to modify its legislation there was other evidence of this desire. The Japanese government, in common with the other governments of the world, had before it at this time a plan for world peace laid before the diplomats at Washington by Secretary Bryan April 24, 1913.² (*Statement No. 4.*)

The Japanese ambassador informed the Secretary of State on June second that Japan accepted the plan "in principle." Moreover, toward the close of the month the

¹ Diplomatic exchanges upon this subject may be found in Department of State, *American-Japanese Discussions Relating to Land Tenure Law of California*, 3-28.

² It was announced by Secretary Bryan on May 30, 1913, that favourable responses had been received from Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Sweden, Brazil, Peru and Norway. An arbitration treaty with Great Britain was renewed on May 31, 1913.

general arbitration treaty between the two countries was renewed.¹ On June fourth, however, Japan presented a second formal note of protest against the California land legislation, to which Secretary Bryan replied on July sixteenth. (*Statement No. 7.*) It was a reiteration and elaboration of the first reply. No more than in the first reply did the California attitude receive clear treatment. The Department of State put its emphasis upon the purpose and attitude of the national administration. It insisted that there was no question of discrimination on account of race, and also that the right to determine "who shall and who shall not be permitted to settle in its dominions and become a part of the body politic" must necessarily be left to the municipal law of each nation to "avoid the contentions which are so likely to disturb the harmony of international relations." Japan was naturally not satisfied. A third protest was made on August twenty-sixth and a fourth late in September.²

The policy of the Wilson administration embodied two distinctions, the one drawn between economic and political legislation, the other between action by a state and the expression of the good will of the nation. Moreover, it maintained that there was no violation of a treaty right. If assurance of harmony of interests represented the contribution of the administration in this crisis, it was in

¹ This treaty of May 5, 1908, was one of a series of arbitration treaties negotiated during the secretaryship of Elihu Root. It would have expired August 24, 1913. The renewal was ratified by the Senate February 21, 1914, and ratifications exchanged May 23, 1914.

² For subsequent discussion of Japanese protests see *American Journal of International Law*, VIII, 571.

keeping with the desire of those in charge to make the world one of peace and mutual agreement. But the Japanese protest, based fundamentally not upon the economic legislation of California, for that was an incident, but upon the discrimination against Japanese in the law of the United States, remained to be considered at a later time.¹

MEXICO

For the time being the interest of the administration was centred elsewhere. On August 26, 1913, the same day that Japan had presented its third protest, General Huerta, who was in power in Mexico City and whom President Wilson had refrained from recognizing, took steps that led the United States to consider more intently, than it thus far had, its relations with the Mexican people.

Since the ninth of May Huerta had refused to recognize the American ambassador and on July sixteenth the latter was called to Washington for a conference. This was followed by his resignation. Early in August John Lind, former governor of Minnesota, was sent to Mexico City as the special agent of President Wilson.² These

¹ There is no discrimination in terms in the statutes of the United States, but by judicial interpretation of the law it has been held that the Japanese, among other races, cannot be naturalized. See J. B. Moore, *Digest of International Law*, III, 331. In the spring of 1917 in a paper before the American Academy of Political and Social Science Toyokichi Iyenaga discussed relations between Japan and the United States and asked the full recognition of the equality of Japanese now resident in the United States. "Japan, America and Durable Peace," *Annals of American Academy*, LXXII, 124.

² For basis for use of such agents and earlier instances of their

events emphasized the determination of the President not to recognize the government of Huerta. But he was of the opinion that the time had come when his policy of "hands off," announced in March, should give way to an offer to assist Mexico out of its difficulties. In making this change he was careful to emphasize the earlier assurance that the United States was acting in the spirit of disinterested friendship. Reason for his change he stated thus, "The present situation in Mexico is incompatible with the fulfilment of international obligations on the part of Mexico, with the civilized development of Mexico herself, and with the maintenance of tolerable political and economic conditions in Central America."

Through Mr. Lind he proposed the following terms of settlement: "(a) An immediate cessation of fighting throughout Mexico, a definite armistice solemnly entered into and scrupulously observed. (b) Security given for an early and free election in which all will agree to take part. (c) The consent of General Huerta to bind himself not to be a candidate for election as President of the Republic at this election. (d) The agreement of all parties to abide by the results of the election and co-operate in the most loyal way in organizing and supporting the new administration." General Huerta rejected these proposals on the sixteenth of August.¹

Eleven days later the President addressed Congress.

use see H. M. Wriston, "Presidential Special Agents in Diplomacy," *American Political Science Review*, X, 481.

¹ The reply of Huerta may be found in *American Journal of International Law*, VII, Supplement, 284.

(*Statement No. 8.*) It was his purpose in doing this to lay definitely before the nation the principle and content of his policy in Mexico, and, if possible, to bring to his support a body of sentiment so considerable as to make it clear that the administration spoke the purpose of the nation. Then, as at later times, Mr. Wilson felt the necessity of restating for foreign peoples the point of view of the American people, as well as the policy of his own administration, and as a preliminary to this he made the effort to pronounce to his own people the make-up of his policy, in order that there might be understanding and decision at home.

This was particularly necessary at this time inasmuch as the President was on the surface apparently preparing the United States to play in Mexico the rôle of "Big Policeman."¹ As the events proved and as his utterances had clearly foreshadowed, his purpose in this matter and his conception of the aid of America was decidedly not that ascribed to him at the time by the prominent leaders of public opinion, long accustomed to the ways and reasons of some of his immediate predecessors.

It may be well to recall that on taking office in 1913 Mr. Wilson had not only to formulate a foreign policy, but, in view of the fact that the Democratic party had not been in power for the sixteen years during which the

¹ This phrase has been generally applied to a course of action pursued by President Roosevelt. It was stressed by him in his message to Congress on December 6, 1904. The European press so interpreted the course of President Wilson in Mexico; cited in Herbert Kraus, "What European Countries Think of the Monroe Doctrine," *Annals of American Academy*, LIV, 110.

United States had become a "world power," he had the much greater task of interpreting that policy to the American people and relating it to the problems with which he had to deal.¹ Mr. Wilson accepted this task with a deep sense of responsibility. It is probably not too much to say that in expounding the principles of an American policy to the American people he made a great, if not the greatest, contribution to the preparation of America for participation in the Great War.

His appeal of August twenty-seventh should be considered with this task in mind. He spoke of the obligation of the United States government in the protection of American interests, but he put first the "obligation to Mexico herself." American friendship for the Mexican people should be such as to lead to willing sacrifices in their time of trouble. By sacrifice he apparently meant the curtailment of American interests for the time being. In this he was emphasizing his position of March eleventh. The reasons why the United States should be so concerned with "the peace, prosperity, and contentment of Mexico" were to be found less in the enlargement thereby of the field for American business than in the "enlargement of the field of self-government and the realization of the hopes and rights of a nation . . . whose best aspirations" had been "so long suppressed and disappointed."

In view of the apparent inability of Huerta to re-

¹ Relations with Colombia, England, Japan and Mexico called for immediate attention.

store order, or of his opponents to gain control, the President believed that it was the duty of the United States to volunteer to assist, if that were possible, "in effecting some arrangement which would bring relief and peace and set up a universally acknowledged political authority" in Mexico. It was to aid in the accomplishment of this end that Mr. Lind had been sent to Mexico City.

The failure of Mr. Lind to secure the retirement of Huerta had led the President to make this statement to Congress. He concluded with the following announcement of his future course,—an announcement that contains the spirit of the Wilson diplomatic policy throughout his term and upon all questions: "Clearly, everything that we do must be rooted in patience and done with calm and disinterested deliberation. . . . We can afford to exercise the self-restraint of a really great nation which realizes its own strength and scorns to misuse it."

There the matter rested, as far as the administration was concerned, for some time. In mid-October the Washington government found it expedient to send warnings to Huerta, and he was given to understand that the United States had no intention of recognizing his claim to the presidency even though the elections then in progress should result in his favour. The elections held under the Huerta régime were not the orderly processes of constitutional government which President Wilson found an essential to the restoration of normal conditions.

DEPENDENCIES

During the seven months in which President Wilson had been placing before the country his conception of foreign policy, there had been some speculation as to his probable procedure with relation to the Philippines. The Democratic party had given consideration to this matter in its platforms since 1900,¹ and the platform of 1912 had favoured an immediate declaration of the nation's purpose to recognize the independence of the islands as soon as a stable government could be established. No certain statement was given of the President's views until October 6, 1913, when the newly-appointed Governor-General delivered a message from the President to the citizens of the Philippine Islands. (*Statement No. 9.*) Here, as in other cases, the President put his faith in self-government, and stated his intention to make it possible wherever his action might be of aid.²

He summed up his faith in addressing an audience at Swarthmore College later in October when he said, " . . . the mere extent of the American conquest is not what gives America distinction in the annals of the world, but the professed purpose of the conquest which was to see to it that every foot of this land should be the home

¹ Platforms of the Democratic party can be conveniently found in E. Stanwood, *History of the Presidency*, II (1897-1916) second edition. Platforms, 1900, pp. 58-63; 1904, pp. 119-124; 1908, pp. 186-196; 1912, pp. 260-271; 1916, pp. 350-360.

² The address of Governor General Harrison in presenting this message was published in the *Weekly Times* (Manila, P. I.) October 10, 1913.

of free, self-governed people, who should have no government whatever which did not rest upon the consent of the governed." (*Statement No. 10.*)

At this time Mr. Wilson was apparently conscious of a need to make this point increasingly clear to his own countrymen. At Philadelphia in October he said that he had asked himself this question, "How are you going to assist in some small part to give the American people and, by example, the peoples of the world more liberty, more happiness, more substantial prosperity; and how are you going to make that prosperity a common heritage instead of a selfish possession?" (*Statement No. 11.*)

GENERAL POLICY

But the full meaning of his thought with reference to his own foreign policy did not become absolutely clear until he made his address to the Southern Commercial Congress at Mobile on October 27, 1913. (*Statement No. 12.*) The address was carefully prepared and after the inaugural address deserves to rank first of all his utterances during the first year of his presidency.

He pointed out the dangers involved in the "concessions" obtained by foreign companies in South and Central America.¹ He predicted that in time "concessions" would be displaced by investments. With pride he pointed to action by his administration in speeding this

¹ These were the dangers referred to by him on March 18, 1913, in discussing the proposed six-power loan to China.

change.¹ "It is a very perilous thing to determine the foreign policy of a nation in terms of material interest. It not only is unfair to those with whom you are dealing, but it is degrading as regards your own actions." Even while speaking such sentiments the President must have felt the possibility of a distinction between his ideal and the actions of his country in the past. He turned aside to say "that the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest."

But there was a deeper meaning in the President's outlook upon the future of Latin America. He was striving to emphasize the need of equity in the relations between nations in order that international disputes might be avoided or readily settled. "Comprehension," said he, "must be the soil in which shall grow all the fruits of friendship, and there is a reason and a compulsion lying behind all this which is dearer than anything else to thoughtful men of America. I mean the development of constitutional liberty in the world. Human rights, national integrity, and opportunity as against material interests — that . . . is the issue. . . ." President Wilson was in this address directing his thought to the Americas. But it is of significance that he proposed a course of action and enunciated a group of principles which three years later he wished to apply to the conduct of the United States in the world at large.

¹ It may be that the President was referring to the withdrawal of the Pearson syndicate from its proposed investment in Colombia.

INTERNATIONAL PEACE

From the outset the administration had been credited with a desire to further projects for insuring international peace. During the previous administration the sentiment for arbitration had made progress under the leadership of President Taft. President Wilson favoured arbitration, but his administration went a step further. As a means of arresting the development of controversies, and thus of avoiding the necessity of arbitration or war, a plan was proposed for preliminary inquiry into the causes of dispute. In his address to Congress in December of 1913 the President related the success of this effort. (*Statement No. 13.*) In April of 1913 Secretary Bryan had presented to the diplomats at Washington a plan providing "that whenever differences of interest or of policy arise that could not be resolved by the ordinary processes of diplomacy they shall be publicly analyzed, discussed, and reported upon by a tribunal chosen by the parties before either nation determines its course of action." In the ensuing eight months assent, in principle, had been gained from thirty-one governments representing four-fifths of the population of the world. Thus the President found "many happy manifestations . . . of a growing cordiality and sense of community of interest among the nations, foreshadowing an age of settled peace and good will."

Pending controversies with England, Russia, Japan and Colombia were not mentioned in this message. But

the attitude of the administration toward the settlement of these disputes was foreshadowed thus: "There is only one possible standard by which to determine controversies between the United States and other nations, and that is compounded of these two elements: Our own honor and our obligations to the peace of the world. A test so compounded ought easily to be made to govern both the establishment of new treaty obligations and the interpretation of those already assumed."

The foundations for the foreign policy of the administration of Woodrow Wilson had been firmly laid before the expiration of the year. In Latin America, particularly in Mexico, and in the Far East, particularly in China, fair dealing involving a refusal to countenance the extension of the financial interests of the United States at the expense of peoples less advanced industrially, friendly co-operation embodied in a moral support of the forces of law and order and a reliance upon the universal principle of self-government,—these had characterized the action of the government at Washington. In controversies, notably in that with Japan, guidance had been found in the reasonableness of deciding disputed questions by orderly processes, and in the importance of deliberation and patience and mutual understanding. At all times emphasis had been placed upon the spirit of the people of the United States rather than upon their might as a nation.

CHAPTER II

PRINCIPLES IN PRACTICE

Pre-eminent Importance of the Mexican Question — Development of the Policy of the Administration — President Wilson's Treatment of the Panama Tolls Controversy — Inviolability of Treaties — Crisis in the Relations with Huerta — Mediation by the "A. B. C." Powers — Triumph of the President's Policies.

MEXICO demanded of the administration increasing attention. In the midst of what the President some three years later called "this perplexing business," it was repeatedly asserted, and the statement met with general acceptance, that however much the American people rejoiced in the fact that the administration had not intervened in Mexico, a great portion did not understand the policy of the President and were frequently baffled by the changes in that policy. In its development the policy of the administration by the opening of 1914 had passed through two stages. In the first the President had merely refused to recognize the government of Huerta, in the second, signalized by the mission of Lind, he had tendered the good offices of the United States in an effort to bring the warring factions together. In spite of the rejection by Huerta of this proffered aid, the President's personal representative had remained in Mexico and

the President had maintained an attitude of "watchful waiting."

He felt that peace in America was not assured until a constitutional government had been established in Mexico, and he held that an elimination of those who exercised arbitrary and illegal power must necessarily precede the formation of a permanent concert of power for the Americas. The United States was particularly on trial in this matter partly because of its course toward Mexico in earlier years and partly because its predominant size in the Americas naturally engendered the suspicion of possible aggression. Consequently the President wished to emphasize the peculiar burden of responsibility resting upon the United States.

In his message to Congress in December of 1913 he said, "We are the friends of constitutional government in America; we are more than its friends, we are its champions; because in no other way can our neighbors to whom we would wish in every way to make proof of our friendship, work out their own development in peace and liberty."¹ His meaning here was subject to two possible interpretations. Championship might imply merely continued refusal to recognize Huerta or it might mean adoption of measures of some sort to hasten the downfall of any who exercised arbitrary authority. Late in January of 1914 the President took a step that marked entrance upon the third stage in the development of his

¹ In this message greater powers in self-government were asked for Porto Rico and Hawaii and ultimate independence for the Philippines was stressed.

policy. He made known to the members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that he intended to raise the embargo on the shipment of arms into Mexico.¹

In his explanation of February 3, 1914, there is a frank statement of the reasons for the use of this weapon against Huerta. (*Statement No. 14.*) This was championship of those who were waging war for a constitutional government. Said the President: "The executive order under which the exportation of arms and ammunition into Mexico is forbidden was a departure from the accepted practices of neutrality—a deliberate departure from those practices under a well-considered joint resolution of Congress, determined in circumstances which have now ceased to exist.² It was intended to discourage incipient revolts against the regularly constituted authorities of Mexico. Since that order was issued the circumstances of the case have undergone a radical change. There is now no Constitutional Government in Mexico; and the existence of this order hinders and delays the very thing that the Government of the United States is now insisting upon, namely, that Mexico shall be left free to settle her own affairs and as soon as possible put them on a constitutional footing by her own force and counsel." Critics of the President pointed out that this order would result in arming those whom the

¹ On January 2, 1914, the President had conferred with John Lind, his personal representative in Mexico.

² The order of Taft of March 14, 1912, had forbidden all export except to the government of Madero. The order of Wilson in 1913 had made no exception.

United States must eventually fight when it intervened, but unlike these critics the President had no intention, then or at a later time, of intervening.¹

But the new determination of the President did seem to actually project the United States into Mexico's domestic troubles.² Moreover, it divided the responsibility for what happened in Mexico between the Huertistas and the Constitutionalist faction; though General Carranza, the leader of that party, refused to assume this burden. There were indications of some disposition on the part of the world at large to hold the United States itself in some measure responsible for acts of violence directed at foreigners in Mexico. In February Great Britain requested that the Washington government investigate the death of a British subject, whose killing, it was charged, had been at the hands of troops of the party of Carranza. The United States accepted the responsibility, but on account of strained relations with Carranza its efforts were not an unqualified success.

Mr. Wilson felt called upon to discuss the rumour of European interference on March 2, 1914, and to deny that any pressure had been brought to bear upon the

¹ There was widespread demand for change in policy toward Mexico in the late winter. See particularly W. M. Shuster, "The Mexican Menace," *Century Magazine*, LXXXVII, 593 (February, 1914,) and G. Harvey, "We Appeal to the President," *North American Review*, CXCIX, 481 (April, 1914).

² Comment at this time was aroused by two other acts of the administration. Late in January United States marines were landed in Haiti to aid in maintenance of order. On February 12, 1914, formal recognition was given a government recently established in Peru.

United States government by other governments.¹ That this denial may have been accompanied by a mental reservation is to be inferred from an occurrence on the following day in the British House of Commons, when Sir Edward Grey announced that if the British government did not obtain satisfaction from the Constitutionalists through the good offices of the United States it reserved the right to obtain reparation by other means when the circumstances should permit.

PANAMA TOLLS

In the meantime other matters were causing concern to the administration. As has been pointed out above, controversies were pending with several governments, and in his conference with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in January the President took the occasion to point out the gravity of the international situation.

Of the questions before him the President decided first of all to take up the contention of Great Britain that the exemption of American coastwise ships from the payment of tolls at Panama was a violation of the treaty of 1901 between the United States and Great Britain. The Democratic platform of 1912 had favoured this exemption and there were Democratic majorities in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Notwithstanding these facts the President on March 5, 1914,

¹ From a stenographic report of a talk of the President on March 2, 1914. Published in *World's Work*, XXVIII, 485-7.

read a message to the Congress in which he asked the repeal of the provision of the act that made the exemption.¹ (*Statement No. 15.*) In doing so he laid emphasis on the fact that opinion outside of the United States was united in holding that the exemption was contrary to the treaty rights of Great Britain.² The President's belief was thus expressed, "we are too big, too powerful, too self-respecting a Nation to interpret with too strained or refined a reading the words of our own promises just because we have power enough to give us leave to read them as we please."

He closed his address with an appeal that caused great speculation and endless explanation. "I ask this of you in support of the foreign policy of the administration. I shall not know how to deal with other matters of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence if you do not grant it to me in ungrudging measure." This was widely interpreted to indicate pressure from Great Britain with regard to Mexico. The President denied this in a subsequent talk with the newspaper men. In answer to questioning he stated that there was no particular significance to be attached to the words "nearer consequence." He regarded it as essential, however, that confidence be strengthened in the pledged word of the United States, if the policy of conciliation and co-operation, in which the

¹ The proposed repeal applied to the clause that provided, "No tolls shall be levied upon vessels engaged in coastwise trade of the United States." *United States Statutes at Large*, XXXVII, 562.

² For compilation of foreign press comment see *Literary Digest*, XLV, 362-3.

administration had been interested from the beginning, was to make headway in Latin America.¹ Before Congress had indicated decisively its reaction to this proposal all attention was taken by startling events in Mexico.

MEXICO

Time had seemed to work no improvement there. As the spring approached the President insisted, in the face of an increasing storm of criticism, that the United States could afford to wait for the desired outcome.² Haste upon the part of the United States could not but lead to bloodshed. Caution and patience might make it unnecessary.

However, on the third of April the personal representative of the President left Vera Cruz for the United States, serving by this departure to emphasize the failure of his mission, undertaken in August of 1913.³ Whether the President was at this time contemplating a new departure in dealing with the situation in Mexico cannot now be determined. Nor is it important. For events at this

¹ *World's Work*, XXVIII, 490-491.

² A compilation of adverse press comment from Europe and Latin America as well as the United States may be found in *North American Review*, CXCIX, 481 (April, 1914).

³ Simultaneously another Latin American problem was before the administration. On April 8, 1914, a treaty between the United States and Colombia was signed at Bogota. This had been anticipated by President Restrepo of Colombia. See *Times* (London), September 30, 1913. In a letter to the *New York Times*, published July 20, 1913, Ex-minister J. T. DuBois had stated that his mission had been handicapped because Colombia desired to await the action of the new administration at Washington.

point forced him to abandon, for the time being, the pursuance of his policy.

On April 9, 1914, a United States paymaster and a boat's crew of nine were arrested at Tampico by an officer of the army of General Huerta. By the order of a superior officer they were released immediately and the American commander was tendered an apology, which was later supplemented by an expression of regret from Huerta. Rear-Admiral H. T. Mayo, in command of the fleet, did not regard these as meeting the requirements of the situation and demanded a formal apology, assurance that the officer would be severely punished, and finally that a salute of twenty-one guns be given the United States flag, the flag to be raised publicly by the saluting party. All this was to be done within twenty-four hours.

The President supported these demands, although the time limit was extended, inasmuch as the issue was now widened to include the personal responsibility of Huerta. In replying the representative of Huerta urged the existence of extenuating circumstances, and stressed the immediate release and apology. Upon the American refusal to consider this, Huerta agreed to the original demand, with qualifications, however, which the United States would not accept.

Mr. Lind arrived in Washington on the thirteenth, and the following day had conference with the President and Secretary Bryan. On the same day Nelson O'Shaughnessy, the American chargé at Mexico City, was informed of the final refusal of Huerta to submit to

what he termed a degradation of the sovereignty of Mexico. The President ordered the North Atlantic fleet to the east coast of Mexico, and on the fifteenth a similar movement of a Pacific fleet to the west coast. He explained in a conference with the committees of Congress that it was his intention to seize the ports of Tampico and Vera Cruz on the east coast and some of the ports on the west coast as well, and to establish by such means a pacific blockade of Mexico.¹ Thus indicating a determination to force acquiescence, President Wilson on the eighteenth sent to General Huerta an ultimatum. Huerta refused to accede and it became known that the President would present the matter before Congress.

In a talk to the newspaper men at Washington, apparently after his order of the fourteenth but before he appeared before Congress, Wilson stated that neither the seizure of custom houses nor the giving of passports need lead to war, and that the purpose of the naval operations in Mexican waters was not, as some seemed to think, the "elimination of Huerta." He was careful to dissociate the act to enforce respect for the United States from his acts that had as their aim the establishment of a stable government in Mexico. Moreover, the country was talking little but war, while the President talked of display of force. The purpose of the President was "to compel

¹ The White House issued a statement upon April 15, 1914, in which it was pointed out that the United States had been singled out for attention by forces of Huerta and that the Tampico incident was one of a series. *New York Times*, April 16, 1914.

the recognition of the dignity of the United States.”¹

Further emphasis of this appeared when the President addressed Congress on the twentieth. (*Statement No. 16.*) He was aware that the Tampico incident taken by itself might be considered insufficient ground for such drastic measures, but “unfortunately, it was not an isolated case. A series of incidents have recently occurred,” he said, “which can not but create the impression that the representatives of General Huerta were willing to go out of their way to show disregard for the dignity and rights of this Government and felt perfectly safe in doing what they pleased, making free to show in many ways their irritation and contempt.” The President in justifying his demand upon Huerta stated as his opinion that only a public salute and apology would impress the whole Mexican population with the importance of the incident.

War was not his plan. Indeed he hoped by the course he was about to pursue to avoid that very outcome. If the situation were dealt with “promptly, firmly, and wisely” it “need have none of the grave implications of interference.” He asked the approval of Congress to use the armed forces of the United States in such ways and to such an extent as might be necessary to obtain from Huerta and his adherents the fullest recognition of the rights and dignity of the United States. This power the Congress voted two days later, following the President’s

¹*World's Work*, XXVIII, 490. See also, article by Samuel Blythe, “Mexico: The Record of a Conversation with President Wilson,” published in *Saturday Evening Post*, May 23, 1914, and reprinted in *Congressional Record*, LI, 9095.

lead in disclaiming any intention of making war upon the Mexican people.

The President had moved even prior to this vote of confidence. The custom house at Vera Cruz was taken by American marines on the twenty-first of April and a day later the occupation of Vera Cruz was complete. This move aroused the Constitutionalists. General Carranza came forward to protest at this invasion of Mexican soil, maintaining that the demand for a salute should have been made to him as the lawful representative of the Mexican people. To forestall difficulties that might follow the insistence on such a view, President Wilson restored the embargo on the shipment of arms into Mexico, and by this act further aroused the fears of Mexican leaders as to the purpose of the United States.

MEDIATION BY THE "A. B. C." POWERS

Before the occupation of the other ports was undertaken, indeed before the army had replaced the marines at Vera Cruz, President Wilson took a step which caused widespread astonishment both at home and abroad but which, in retrospect at least, seems perfectly natural in view of his previous utterances upon Latin American affairs and the attitude of the administration upon matters of arbitration. On April twenty-fifth the diplomatic representatives at Washington of three Latin American governments, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, had tendered their good offices in this emergency. In its acceptance, given on the same day (*Statement No. 17*), the United States

Department of State set forth again in the following terms the fundamental principles of the administration's Latin American policy: "Conscious of the purpose with which the proffer is made, this Government does not feel at liberty to decline it. Its own chief interest is in the peace of America, the cordial intercourse of her republics and their people, and the happiness and prosperity that can spring only out of frank mutual understandings and the friendship which is created by common purpose.

"The generous offer of your Governments is therefore accepted. This Government hopes most earnestly that you may find those who speak for the several elements of the Mexican people willing and ready to discuss terms of satisfactory, and therefore permanent, settlement. If you should find them willing, this Government will be glad to take up with you for discussion in the frankest and most conciliatory spirit any proposals that may be authoritatively formulated, and will hope that they may prove feasible and prophetic of a new day of mutual co-operation and confidence in America."

A great value in such a conference lay in its effect upon public opinion, not only in Latin America, but also in the United States. Mediation had been obtained — seemingly at the expense yet with the assent of the United States. The act stood for progress. Moreover, the inclusion of the whole Mexican situation in the scope of the proposed conference meant that an object long desired was now attained. There was finally to be a conference of the more important American republics upon the res-

toration of order in Mexico. Both Huerta and Carranza had accepted the proposal before the month was out. As a result of the policy pursued by the administration at Washington a purely national line of conduct was superseded by a somewhat limited, yet deeply significant, international program for dealing with problems arising out of unstable government in a backward province of the New World.

GENERAL POLICY

Prior to the meeting of the conference of mediators President Wilson availed himself of two opportunities to drive home to the American people the purport of these recent movements. On May twelfth he said: "We have gone down to Mexico to serve mankind, if we can find out the way. We do not want to fight the Mexicans. We want to serve the Mexicans, if we can, because we know how we would like to be free and how we would like to be served if there were friends standing by ready to serve us. A war of aggression is not a war in which it is a proud thing to die, but a war of service is a thing in which it is a proud thing to die." (*Statement No. 18.*) The President referred to the number of national stocks represented among those Americans who were killed in the taking of Vera Cruz, and said: "They were Americans, every one of them, and with no difference in their Americanism because of the stock from which they came. Therefore, they were in a peculiar sense of our blood, and they proved it by showing that they were of our spirit,

that no matter what their derivation, no matter where their people came from, they thought and wished and did the things that were American; and the flag under which they served was a flag in which all the blood of mankind is united to make a free Nation." These phrases are the common currency of American public addresses, but Woodrow Wilson by his earnestness and purposefulness was to give them a new and greater moral value.

Seizing upon the moment when his policy of conciliation in Latin America had seemed about to give way, and a more rigid and accustomed policy of coercion to be his only alternative, he had emphasized in a most dramatic way the possibilities of a wider use of co-operation now that the faith of the greater South American countries had been won by his conduct in office.

Perhaps the most telling criticism, from the point of view of a great many citizens of the United States, levelled at this latest development in the administration's policy, was that it obligated the United States to other nations and that its conduct thereafter must be bound as never before in foreign relations. It was pointed out that this was contrary to previous conduct and purpose of the United States. In meeting such objections the President said: "It was not merely because of passing and transient circumstances that Washington said that we must keep free from entangling alliances. It was because he saw that no country had yet set its face in the same direction in which America had set her face. We cannot form alliances with those who are not going our way;

and in our might and majesty and in the confidence and definiteness of our own purpose we need not and we should not form alliances with any nation in the world." (*Statement No. 19.*)

The conference of mediation convened at Niagara Falls on May twentieth and remained in session for six weeks. During that period the President triumphed in his fight for the repeal of the tolls exemption clause of the Panama Canal Act, and thus settled that controversy with Great Britain.¹ The issue with Japan remained to be met, and on the tenth of June the Japanese ambassador filed an additional protest with the Department of State.

On June 30, 1914, the Niagara Falls conference adjourned without arriving at a satisfactory result.² The acquiescence of the United States in the arbitration of a point of honour had come to no certain result, and however much it may have enhanced the reputation of the administration in Latin America, the Mexican situation was quite as unsettled as ever. At least so it seemed on the surface. The President's Mexican policy stood convicted of utter failure in the minds of many of his countrymen, particularly among those who are usually regarded as speaking with authority upon matters of international relations and foreign policy.

President Wilson devoted his next public address to a consideration of foreign policy in its larger aspects.

¹ Act signed June 15, 1914. *United States Statutes at Large*, XXXVIII, 385.

² Protocol signed June 24, 1914. For articles of agreement see *American Journal of International Law*, VIII, 584.

(*Statement No. 20.*) He again raised this question which he had raised at Philadelphia nearly a year earlier : "What are we going to do with the influence and power of this great nation? Are we going to play the old rôle of using that power for our aggrandizement and material benefit only? You know what that may mean. It may upon occasion mean that we shall use it to make the peoples of other nations suffer in the way in which we said that it was intolerable to suffer when we uttered our Declaration of Independence." In refraining from debating the details of the situation of the moment, Mr. Wilson cut back to the basis of self-government, his usual starting point.

He continued : "We set this Nation up — at any rate we professed to set it up — to vindicate the rights of men. We did not name any differences between one race and another. We did not set up any barriers against any particular people." Was this a veiled reference to the recent difference with Japan? Did it contain an admonition for a policy in the Philippines? Was it a reference to his views upon proposals for the restriction of immigration? It made little difference. The purpose and the principle of the President were the same.

The entire address was charged with what had been repeatedly termed the impossible idealism of the President. "If I did not believe," he said, "that the moral judgment would be the last judgment, the final judgment, in the minds of men as well as at the tribunal of God, I could not believe in popular government. But I do be-

lieve these things, and therefore I earnestly believe in the democracy not only of America but of every awakened people that wishes and intends to govern and control its own affairs."

The closing paragraph of the address shows clearly why in times of greater trial the President came quite naturally to voice the idealism of the nation: "My dream is that as the years go on and the world knows more and more of America, it . . . will turn to America for those moral inspirations which lie at the basis of all freedom; that the world will never fear America unless it feels that it is engaged in some enterprise which is inconsistent with the rights of humanity; and that America will come into the full light of the day when all shall know that she puts human rights above all other rights, and that her flag is the flag not only of America, but of humanity. What other great people has devoted itself to this exalted ideal? To what other nation in the world can all eyes look for an instant sympathy that thrills the whole body politic when men anywhere are fighting for their rights? I do not know that there will ever be a declaration of independence and of grievances for mankind, but I believe that if any such document is ever drawn it will be drawn in the spirit of the American Declaration of Independence, and that America has lifted high the light which will shine unto all generations and guide the feet of mankind to the goal of justice and liberty and peace."

The day following this address Huerta was elected President of Mexico. But it was the end. He resigned on July fifteenth and five days later fled from Mexico. Critics of the administration now asserted that the refusal of the President to recognize Huerta had pulled down the only strong power in Mexico. They reiterated the belief in the responsibility of the United States to force its conception of order upon its less powerful neighbours. But to other commentators the retirement of Huerta signalized a triumph for the policy of idealism, that is, the course of the administration in refusing to intervene in Mexico. The Wilson practice in Mexico had been to insist upon order as a necessary element for membership in the group of states, but to permit the Mexican people to achieve their own victory against the elements of disorder within the state.¹ The larger significance of the success of the administration's program in Latin America, and in Mexico in particular, was still unsuspected.

The triumph of the Wilson program, as far as it related to the growth of friendly relations, was signalized late in July when treaties providing for arbitration were signed with the three South American governments with whom the United States had recently been acting. On the fifteenth of September an order was issued for the withdrawal of troops from Vera Cruz, and the troops were withdrawn on the twenty-third of November. The hon-

¹ See editorials "Exit Huerta" and "Again the Big Policeman," *The Nation* (New York), XCIX, 91.

our of the United States had not been vindicated, that is, if a salute to the flag was the test, but Huerta had gone from power. A better opportunity was now afforded the Mexican people to justify the faith of the republics of North and South America.

Eighteen months in office had revealed in practice the principles underlying the foreign policy of President Wilson. Of the problems facing him at the opening of his administration he had disposed of the controversy with Great Britain, and in such a way as to emphasize our belief in the inviolability of treaty obligations, and in Mexico had carried to a triumphant conclusion the most important phase of his Latin American program. Although the Mexican problem had yet to assume its most threatening character, and pending controversies with Japan and Colombia were unsettled, the President had indicated his mode of procedure in each case, and his conduct in other matters and his expressions of purpose gave ample warrant for the thought that difficulties were to be lessened by a general acceptance of his leadership. In evaluating the work of the administration Charles W. Eliot placed as the principal achievements, not the legislative enactments upon tariff, currency and the trusts that had occupied so much of the attention of the President, but the "contributions to sound international policies and conduct."¹ It is this record and the

¹ *Harper's Weekly*, August 22, 1914. Also printed in *Congressional Record*, LI, Appendix, 869.

impression that its character had made abroad as well as at home that stood as a matter of history when the European war broke upon the world and gave President Wilson the leadership of the American people in the greatest crisis of their history.

CHAPTER III

MAINTENANCE OF NEUTRALITY

Outbreak of the European War—Initial Position of the United States—Meaning of Neutrality—Attitude upon British Policy—Plans of the Administration—Difficulties with Germany—American Proposal for *Modus Vivendi*—Duties of the United States—Result of American Adherence to Rules of International Law—Possibility of an International Tribunal.

UPON the outbreak of the European war the President, as was expected, issued a proclamation of neutrality, and followed it by a statement to the belligerent governments that he would welcome an opportunity to act in the interest of European peace, at that or any future time. Of more vital significance in view of the developments soon to appear, the United States sent an identic note to the several powers on August 6, 1914, in which attention was called to the differences of opinion as to the rights of neutrals on the sea and the proposal was made that for the duration of the war, the laws of naval warfare laid down in the Declaration of London be accepted by all nations.¹ In making this suggestion the administration took the basic position it was to occupy in the ensuing months of diplomatic controversy.

¹ Official correspondence relative to the Declaration of London was published by Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent Governments Relating to Neutral Rights and Commerce*, European War Series, No. 1, pp. 5-8.

The Declaration of London had been formulated at a conference of ten maritime powers in 1909, but had not been formally ratified except by the United States.¹ Yet there had been very general approval of its proposals.² In this situation the government of the United States took the opportunity accorded at the outset of a European war, in which the participation of Great Britain made certain the vital importance of the rules of naval warfare, to propose to the belligerents a *modus vivendi*. The importance of the suggestion lay not only in the possibility of an agreement among the belligerents as to the rules, but in the thought that had underlain the original declaration and that had characterized many earlier American positions, that is that the rights of neutrals should be determined by a power greater than the will of any single belligerent. In taking such a position at the outset the American government made easier many a subsequent step in its defence of the rights of neutral nations.

Before replies were received from the belligerents another phase of the position of the United States as a neutral came to occupy the centre of attention. To the people of the United States the war appeared as one more in a long series of European quarrels, and, long accustomed to a non-interference in European affairs, they naturally looked upon themselves as spectators and possible mediators in this Great War. It was apparent at once, how-

¹ For text of the Declaration of London see *American Journal of International Law*, III, Supplement, 179.

² For detailed information upon status of the Declaration in 1914, see *ibid.*, IX, 199.

ever, that, as in previous conflicts, there were to be groups in the United States deeply sympathetic with the various nations involved. At the outset the sympathies were largely those born of nationality and language. It was not clear that basic principles in governmental or social theory were issues in the conflict. It did not appear at that time that the conflict was one between autocracy and democracy. It seemed that there were elements of each on both sides. However, the influence of nationality appeared really threatening, as it had not during earlier European quarrels, for several millions of the citizens of America had been born in the portions of Europe involved in the war.

In the President's conduct or words there was no hint of American participation in the conflict. But in less than a month the differences in points of view of American citizens arising out of differences in national stocks became so evident and speakers so intemperate that the President issued an appeal to his fellow-countrymen "to be neutral in fact as well as in name." (*Statement No. 21.*) "We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another." Such advice quite obviously sprang from an assumption that the greatest dangers for the United States in this conflict were not those threatening vital American interests on land or sea, but those to be found in actions of

citizens of the United States that might be construed as showing preference to one of the belligerents. He had in mind the neutrality of a people far removed from the conflict. Yet by the second part of this statement the President did not mean that the United States should cut intercourse with the various nations; it was not his thought that the United States should draw off from the sea, but merely that its treatment of the nations should be impartial within the well-recognized agreements of international law. Where there was not agreement, the positions taken by the United States in earlier conflicts should furnish the guide.

In keeping with his offer of mediation the President avoided any step that would seem to indicate that his nation was passing judgment upon the conduct of nations at war. In response to appeals made in September of 1914 by both the French and German governments, and for different reasons by a commission from Belgium, the President stated that "it would be unwise, it would be premature for a single Government, however fortunately separated from the present struggle, it would even be inconsistent with the neutral position of any nation which like this has no part in the contest, to form or express a final judgment." (*Statement No. 22.*) In refraining from a protest upon the invasion of Belgium President Wilson was following the tradition of non-interference in the affairs of Europe. That he was acting in accordance with the general expectation at that time will not be de-

nied, in spite of the overwhelming tide of sympathy for the people of Belgium among the people of the United States.)

In these replies the President referred to the existence of treaties between the belligerent nations for the settlement of just such disputes as these protests had brought to his attention. It is of interest to note that within a period of two weeks following the outbreak of the war, the United States Senate had ratified treaties with eighteen countries, each of them providing for commissions of inquiry.¹ Moreover, on September 15, 1914, treaties of a like nature were signed at Washington with Great Britain, France, Spain and China. Secretary Bryan stated at this time that twenty-six nations had signed such treaties and that Russia, Germany and Austria were being urged to do likewise. Nothing could be clearer than that the existence of the European war had not, as yet, affected the purpose of those whose aim it was to devise additional means for preventing international conflicts.

In mid-September the President made an informal proposal to Germany that negotiations looking to peace be undertaken, presumably under the auspices of the government of the United States. The nature of the German reply which asked that the United States obtain from the Allies a statement preliminary to a conference led the President to proceed no further at that time.

In October it became known that the proposal of the

¹ For text see *American Journal of International Law*, VII, 824. Record and list of ratifications, *ibid.*, VIII, 565; IX, 175.

United States for the general acceptance of the Declaration of London, although accepted tentatively by Germany and Austria-Hungary, had not been adopted because the Allies under lead of Great Britain had named qualifying conditions. Consequently the government of the United States withdrew its suggestion of August 6, 1914, and fell back upon the already accepted rules of international law and the treaties then in existence, reserving the right to protest and demand reparation in each case of violation of its own rights.

ATTITUDE UPON BRITISH POLICY

Daily the American government was becoming more involved in the struggle, owing in large measure to the presence of American shipping in European waters and the disagreement among the belligerents as to the definition of contraband and the treatment of cargoes bound for neutral ports in Europe. The situation was of such a character as to increase in difficulty. The British Orders in Council of August, September and October steadily increased the control that Great Britain presumed to exercise over the commerce of neutrals.¹ As Great Britain was in control of the sea the primary American grievance seemed against that government.

On December 26, 1914, the United States filed a lengthy protest against the seizure and destruction of cargoes bound for neutral ports. Great Britain was charged with

¹ Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 1, pp. 11-18.

violation of the rules in cases of both conditional and absolute contraband. It was pointed out that peace, not war, was the normal relation between nations, and the request was definitely made that Great Britain "refrain from all unnecessary interference with the freedom of trade between nations which are sufferers, though not participants, in the present conflict." (*Statement No. 25.*) The tone of this note and the practice of the Department of State in filing notes of protest in each specific case made it clear that it was the purpose of the administration to consistently and completely present the American contention and to wait upon a more happy time to press the matters to a decision before courts of arbitration.

(The President's point of view had been stated in October when he said before the American Bar Association, "The opinion of the world is the mistress of the world, and the processes of international law are the slow processes by which opinion works its will." (*Statement No. 23.*) Yet in the same address the President revealed that he was thinking of the possibilities, as yet largely hidden, in the struggle for power in Europe. For he spoke of the time of world change when men were going to find out "just how, and in what particulars, and to what extent the real facts of human life and the real moral judgments of mankind prevail. . . .")

PLANS OF THE ADMINISTRATION

If, however, Woodrow Wilson was quickening to a realization of the months of diplomatic strife that were

before him, he gave no hint of it in his second annual message to Congress in December of 1914. (*Statement No. 24.*) "No one," said he, "who speaks counsel based on fact or drawn from a just and candid interpretation of realities can say that there is any reason to fear that from any quarter our independence or the integrity of our territory is threatened." He spoke at length of the need to develop better measures for trade with Latin America, and in general to put American shipping upon the sea while opportunities were offered by the engrossment of European nations in the war. The unprecedented destruction of men and goods in Europe made it necessary because the time was approaching when as never before Europe would need American aid. "We should be ready, more fit and ready than we have ever been," urged the President.

While thus urging the passage by the Senate of a specific shipping bill, endorsed in an earlier session by the administration, the President paused to ask favourable action by the Senate upon a matter of a very different nature. This was a bill granting to the people of the Philippines a larger measure of self-government. Within a few months of taking office the President had made known his general attitude in this matter, but in addressing the Congress at this time he placed the need upon quite other grounds, significant in view of his later utterances upon the European war. "How better," he asked, "in this time of anxious questioning and perplexed policy, could we show our confidence in the

principles of liberty, as the source as well as the expression of life, how better could we demonstrate our own self-possession and steadfastness in the courses of justice and disinterestedness than by thus going calmly forward to fulfil our promises to a dependent people, who will look more anxiously than ever to see whether we have indeed the liberality, the unselfishness, the courage, the faith we have boasted and professed?"

The quite obvious contrast between the attitude of the United States government toward Mexico, and that of Austria toward Servia had not been lost upon careful observers of Wilson's foreign policy. Here again it was patent that the President intended to make perfectly plain to an unbelieving world that there was even in time of tragic uncertainty for a great portion of mankind such a possibility as an enduring belief in self-government.

DIFFICULTIES WITH GERMANY

But it was increasingly difficult not to be drawn into the European maelstrom. On January 7, 1915, Secretary Bryan in reply to a request of the German government that the government of the United States investigate charges of improper practices in Europe stated that the United States government could not as a neutral investigate or even comment.

The next development required more than a mere refusal to act. Repeatedly had the charge been made, and now with greater insistence as the winter advanced, that the attitude of the administration evidenced marked dis-

crimination against Germany and Austria. This arose out of many things, but from nothing so much perhaps as the determination of the President to abide strictly by the rules of international law, and where disagreement or uncertainty existed as to any rules to maintain an American case based upon whatever precedent existed. This was emphasized by the refusal of the American government to countenance proposed changes in the rules or customs even where there was plausible justification for it in alterations in methods of maritime warfare. Whenever the German government decided to force this issue the opposition of the United States would be inevitable.

On January 20, 1915, Secretary Bryan in a letter to Senator Stone took up twenty charges of discrimination and presented the administration's answers. (*Statement No. 27.*) The spirit of the reply appeared in the concluding paragraph: "If any American citizens, partisans of Germany and Austria-Hungary, feel that this administration is acting in a way injurious to the cause of those countries, this feeling results from the fact that on the high seas the German and Austro-Hungarian naval power is thus far inferior to the British. It is the business of a belligerent operating on the high seas, not the duty of a neutral, to prevent contraband from reaching an enemy. Those in this country who sympathize with Germany and Austria-Hungary appear to assume that some obligation rests upon this Government in the performance of its neutral duty to prevent all trade in contraband, and thus to equalize the difference due to the relative naval

strength of the belligerents. No such obligation exists; it would be an unneutral act, an act of partiality upon the part of this Government to adopt such a policy if the Executive had the power to do so. If Germany and Austria-Hungary cannot import contraband from this country, it is not, because of that fact, the duty of the United States to close its markets to the allies. The markets of this country are open upon equal terms to all the world, to every nation, belligerent or neutral." This letter did not close the controversy, for the question continued to agitate a great portion of the American people.

The action of the German government that followed immediately upon this correspondence brought home to the administration the real dangers of neutrality in such a war as was about to be waged upon the sea. What had seemed an advisable agreement in August now seemed absolutely essential, if the possibility of neutrality was not to disappear. Fortunately the basis for the American action in the new contingency had been laid and the protests of the previous six months had been built upon it.

In an effort to overcome the naval supremacy of Great Britain, which was never more conclusive than on February 1, 1915, the German government decided to risk upon the sea a decided departure from the rules of international law and to justify it as retaliation against the British restrictions upon neutral commerce. On February 4, 1915, the German Admiralty issued a proclamation declaring a "war zone" about the British Isles and

warning neutrals of the dangers therein.¹ After February 18, 1915, it was the intention that German submarines should destroy every merchant vessel without making provision for safety of crews or passengers. In warfare of such a nature neutral vessels were subject to peril within the "war zone," the peril inherent in a situation where mistakes must occur. There was further complication in the fact that British vessels were upon occasion using neutral flags, which placed the neutral vessels in a dangerous position, in view of the fact that a submarine could not visit and search to make sure of identity, but must sink without warning, as the proclamation explained.

This raised for the administration a new question. Here it was not a matter of the capture of a vessel because of the destination of its cargo or the existence of blockade, such as had led to the protests to England; it was a question of absolute destruction by submarines. Thus it raised not a question of submission to seizure, or even confiscation or destruction of property, but of probable, indeed almost certain, destruction of life. Keenly alive to the dangerous possibilities inherent in the new situation, the American government on February 10, 1915, expostulated, particularizing upon the possible destruction of any merchant vessel of the United States or the death of American citizens. The Imperial German government would be held "to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities." (*Statement No. 29.*)

¹ Text, *ibid.*, No. 1, p. 52.

On the same day the American government protested to Great Britain against the reported use of the American flag on a British vessel while travelling through the war zone.

The German minister for foreign affairs in a note of February 16, 1915, admitted that the proposed submarine campaign was a drastic measure.¹ It was undertaken to break the British blockade upon foodstuffs and in turn, also, cut off the British supply of munitions. From the point of view of neutrals this statement was a declaration that in order to make it possible for neutrals to trade with Germany in foodstuffs it intended to make it impossible for them to trade with the Allies in munitions. This note opened a way for an American proposal by intimating that should the American government obtain from the powers at war with Germany an observation of the Declaration of London, "the German Government would recognize this as a service which could not be too highly estimated in favour of more humane conduct of war and would gladly draw the necessary conclusions from the new situation thus created."

On February 20, 1915, the United States presented to the belligerents suggestions for a *modus vivendi* in this emergency. It proposed that foodstuffs might be permitted to reach Germany for the sole use of non-combatants. It also proposed restrictions upon use of floating mines. But most important of all was the condition, "That neither [Germany nor Great Britain] will use submarines

¹ Text, *ibid.*, No. 1, p. 56.

to attack merchant vessels of any nationality except to enforce the right of visit and search." (*Statement No. 30.*)

In its reply of March 1, 1915, the German government stated its willingness to acquiesce in the American suggestions contingent upon the abandonment by Great Britain and its Allies of the practice of arming merchant vessels. The British note of March 15, 1915, gave the answer of the Allies to the American effort at compromise. In the refusal to assent to alteration of a well-established practice the British government made impossible the acceptance of the *modus vivendi*.

The American government in a note of March 30, 1915, denied the legality of the sweeping changes made by the British in their Orders in Council. The British must be prepared "to make full reparation for every act which under the rules of international law constitutes a violation of neutral rights."¹ In absence of an agreement by the belligerents upon an alteration in established practice the United States fell back upon its original and basic position, an insistence upon international law as it stood at the opening of the war. Upon such a position it built its protests.²

Aside from the fact that it was the German government, not that of Great Britain, which had threatened the

¹ *Ibid.*, No. 1, p. 69.

² American position on status of armed merchant vessels was given in memorandum of Department of State issued September 19, 1914. Text, *American Journal of International Law*, IX, Supplement, 121.

most drastic changes in the rules, there was in the manner of the British enforcement of their Orders in Council an additional reason for the American willingness to leave grievances against Great Britain to adjudication by courts. The British decrees were enforced, in an accordance with dictates of humanity, without risk to neutral ships, cargoes or passengers. Moreover, there had been concluded during the past six months with Great Britain, France and Russia treaties providing for commissions of inquiry for treatment of "any differences . . . of whatever nature." The third of these, that with Russia, had been proclaimed on March 25, 1915. No such treaties had been made with Germany and Austria.¹

DUTIES OF THE UNITED STATES

On April 8, 1915, the President restated with considerable emphasis his oft-repeated insistence upon neutrality in word and deed. (*Statement No. 31.*) The utterance indicated, however, a change, slight indeed, in the President's attitude toward the formulation of an American judgment upon the practices and purposes of the belligerent governments. He seemed conscious, also, of a danger involved in seeming to restrain the opinion of mankind or, more particularly, that of a large majority of his own countrymen. High as he held the wisdom of American non-participation — and he was presently to hold it at great cost to his prestige as a leader — he

¹ For treatment of the effect of these treaties upon relations of United States with the nations at war see *American Journal of International Law*, IX, 494.

seemed to feel the irksomeness of his admonition to be neutral. Naturally a neutral attitude became less easy to maintain, however desirable it might continue to be, when one of the belligerents threatened the lives of neutrals.¹

To the members of the Associated Press he admitted on April 20, 1915, that he spoke to them with restraint, where he preferred that it might have been otherwise. "There have been times," said he, "when I stood in this spot and said what I really thought, and I pray God that those days of indulgence may be accorded me again." (*Statement No. 33.*) He felt, as he said, that there was approaching a climax in the affairs of the world. This climax would bring to the severest test, not only the European belligerents, but also the people and government of the United States.

The President struck a new note in his interpretation of neutrality. He still maintained that judgment by the United States was preposterous, but he asserted that the basis of neutrality was not found in indifference nor in self-interest, but in sympathy for mankind. In spite of his desire to refrain from passing judgment, but in furtherance of his hope of an American mediation, he was not unwilling at this time to give greater currency to the idea that the United States was ready as no other nation was "to form some part of the assessing opinion of the world."

¹ On this same day, April 8, 1915, a steamer in the service of the American Commission for the Relief of Belgium was torpedoed and fifteen lives were lost.

Although awaiting a day when American participation in the negotiations would be welcomed, the President pointed out that the American people, made up of many nations, were in an advantageous position to understand all nations. He recalled that they had already shown their disinterestedness in the administration of the affairs of other peoples. The President could have pointed to his policy in the Philippines, and perhaps he had his course in Mexico in mind, although he said nothing of either. "We do not want anything," he said, "that does not belong to us. Isn't a nation in that position free to serve other nations . . .?"

Aptly as the title "America first" fitted this address, it was in reality a call to a field of service wider than the boundaries of the United States. This call met with a generous response in the United States. The President was interpreted, quite generally, as coveting an opportunity for the United States to act as a mediator at the close of hostilities, but, even limited in such a way, the suggestion gave impetus to a sentiment that was in need of aid. No paragraph, perhaps, gave more heart to that segment of American opinion which was losing faith in the patient policy of the President than that in which he spoke of nations as men. He desired for America that "splendid courage of reserve moral force" which impels a nation to withhold its hand until the time when physical force alone would wipe out wrongdoing.

On the day following this address, April 21st, the

American government made reply to a communication from the German government dated April 4, 1915. In this communication the German government had impugned the good faith of the United States as a neutral, specifying the alleged submission to British infringement upon American rights, and had plainly asked for an embargo upon arms.¹ As the American reply stated, the position of the American government had already been made abundantly clear. (*Statement No. 34.*) But again the American government restated its refusal to alter well recognized practices in time of war. Nor did its note minimize, as did the German contention, the importance of making a record of protest against British invasions of American rights. This note, prepared by the President himself, concluded with these words: "This Government holds, as I believe Your Excellency is aware, and as it is constrained to hold in view of the present indisputable doctrines of accepted international law, that any change in its own laws of neutrality during the progress of a war, which would affect unequally the relations of the United States with the nations at war would be an unjustifiable departure from the principle of strict neutrality by which it has consistently sought to direct its actions, and I respectfully submit that none of the circumstances urged in Your Excellency's memorandum alters the principle involved. The placing of

¹ For text of memorandum see Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 1, p. 73.

an embargo on trade in arms at the present time would constitute such a change and be a direct violation of the neutrality of the United States."

The refusal by the American government to press the cases against Great Britain had the effect of favouring sea power in the European conflict. Had the American government proceeded against Great Britain with embargo or reprisal it would have resulted in distinct advantage to the German cause. The decision of the American government was natural, as it was an adherence to the rules. But it carried with it the inevitability as far as the United States was concerned of actual participation when Germany insisted upon its demands.

The note of April 21, 1915, closed the controversy with Germany as far as it related to the shipment of arms to the Allies. But any satisfaction that might have been felt in the United States over its conclusion was marred by the general dissatisfaction with the German methods of propaganda which had served to give the matter so bitter a character.

For nine months the administration had maintained the policy of neutrality indicated at the outbreak of the war in Europe.¹ From the outset this policy had embraced these elements: an insistence upon the supremacy of international law; a record of protest upon all matters

¹ Detailed treatment of the position of the American government upon the more important points may be found in editorial comment, *American Journal of International Law*, IX, 456-473. See also M. Smith, "American Diplomacy in the European War," *Political Science Quarterly*, XXXI, 481-484, 488-494.

involving the United States as a neutral; a refusal to interfere in disputes not concerning the United States directly as a neutral; a defence of American actions as sanctioned by international practice; proposals for a *modus vivendi* in an effort to increase the security of non-belligerents. The fact that such a course favoured the sea power of Great Britain had brought controversy with Germany in such a way as to indicate that Germany demanded of the United States an action that would result in favour to its cause. Consequently — aside from the routine matters of protest — the business of neutrality involved dealing with the German demands. A growing appreciation of this fact was revealed in the actions and words of the President after the rejection of the American proposal of February 20, 1915. Should Germany force the submarine issue it would bring to the American government the problem of adequate protection of the position of neutrals. The President was to seek this protection through diplomacy and to do so with marked success. That he had not placed entire faith in it as an ultimate solution was indicated by his utterances in April upon the need of international co-operation and the wisdom of a greater participation by the United States in affairs affecting the world as a whole.

CHAPTER IV

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

German Submarine Campaign — Policy of the Administration — Place of the United States in the World — Basis of American Protest — Attitude of the Government Toward Mexico — Pan-American Conference and Solution for Mexico — Championship of Integrity of Neutral Rights — German Propaganda in the United States — President's Position on Preparedness — Duties of the United States — International Peace.

EARLY in the conflict, as in former European wars, the Atlantic had seemed a barrier that separated the United States from the struggle. But as the war progressed the ocean seemed the highway that might lead to American participation. In attempting to make good the claim that changes in rules of the sea should be ratified by all nations President Wilson was following in the path long chosen by American diplomats, but to a greater degree than his predecessors he faced the necessity of making good the contention of neutrals in face of attack, not only upon property, but upon life itself. The United States had never in its history been quite able to ignore conflicts upon the sea. In the Great War it was the phase of the struggle that involved freedom of the sea that in time came to affect the vital interests of the United States.

Toward the close of April of 1915 it was apparent that

the German government was preparing to test the full value of the submarine for bringing into being the German conception of freedom of the seas.¹ The activity of German submarines in the "war zone" claimed increasing notice from the American public. On March 28, 1915, an American had been lost when a British steamer, the *Falaba*, had been sunk, and a month later an American vessel, the *Cushing*, had been shelled by an aeroplane. On May 1, 1915, an American steamer, the *Gulflight*, was sunk by a submarine and two American citizens were lost. Prior to this two American ships had been sunk by German mines. Moreover, the *William P. Frye*, also of American registry, had been captured and sunk by a German raider in the South Atlantic. These events and the increasingly aggressive character of propaganda in America had brought American excitement to a high pitch. German agencies had entered upon a campaign of intimidation, citing these attacks and threatening others, in an avowed effort to compel Americans and American shipping to keep out of the "war zone." On April 22, 1915, the German embassy at Washington was responsible for publication in the newspapers of a warning to Americans not to travel in British vessels.

When on May 7, 1915, the British liner *Lusitania* was sunk without warning and one hundred and twenty-four Americans were lost, the public mind was prepared for a crisis, and consequently for the administration the time of

¹ See C. P. Anderson, "Freedom of the Seas," *Annals of American Academy*, LXXII, 65. Also C. G. Fenwick, "The Freedom of the Seas," *American Political Science Review*, XI, 386.

greatest test had come. All precedent and the President's earlier words, not in his speeches, it is true, but in his dispatches, pointed to a break with Germany. Six days elapsed before a communication was sent to the German government. In the interim, three days after the sinking, the President addressed an audience of newly naturalized citizens at Philadelphia. (*Statement No. 35.*) What he said was scanned for a clue to his proposed action. The statement of basic principles that he had so often iterated from his entrance upon office was overlooked partly because the ideas were so familiar, but more perhaps because it was thought that the President would in some concrete way foreshadow a new treatment for this specific situation.

Two short paragraphs only could by any interpretation be regarded as an indication of what the President intended to do. He had led up to a call to America to set an example to a world rent with strife, and then suddenly astonished most of his countrymen by saying, "There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight." So astonished were they, and so obsessed with prevailing personifications of nations, that the sentence following was quite generally forgotten and its significance lost. Yet the second sentence contained the spirit of the President's policy since the outbreak of the war, and the spirit of his reply to Germany. He said, "There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right." By this the President meant that the United States was adhering to

international law and still maintained the position, often taken, that of reliance upon other means than trial by battle. This was not a new thought with the President. Indeed he had said to the Associated Press some weeks before: "My interest in the neutrality of the United States is not the petty desire to keep out of trouble. . . . I am interested in neutrality because there is something so much greater to do than fight. . . . There is a distinction waiting for this nation that no nation has ever yet got. That is the distinction of absolute self-control and self-mastery." (*Statement No. 33.*)

Because of recent events, particularly the continuance of German propaganda, lines of division based on national stocks had deepened, and the President took the opportunity to say to these recently naturalized citizens: "You cannot dedicate yourself to America unless you become in every respect and with every purpose of your will thorough Americans. You cannot become thorough Americans if you think of yourselves in groups. . . . A man who thinks himself as belonging to a particular national group in America has not yet become an American, and the man who goes among you to trade upon your nationality is no worthy son to live under the Stars and Stripes." But perhaps wishing to avoid too great an emphasis upon Americanism at this time, he went on, "My urgent advice to you would be not only always to think first of America, but always, also, to think first of humanity. . . . America was created to unite mankind. . . ."

The following day the cabinet considered the communication to be sent to Germany and on May 13, 1915, it was delivered to the German ambassador.¹ (*Statement No. 36.*) The series of attacks, including those upon the *Cushing* and the *Gullflight*, and culminating in that on the *Lusitania*, had been viewed by the government of the United States "with growing concern, distress and amazement." No abbreviation of the neutral rights of American shipmasters or American citizens could be permitted. But the basis for the American case was put on other than the grounds merely of the rights of American citizens, important though they were,—“The Government of the United States . . . desires to call the attention of the Imperial German Government with the utmost earnestness to the fact that the objection to their present method of attack against the trade of their enemies lies in the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and humanity, which all modern opinion regards as imperative. It is practically impossible for the officers of a submarine to visit a merchantman at sea and examine her papers and cargo. It is practically impossible for them to make a prize of her; and, if they can not put a prize crew on board of her, they can not sink her without leaving her crew and all on board of her to the mercy of the sea in her small boats.

¹ Two days after the sinking of the *Lusitania* the German government had presented a note dealing with treatment of neutral vessels in the "war zone," and the next day, May 10, 1915, a message of sympathy on loss of American lives.

. . . Manifestly submarines can not be used against merchantmen, as the last few weeks have shown, without an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity."

The United States was not here protesting so much against the injury or death of a citizen of a neutral state, a common incident of war, as it was protesting against the attack by a belligerent power upon all neutrals. As the invasion of Belgium was to Europe, so this German declaration was to the whole world,—a declaration that law was not binding, not the laws of property, but the laws of humanity. But the note closed with the statement that the United States government would not "omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens." The larger significance of this note was concisely stated in an editorial in the *American Journal of International Law*: "A mighty belligerent has thus been brought, so to speak, before the bar of humanity and civilization to answer a no less powerful neutral for alleged infractions of the laws governing their relations in the society of nations, of which they are both members."¹

An opportunity was afforded the President to speak more directly to his own countrymen four days later, May 17, 1915, when he spoke briefly on the occasion of a review of the Atlantic fleet. (*Statement No. 37.*) He felt that the people of the United States possessed an effi-

¹ *American Journal of International Law*, IX, 672.

cient navy, partly, as he said, "because that navy somehow is expected to express their character not within our own borders, where that character is understood, but outside our borders, where it is hoped we may occasionally touch others with some slight vision of what America stands for."

The President reverted to this later in the same address. America "asks nothing for herself except what she has a right to ask for humanity itself. We want no nation's property; we wish to question no nation's honour; we wish to stand selfishly in the way of the development of no nation; we want nothing that we cannot get by our own legitimate enterprise and by the inspiration of our own example." This might serve as a summary of the President's endeavour in the preceding two years. He felt, as he stated, that his policies embodied the spirit and purpose of the United States. ". . . The force of America is the force of moral principle, . . . there is not anything else that she loves, and . . . there is nothing else for which she will contend." In such a spirit Wilson carried on the controversy with Germany.

The German answer of May 28, 1915, was distinctly unsatisfactory.¹ On June 9, 1915, a second note was

¹ Note of May 28, 1915, should be carefully distinguished from German notes of May 9, 1915, and May 10, 1915. *Infra*, p. 75. Prior to the German note of May 28, 1915, in reply to the American note of May 13, 1915, the American steamer, *Nebraskan*, had on May 25, 1915, been attacked by a submarine. No lives had been lost. On June 1, 1915, the German government presented the American government reports upon the *Cushing* and the *Gulflight*. Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 2, p. 170.

sent. Secretary Bryan resigned on June 8, 1915. Instead of the treatment of the German issue indicated in this note, he desired to provide for an investigation by an international commission, and further that Americans be warned not to travel on vessels of the belligerent powers or on those carrying cargoes of ammunition. Mr. Bryan gave out two statements in explanation of his course of action.¹ It would seem from a fair reading of them that he felt that by the course of the United States in concluding treaties with twenty-eight nations providing for commissions of inquiry, the United States was morally bound to proceed in this matter as if such a treaty had been concluded with Germany.² Mr. Wilson apparently believed that he had not exhausted the preliminary stage of diplomatic negotiation, and he proved to be right.³

The President in this second note maintained: "The sinking of passenger ships involves principles of humanity which throw into the background any special circumstances of detail that may be thought to affect the cases, principles which lift it . . . out of the class of ordinary subjects of diplomatic discussion or international controversy. . . . The Government of the United States is contending for something much greater than mere rights of

¹ *New York Times*, June 9, 1915; June 11, 1915.

² For dispassionate editorial comment upon the significance of the service of Mr. Bryan as Secretary of State see *American Journal of International Law*, IX, 664-666.

³ Robert Lansing, who had served as Counsellor for the Department of State since April 1, 1914, was appointed Secretary of State June 23, 1915.

property or privileges of commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity, which every Government honors itself in respecting and which no Government is justified in resigning on behalf of those under its care and authority." (*Statement No. 39.*) Here was a moral principle for which the United States might be expected to fight if Germany persisted in its course.

Although the United States in this note asked for assurance that American ships and American lives should not continue to be jeopardized, the German government was slow in replying and its note of July 8, 1915, was unsatisfactory. A third American note on the *Lusitania* was sent on July 21, 1915. (*Statement No. 40.*) While based on the same general principles of the earlier notes its tone was sharper. Recurrence of such sinkings "when they affect American citizens" would be considered "deliberately unfriendly." Yet on August 19, 1915, the liner *Arabic* was sunk and two Americans were among those lost. A serious crisis was avoided by the immediate acknowledgment of responsibility by the German government. Moreover, on September 1, 1915, the importance of specific cases was overshadowed by the general pledge of the German government: "Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of noncombatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance."¹ Thus

¹ Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 3, p. 159. Notwithstanding this pledge the liner *Hes-*

the necessity that the United States should enter upon a war for a moral principle was avoided at this time.¹

MEXICO

Meanwhile events in Mexico continued to give the administration the utmost concern. There had been no apparent diminution in disorder and attacks upon American citizens were still frequent. The American government protested to various leaders at different times but except for one marked instance the protests were fruitless. Early in June President Wilson admonished the various factions to get together. (*Statement No. 38.*) Unless they should speedily settle their differences the government of the United States "must presently do what it has not hitherto done or felt at liberty to do, lend its active moral support to some man or group of men." This would be done for the purpose of "setting up a Government at Mexico City which the great powers of the world can recognize and deal with." This admonition was followed in July by a demand made upon the contending leaders that railway communication be reopened to permit shipment of food into Mexico City.

Although intervention on the part of the United States seemed near, it did not materialize. Instead, a Pan-American conference came into being to consider the mat-

perian was sunk on September 4, 1915, and one American citizen was lost.

¹ Specific cases were still in controversy. The *Arabic* case was dealt with in German notes of September 7, 1915, and October 5, 1915.

ter and in this way. The representatives at Washington of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Guatemala and Uruguay met with Secretary Lansing and after conference issued an appeal to the Mexican people and the Mexican leaders. (*Statement No. 41.*) It was specifically stated that the action was not to represent the will of the combined nations, but that each nation should proceed independently. As the suggestion for conference came from the American Secretary, so the spirit of the appeal was that of the American administration. It was an offer of "friendly and disinterested help."

To the proposal of a conference all leaders, except Carranza, agreed. Subsequent appeals by the conference in September and October brought no favourable response from him. Yet on October 9, 1915, the conference in bringing its session to a close agreed that the Carranza organization constituted a *de facto* government in Mexico, and recommended its recognition. The United States formally granted this recognition on October 19, 1915, following it the next day by an embargo on the shipment of arms to all anti-government parties in Mexico.

Thus terminated the struggle brought upon the United States by the refusal of the Wilson administration to recognize the personal government of Huerta. The administration had now recognized Carranza as constituting a *de facto* government in Mexico, and had come to this step with the aid and counsel of six other American powers. As the President had welcomed an opportunity to

prove his belief in mediation by the acceptance of the offer of the "A. B. C." powers in 1914, so in 1915, more than a year later, he took occasion to say of Pan-Americanism: "The moral is, that the states of America are not hostile rivals, but cooperating friends, and that their growing sense of community of interest, alike in matters political and alike in matters economic, is likely to give them a new significance . . . in the political history of the world. . . . It has none of the spirit of empire in it. It is the embodiment, the effectual embodiment, of the spirit of law and independence and liberty and mutual service." (*Statement No. 47.*)

GENERAL POLICY¹

In October Secretary Lansing again took up the long-standing controversy with Great Britain. On June 22, 1915, Great Britain had stated in reply to the earlier protests of the United States that there were no substantial losses to neutral shipping growing out of British Orders in Council. In a note of October 21, 1915, Secretary Lansing insisted that the British Orders in Council and the enforcement of them violated the basic principles laid

¹ Detailed treatment may be found in editorial comment, *American Journal of International Law*, IX, 666-694. See also M. Smith, "American Diplomacy in the European War," in *Political Science Quarterly*, XXXI, 481. In a special supplement published July, 1915, the *American Journal of International Law* presented the *Diplomatic Correspondence Between the United States and Belligerent Governments relating to Neutral Rights and Commerce*. It contains the documents cited elsewhere as *European War Series*, No. 1 (printed May 27, 1915) and some of those in *ibid.*, No. 2 (printed October 21, 1915).

down in international law. (*Statement No. 45.*) “The Government of the United States desires . . . to impress most earnestly upon His Majesty’s Government that it must insist that the relations between it and His Majesty’s Government be governed, not by a policy of expediency, but by those established rules of international conduct upon which Great Britain in the past has held the United States to account when the latter nation was a belligerent engaged in a struggle for national existence. It is of the highest importance to neutrals not only of the present day but of the future that the principles of international right be maintained unimpaired.

“This task of championing the integrity of neutral rights, which have received the sanction of the civilized world against the lawless conduct of belligerents arising out of the bitterness of the great conflict which is now wasting the countries of Europe, the United States unhesitatingly assumes, and to the accomplishment of that task it will devote its energies, exercising always that impartiality which from the outbreak of the war it has sought to exercise in its relations with the warring nations.” But this did not imply the necessity of waging war. It was filing protest and claiming the necessity of appealing to a greater power than that of a single belligerent.

The summer and fall were marked by a continuance in the United States of pro-German propaganda. The most striking event that bears upon the foreign policy of the administration was the request on September 8, 1915,

for the recall of Constantin Dumba, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador to the United States. This was based upon proof of instigation of strikes among workers in American industries.¹ In the closing months of the year the recall was demanded of Karl Boy-Ed and Franz von Papen, attachés of the German Embassy, for "improper activities in naval and military matters."

The events of the year had worked a profound change in the attitude of the President not toward participation in the war in Europe but upon the question of defence of American interests. In early October it became publicly known that the President was entirely convinced that the United States must take great strides toward preparation for this defence. He evidenced this most clearly in addressing the Civilian Advisory Board on October 6, 1915. (*Statement No. 43.*) That he conceived of the possibility of Germany as an active enemy of the United States was now evident. On October 11, 1915, he admitted that after all "neutrality" was a negative word. He no longer asserted that the United States could not pass upon the merits of the controversy in Europe; rather he felt that the United States had assessed the merits, but stood apart to maintain certain principles which were grounded in law and justice. The United States could not enter such a conflict except upon its own terms and for its own purposes. (*Statement No. 44.*)

On November 4, 1915, the President spoke at great

¹ See editorial comment in *American Journal of International Law*, IX, 935.

length before the Manhattan Club of New York City. (*Statement No. 46.*) "We are thinking now chiefly of our relations with the rest of the world, not our commercial relations — about those we have thought and planned always — but about our political relations, our duties as an individual and independent force in the world to ourselves, our neighbors, and the world itself." This is the second indication that the President was willing to contemplate an actual participation by the United States in a readjustment of international relations. His method of approach is familiar to those who have followed the narrative of his previous utterances upon Pan-American affairs. It was clear to him that American principles were well known. "It is not only to be free and prosperous ourselves, but also to be the friend and thoughtful partisan of those who are free or who desire freedom the world over. . . . We shall never in any circumstances seek to make an independent people subject to our dominion; because we believe, we passionately believe, in the right of every people to choose their own allegiance and be free of masters altogether."

The important subject of his address was the question of defence. Here was voiced by the President for the first time the distinct fear of interference with the development of the United States as a nation. Men were asking, said he, "how far we are prepared to maintain ourselves against any interference with our national action or development." Whatever augmented military power was obtained it was to be used for defence, not

only of citizens and territory but of the ideals of the American people. It was to be for "the constant and legitimate uses of times of international peace."

In the period from April to December of 1915 the President had carried to a successful issue his diplomatic controversy with Germany, as far as it related to the principles he was insisting upon. Specific cases were still in controversy, but against Germany as against Great Britain the record of protest was rigidly kept. Each successive utterance of the President revealed an increased emphasis upon the rights of neutrals and the need of international agreement and co-operation. From both groups of belligerents the administration asked an adherence to the rules of international law. Following the record of protest and the insistence that above all exigencies of war were the rights of humanity came the request to the American people that they provide an adequate means for making good the demands of the American government on behalf of all mankind.

CHAPTER V

PREPARATION FOR DEFENCE

Purposes of Preparedness — A New Pan-American Program — Remaining Dangers to Neutral Rights — Armed Merchantmen as Auxiliary Cruisers — President's Defence of American Rights — New Difficulties in Mexico — Germany's Pledged Word Violated — Hostilities Averted but the Problem Unsolved — League of Nations to Enforce Peace as the Solution.

THE Sixty-Fourth Congress, elected in November, 1914, with a Democratic majority but without any mandate respecting the foreign policy of the government, assembled for its first session on December 7, 1915. The President read his third annual message, and proposed officially what he had heretofore suggested unofficially, i.e., a program of immediate preparedness for national defence such as he had outlined in his address to the Manhattan Club. (*Statement No. 47.*) But true to his primary interest in the ends to be achieved, he felt that it was necessary again to make clear the aims of the United States toward which its augmented military power might be directed. The Great War, which had "altered the whole face of international affairs," had thrust upon the United States problems of more serious import than any since the Civil War.

With the grave possibilities of this fact for the future of his country in mind, the President attempted charac-

teristically to connect the program he was about to suggest with the traditional ideals and policy of the United States. Thus he began by pointing out that the Monroe Doctrine had been maintained in its full vigour not merely to protect the United States from the possibilities of interference with its own free development. Its purpose was also to afford the Latin American republics a like freedom. "From the first," he said, "we have made common cause with all partisans of liberty on this side the sea, and have deemed it as important that our neighbours should be free from all outside domination as that we ourselves should be; have set America aside as a whole for the uses of independent nations and political free-men." This conception of the Monroe Doctrine was concretely exemplified by the policy followed in Mexico since 1913.

But the President had a still wider horizon before him. Not only was the United States the friend of free national development in America, and its champion too; it was preparing to be its champion elsewhere. "We resent," he declared, "from whatever quarter it may come, the aggression we ourselves will not practise. . . . We do not confine our enthusiasm for individual liberty and free national development to the incidents and movements of affairs which affect only ourselves. We feel it wherever there is a people that tries to walk in these difficult paths of independence and right."

For its duties in maintaining such ideals as these the United States, in his opinion, could honourably and should

speedily arm itself. Regarding war "as a means of asserting the rights of a people against aggression," the United States "must be fitted to play the great rôle in the world," particularly in the western hemisphere, which its citizens "are qualified by principle and by chastened ambition to play."

PAN-AMERICAN PROGRAM

The President had emphasized in his message the increasing cordiality between North and South America. An opportunity was given again soon to further cement this good will when the second Pan-American Scientific Congress met in Washington. Proposals presented by Secretary Lansing to the South and Central American diplomats were the subject of an address by President Wilson on January 6, 1916. (*Statement No. 48.*) After speaking generally on the desirability of friendliness and co-operation among all the American states, he emphasized the chief features of the administration's Pan-American program. These were that the various states were (1) to unite in guaranteeing to each other absolute political independence and territorial integrity, and (2) to settle all disputes arising between them by investigation and arbitration. Admirable machinery would thus have been provided for the maintenance of the "rights of nations" declared by the American Institute of International Law at its first convention held early in January, 1916.¹ This declaration

¹ The American Institute of International Law was founded October 12, 1912, for the purpose of instructing and strengthening pub-

insisted upon the right of each state to protect itself, to develop itself without hindrance from other states, and to the equal respect of these rights by all other states.

The Pan-American policy of the administration was not only in line with these proposals of the leading American students of international relations, it was considerably in advance of it. While the Institute of International Law declared "rights" the Department of State was working for practical methods to give those rights actual substance. More than this, it was urging the adoption of concrete measures for keeping the peace in the western hemisphere. The American proposals included the arbitration of all boundary disputes and the prohibition of the shipment of arms and munitions to revolutionists. These two prolific causes of war in South and Central America would thus have been eliminated. This program has yielded thus far no positive results.¹

It might seem despite these declarations of principle that quite an opposite practice was being pursued by the Washington government. For at the same time that Secretary Lansing was making his proposals to South Amer-

lic opinion, in the western hemisphere, regarding the wisdom of international justice. It is made up of representatives from societies in each of the twenty-one American republics. For the text of its "Declaration of the Rights of Nations" see *American Journal of International Law*, X, 124.

¹ April 13, 1916, a congress of American republics meeting in Buenos Aires created the Pan-American International High Commission, the functions of which are to work for the establishment for the Pan-American nations of uniform laws, particularly respecting business. The headquarters of the Commission were established at Washington.

ica, the United States Senate had under consideration treaties with Haiti and Nicaragua, which apparently infringed on the sovereignty of these states. Under the treaty with Haiti ¹ the United States assumed a protectorate over that republic. The territorial integrity and political independence of Haiti were guaranteed by the United States which in turn took over control of its finances and police. Without specifically providing for it the treaty made it possible for the United States to assume complete direction of Haiti's foreign affairs should circumstances warrant it.

The much discussed treaty with Nicaragua was ratified by the Senate February 18, 1916, and by Nicaragua April 11th. It granted the United States an exclusive option on the Nicaragua canal route and a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca in return for \$3,000,000. This treaty differed from the proposals offered in 1913 ² in that it did not seek to establish a protectorate over Nicaragua.

¹ The treaty with Haiti was signed September 16, 1915, ratified by the Haitian Congress November 12, 1915, and by the United States Senate February 25, 1916. The events of 1914 and 1915 which led the United States to propose such a treaty are set forth very briefly in *The American Year Book* for 1914, p. 115; *ibid.*, for 1915, pp. 129-130. See also C. L. Jones, *Caribbean Interests of the United States*, ch. ix. For text of the treaty see *American Journal of International Law*, X, Supplement, 234.

² *Infra*, p. 6, n. A similar treaty had been signed June 6, 1911: Nicaragua ratified it, but the United States Senate did not. The treaty of February, 1913, was redrawn and submitted to the Senate July 20, 1913. In its final form it was submitted to the Senate August 12, 1913. See G. A. Finch, "The Treaty with Nicaragua Granting Canal and Other Rights to the United States," in *American Journal of International Law*, X, 344. For text of the treaty see *ibid.*, X, Supplement, 258.

Whether the Wilson administration in its relations with countries bordering on the Caribbean Sea was conducting itself consistently with the spirit of its own declarations remains to be discussed in a later chapter.¹ It can be pointed out here, however, that until the Lansing proposals were accepted, the obligations of the United States under the Monroe Doctrine and with respect to the Panama Canal sufficiently account for these two treaties. And the Lansing proposals are themselves ample evidence of the desire of the administration to meet these responsibilities in a manner in keeping with its avowed purpose to respect the sovereignty of even the smallest states.

THE ARMED MERCHANTMEN CONTROVERSY

Meanwhile matters of vastly greater public interest were making insistent demands on the attention of the Department of State. Communications received early in January, 1916, from the Imperial German government indicated that it intended to fulfil the hope raised by its promises of September 1, 1915, and to accede to the other demands of the United States respecting submarine warfare. True, the liner *Persia* had been sunk in the Mediterranean on December 30, 1915, and at least two American citizens had been lost. Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey all denied that their submarines were responsible for this loss, and indeed no evidence was found which could establish their responsibility. But, according to the memorandum delivered by the German

¹ *Infra*, ch. VI, p. 116.

ambassador to the Secretary of State, January 7, 1916, if a German submarine had by inadvertence unlawfully sunk the *Persia*, the necessary amends would have been made. This memorandum informed the United States that commanders of German submarines in the Mediterranean had been ordered to deal with enemy merchant vessels in that area as the rules of naval warfare required, and promised that disobedience of this order would be followed by punishment of the guilty officers and reparation for damages to American citizens. The *Persia* was specifically mentioned as a case in point, provided it were shown that it had been sunk by a German submarine. It is of course true, as earlier American protests had emphasized, that there is no adequate reparation for loss of life. However, this note is considerably more than a promise of reparation. It evidenced a purpose to recognize the rules of international law, at any rate in the Mediterranean Sea, and there is implied a disavowal in advance of any future unlawful acts of its naval officers.

Moreover, there was other proof of apparent acquiescence by Germany in American contentions. The German note on the case of the *William P. Frye*,¹ dated November 29, 1915, was made public on January 8, 1916. This note, after arranging for indemnity and for arbitration of disputed points, went on to pledge that, until the questions at issue were settled, "the German naval forces would sink only such American vessels as are loaded with

¹ *Infra*, p. 65.

absolute contraband, when the pre-conditions¹ provided by the Declaration of London are present." It was further admitted "that all possible care must be taken for the security of the crew and passengers. . . ."

Two days later, January 10, 1916, it was announced that the German ambassador at Washington had submitted to his government for approval a definite settlement of the *Lusitania* case.² This approval having been given, the settlement was offered the United States government as a reply to its note of July 21, 1915. Though indemnity was offered, the United States refused to accept the German proposal because there was no admission that the sinking of the *Lusitania* was illegal. Subsequently in supposed agreement with the desires of the United States the reply was altered, but it was not accepted.

It must be noted that Germany had not gone the whole length in meeting the American demands; there were to be limits to its observance of the rights of neutrals. The rules of international law were to be observed in the Mediterranean Sea presumably with respect to all shipping including that of the enemy. In other areas the rules

¹ These conditions are met if more than half the cargo of the neutral merchantman be contraband; if the cargo be destined to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or to the armed forces of the enemy; and if capturing and taking the neutral merchantman into a port for condemnation as a prize would involve dangers to the warship or to the success of the operation in which it is engaged at the time. See Articles 30, 40 and 49 of the Declaration of London, *American Journal of International Law*, III, Supplement, 179.

² *Infra*, p. 72.

were to be followed only in cases involving American merchant vessels or passenger liners whether of American or other registry including those of the belligerents. There still remained other contingencies to be dealt with, among them that involving armed merchantmen of the enemies of Germany.

Great Britain had been permitting, apparently from the early days of the war, the arming of its merchant vessels. This it was undoubtedly privileged to do, under the heretofore accepted principles of international law, where the purpose was the quite reasonable one of self-defence.¹ But this right Germany denied.² Furthermore, Germany had claimed that English armed merchantmen had taken the offensive against German submarines, thereby beyond question divesting themselves of peaceful character.³ It followed that if some such vessels had used their armaments offensively others might do so, and thus the German submarine, to be effective at all in destroying enemy commerce, must treat all enemy merchantmen as if they were public armed vessels instead of private. In such circumstances guarantees of life to crews and passengers

¹ See A. P. Higgins, "Armed Merchant Ships," in *American Journal of International Law*, VIII, 705; J. B. Scott, "Armed Merchant Ships," *ibid.*, X, 113.

² In a note to the United States dated March 1, 1915, the German government had conditioned a promise to restrict its use of submarines on the abstention by enemy merchantmen from using neutral flags and from arming themselves, declaring that the latter was contrary to international law. See Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 1, p. 60. The same view is expressed in a German note dated October 15, 1914, *ibid.*, No. 2, p. 45.

³ See the German note of September 4, 1915, *ibid.*, No. 3, p. 160.

disappeared entirely; and as American citizens had the right to travel on or take service in belligerent merchantmen with the expectation of safety of life, at least, some means had to be found of assuring that safety.

The government of the United States endeavoured to solve the problem raised by the arming of merchantmen and the development of the submarine by asking the belligerent powers to agree to a declaration of principles governing the conduct of both submarines and merchantmen.¹ On January 18, 1916, Secretary Lansing presented to the governments of the Entente Allies, informally and confidentially, a definite proposal for a declaration, the chief features of which were that merchant vessels were not to be armed and in turn were not to be attacked without warning, nor to be fired upon except in case of resistance or flight, nor to be sunk until their nationality were determined and their crews afforded a chance for safety. (*Statement No. 49.*) It need scarcely be pointed out that had these principles been adopted and adhered to the only really dangerous cause of future controversy between the United States and the warring powers would have been eliminated. Nearly all questions arising out of other causes could have been dealt with by arbitration. But since the proposal was in effect a request to the enemies of Germany to abandon a practice which, however inexpedient and dangerous, was admittedly lawful,² in return for

¹ This constitutes the administration's third attempt to induce the belligerents to agree on a method of conducting their naval warfare which would protect neutral rights. See *infra*, p. 44 and p. 56.

² The Department of State had issued on September 19, 1914, a

which Germany was to discontinue a method of warfare which was unquestionably unlawful, it was doubtless too much to expect that England and its allies could or would agree to it.

It is unfortunate that the administration here seemed to abandon the ground which it took in the first *Lusitania* note, May 13, 1915, i.e., that submarines could not possibly be used against commerce in accordance with practice sanctioned by international law.¹ It is more unfortunate that the proposal of January 18, 1916, had the appearance of being unneutral and of favouring Germany, especially in the unguarded suggestion contained in the last paragraph that the United States contemplated treating armed merchantmen as auxiliary cruisers. Nevertheless, it can be said in favour of the proposal as a whole that, like the two previous attempts to establish a *modus vivendi* for the belligerents, it was an endeavour to render neutral rights on the high seas as safe as was humanly possible. But if Secretary Lansing's confidential suggestion were made public, as it was on January 28, 1916, and if Germany were to seek to take advantage of it, as Germany later did, all the future dealing of the United States with that power was bound to become more difficult. It would be hard to convince Germany that the United States government did not mean what it said; yet, if

circular note in which it defined the status of armed merchant vessels, admitting their right to arm for defence without losing their peaceful character. Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 2, p. 43.

¹ *Infra*, Part III, Statement No. 36.

the United States did make good its threat to treat armed merchantmen as auxiliary cruisers it would be altering the rules in time of war. Since its whole case against both belligerents rested on its insistence that the rules could not be changed while the war was in progress, except by the acquiescence of all the nations concerned, it would have abandoned at one stroke all that it had so patiently worked for during the previous eighteen months.

Perhaps the realization of this and the consequent fear of an approaching crisis moved President Wilson to his next step. Whatever the motive, he was induced to go before the people near the end of January in furtherance of the request he had made in his message to Congress for military and naval preparedness. In a ten days' tour ending February 4, 1916, he addressed audiences in New York, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Milwaukee, Chicago, Topeka, Kansas City, Des Moines, St. Louis, and many smaller places. He became more emphatic as the tour progressed; the keynote was not struck until he reached Cleveland. (*Statement No. 50.*) "We are daily treading," he said, "amid the most intricate dangers, . . . dangers . . . not of our making . . . not under our control, . . . no man in the United States knows what a single week or a single day or a single hour may bring forth." He affirmed his deep consciousness of the "double obligation" laid upon him; he was to keep the nation out of war and he was "to keep the honor of the nation unstained." There might come a time when it would be impossible to do both of these things. He assured his fel-

low citizens that they could count upon his resolution to keep out of war, but where the actions of others might bring the nation could not be foretold. Thus he urged that the country support the government in adequate preparation for meeting whatever circumstances might arise.¹

That the preparedness program was well timed is evidenced by the fact that on February 10, 1916, Germany and Austria introduced a new danger into the situation by announcing that they would after February 29, 1916, regard as warships armed merchant vessels of their enemies and would deal with them accordingly.² In other words, submarine commanders would be instructed to sink without warning any such armed vessels, whether carrying passengers or not.

It has been supposed that in making this new move the Central Powers were relying on the suggestion of threat against Great Britain contained in the last paragraph of Secretary Lansing's proposal of January 18, 1916. But they had no ground for supposing that the United States would acquiesce in their decision to treat armed merchantmen as warships as long as the rules of warfare remained unchanged. Furthermore, if they really had been trying to act, as they professed, in a friendly manner toward the United States, the least that could have been expected

¹ These speeches were as widely discussed as any of President Wilson's utterances up to that time. They were indeed vigorous, but it is unfortunate that as played up by the newspapers, they were made to seem alarmist in the extreme. For an analysis of the significance of this speaking tour see R. Bean, "The President among the People," in *The World's Work*, XXI, 610.

² *Infra*, p. 88.

of them was that before adopting a new policy they wait until some answer to the Lansing proposals had been received from England and its allies. If the Entente Powers should have accepted the American proposals there would have been no reason for a change in German policy. The truth seems to be that Germany deliberately tried to embarrass the efforts of the United States to safeguard neutral rights, by making it impossible for its enemies to accept the modifications in international law which in turn would have made it possible for Germany, according to its own contention, to conduct its submarine campaign in a sufficiently lawful manner.¹ In any event, in view of the correspondence between the United States and Germany, the government of the latter country had no reason to expect that the Wilson administration would voluntarily consent either to an actual curtailment of the rights of neutrals or to a change in the laws of naval warfare until all interested nations had agreed to it.

Following the publication of the announcement of Germany and Austria occurred a remarkable debate in Congress, which, precipitated by some Republican members who criticized the President on the unwarranted assumption that he would acquiesce in the German program, finally revealed itself as an attack on the policy of the President from his own party on grounds of the opposite character. Resolutions introduced by Thomas P. Gore, of Oklahoma, in the Senate, and Jeff McLemore, of

¹ See the German notes of October 15, 1914, March 1 and September 4, 1915, referred to in the note on p. 88, *infra*.

Texas, in the House of Representatives, were designed to prohibit American citizens from travelling on armed merchantmen.¹ But the President did not believe that such resolutions should be adopted. He addressed to Senator Stone a letter, on February 24, 1916, which discovered to the surprised leaders of both parties how inaccurately they had gauged the President's temper and courage, as well as his conception of his duty in safeguarding the rights of citizens of the United States and in the maintenance of international obligations. (*Statement No. 51.*)

He reaffirmed his purpose to keep the United States out of war if possible. But for his part he could not "consent" ² to any abridgement of the rights of American citizens in any respect." "Once accept a single abatement of right," he went on to point out, "and many other humiliations would certainly follow, and the whole fine fabric of international law might crumble under our hands piece by piece. What we are contending for in this matter is the very essence of the things that have made America a sovereign nation. She can not yield them without conceding her own impotency as a nation and making virtual surrender of her independent position among the nations of the world." ³

¹ For the text of the Gore and McLemore resolutions see the *New York Times*, March 4, 1916. Secretary Bryan made proposals similar to these June 10, 1915; see *American Journal of International Law*, IX, 661.

² Note that there had been no "consent" to interference by Great Britain, notwithstanding the many allegations to that effect by critics of the administration.

³ The Gore and McLemore resolutions were defeated.

Of identical import was his address before the Grid-iron Club, Washington, February 26, 1916. (*Statement No. 52.*) He asserted that American policy must be based "upon a profound principle of human liberty and humanity," not upon expediency; that "America ought to keep out of this war . . . at the sacrifice of everything except this single thing upon which her character and history are founded, her sense of humanity and justice"; that "if she sacrifices that, she has ceased to be America"; that it was a mistake to suppose that it was in accord with the spirit of the American nation that it would "go about seeking safety at the expense of humanity." Plainly the President was preparing his countrymen for the arrival of the day when, having exhausted the resources of patience and tolerance and friendliness, they must resort to their might to dispose of a foe to humanity and justice.

MEXICO

While relations with Europe were thus in such a critical situation, events in Mexico which the President could not control were increasing the difficulties of the United States government in maintaining its policy. Some of the incidents on the border, like the massacre of a party of American mining men at Santa Ysabel, Chihuahua, on January 10, 1916, were of extremely grave character. Nevertheless, the Department of State contented itself with merely insisting to the Mexican government that

order must be maintained and satisfaction given for wrongs against American citizens.

But on March 8, 1916, a force of Mexicans led by General Villa attacked the town of Columbus, New Mexico, and killed seventeen persons. This invasion of American territory and the cold-blooded murder of American citizens led to drastic measures. On the day of the attack the President ordered Major-General Frederick Funston to prepare to pursue and, if possible, capture the Villa band. The punitive expedition, under the immediate command of Brigadier-General John J. Pershing, after a month in Mexico without accomplishing its object, began to encounter the opposition of the government of General Carranza, notwithstanding that he had on March 10th consented that American troops might pursue bandits in Mexican territory.¹

The administration was embarrassed in its patient efforts to deal with Carranza by the activities of citizens of the United States in spreading reports calculated to inflame public opinion on both sides of the boundary. The President attempted to meet this danger by issuing from the White House, March 25, 1916, a public statement in which, after reasserting the purpose of the Pershing expedition, he declared that "sinister and unscrupulous influences" were at work; that all along the border persons

¹ For accounts of these events see J. B. Scott: "The American-Mexican Joint Commission of 1916," in *American Journal of International Law*, X, 890; G. A. Finch, "Mexico and the United States," *ibid.*, XI, 399. The notes which passed between the Department of State and the Mexican Foreign Secretary are published in the *American Journal of International Law*, X, Supplement, 179-225.

were actively engaged in spreading sensational and disturbing rumours in order to increase friction between the United States and Mexico "for the purpose of bringing about intervention in the interest of certain American owners of Mexican properties." (*Statement No. 53.*) He served notice on such persons that their object could not be attained so long as a "sane and honourable" policy were followed by the United States government.

CONTROVERSY WITH GREAT BRITAIN

Coincident with the increase in Mexico of the suspicion and distrust which were to make the path of peace so hard a one in the next few months, the relations of the United States with the warring powers in Europe became laden with more dangers day by day. On March 24, 1916, the State Department announced the receipt of a note ¹ from the Entente Allies rejecting the Lansing proposals regarding armed merchantmen. The administration, accepting this decision as final, adopted a new method of dealing with the situation. In a memorandum dated March 25 (made public April 26) it announced its attitude toward the status of armed merchantmen, which was, briefly, that a merchant ship of a belligerent power armed for offence whose papers directed it to adopt offensive measures against enemy warships was to be regarded as having lost its character as a peaceful trading vessel and might be treated as a warship. (*Statement No. 54.*) But in

¹ For text of this reply see Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 3, p. 187.

order to justify sinking such a vessel the burden was on the enemy warship to discover conclusive evidence of the merchantman's aggressive purpose. This interpretation was the greatest concession the United States could make to Germany and still insist on adherence to the existing rules.

Another matter of dispute with the allied nations arose out of the practice, inaugurated in December, 1915, by England, of interfering with the mails between the United States and Holland and the Scandinavian states. This practice was also followed by France, and was justified by both governments on the ground that contraband rules were being violated through the agency of the parcel post. While examination of mails to determine whether they contain contraband is permissible, the means used by England were not sanctioned by principle or usage.¹ Vigorous protest by the Department of State on January 4, 1916, elicited a reply from the Allies dated April 3, 1916, which, while admitting the soundness of the American contention, offered a pragmatic justification and promised to respect the inviolability of "genuine correspondence." Nevertheless, the interference continued and eventually led to further exchange of notes, the administration adhering to the policy it had followed from the first, i.e., while demanding to the fullest extent its property rights,

¹ Removal of mails from the vessels in which they were carried, and seizure of neutral vessels to bring them into a belligerent port for the purpose of removing the mails and even of subjecting them to censorship constituted an unwarranted extension of belligerent privileges in this matter.

to record the American claims against the belligerents for invasion of such rights and to await the coming of peace for legal settlement of its claims.¹

CRISIS IN RELATIONS WITH GERMANY

Meanwhile relations with Germany were subjected to a new strain when the news came of the sinking by a submarine on March 24, 1916, of the unarmed French channel steamer *Sussex*, with the loss of lives of American citizens. The evidence² accumulated by the Department of State indicated beyond all doubt that Germany was again guilty of gross violation not only of the principles of international law but of its own promises made September 1, 1915.³ In these circumstances there was only one course to pursue.

President Wilson hinted that this new crisis was extremely serious in his address April 17, 1916, to the Daughters of the American Revolution in Washington. (*Statement No. 55.*) He was speaking of American traditions but had his immediate problem in mind when he said: "America will have forgotten her traditions whenever upon any occasion she fights merely for herself under such circumstances as will show that she has forgotten to

¹ The correspondence regarding interference with mails is published in Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 3, Part V.

² In reply to inquiry by the United States government Germany admitted the sinking without warning by one of its submarines, at the time and place indicated in the news item, of a vessel which it believed, however, was not the *Sussex*. See Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 3, p. 238.

³ *Infra*, p. 72.

fight for all mankind. And the only excuse that America can ever have for the assertion of her physical force is that she asserts it in behalf of the interests of humanity." He also felt the need of reminding the American people that it should not go to war out of mere selfishness in the assertion of its own rights as a nation. If there were to be war, as some were thinking and saying, it must be for a higher purpose,—a purpose bound up with the welfare of all mankind.

This attitude is maintained in the note dispatched to Germany April 19, 1916.¹ (*Statement No. 56.*) True, the rights and grievances of the United States are set forth with emphasis, and the impressive catalogue of unlawful acts on the part of German submarine commanders indicates that the case of the *Sussex* was not the cause of the final decision of the United States, but furnished the occasion for it.² The note recited that the government at

¹ The note is dated April 18, 1916, and was received in Berlin, April 20, 1916.

² From the date of the sinking of the *Persia* to April 18, 1916, the following cases of sinkings by German submarines which involved Americans are known: Norwegian bark, *Silius*, seven Americans aboard, sunk without warning March 9, 1916; Dutch liner *Tubantia*, several American passengers, sunk March 16, 1916; British steamer *Berwindvale*, four Americans aboard, sunk March 16, 1916; the *Sussex*, March 24, 1916; British steamer, *Englishman*, several Americans aboard, one reported lost, sunk March 24, 1916; British steamer *Manchester Engineer*, two Americans aboard, sunk without warning March 27, 1916; British steamer *Eagle Point*, one American aboard, sunk without warning March 29, 1916. Besides these the Italian steamer *Brindisi* was sunk by a mine, January 6, 1916; 242 lives lost, including one American. Other unwarranted sinkings not involving Americans were: British steamer *Clan MacFarlane*, December 30, 1915; British liner *Zent*, April 5, 1916; British liner *Chantala*, April 8, 1916; Spanish steamer *Santanderino*, April 10, 1916. Lives were lost in each of these four sinkings.

Washington had been indeed very patient; that its "sentiments of very genuine friendship for the people and Government of Germany" had led it to hope that the latter would "square its policy with the recognized principles of humanity as embodied in the law of nations"; that nevertheless the "inhumanity of submarine warfare" as conducted by German commanders had become more appalling; that it had become "painfully evident" that "the use of submarines for the destruction of an enemy's commerce, of necessity, because of the very character of the vessels employed and the very methods of attack which their employment of course involves, utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity, the long-established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals, and the sacred communities of non combatants";¹ that if the German government still purposed to conduct the war without regard to "the universally recognized dictates of humanity" there remained but one course open to the United States, namely, "to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether"; and that however reluctant the United States government was to contemplate this action it would feel constrained to take it "in behalf of humanity and the rights of neutral nations."

And when the President emphasized the grave dangers in the situation by laying the *Susser* note before a joint session of Congress on the same day, April 19, 1916, his address only repeated the sense of the note itself. (*State-*

¹ The government of the United States here resumed the position it took in its first *Lusitania* note. *Infra*, p. 72.

ment No. 57.) "We cannot forget," he said, "that we are in some sort and by the force of circumstances the responsible spokesmen of the rights of humanity, and that we cannot remain silent while those rights seem in process of being swept utterly away in the maelstrom of this terrible war. We owe it to a due regard for our own rights as a nation, to our sense of duty as a representative of the rights of neutrals the world over, and to a just conception of the rights of mankind to take this stand now with the utmost solemnity and firmness."

The tremendous importance of the *Sussex* case arises partly from the way in which it was handled. As an outrage against humanity and neutral rights it was vastly less in degree than the sinking of the *Lusitania*. Not only were fewer lives lost but the element of cold-blooded deliberation seems to have been lacking. However, the principles involved in the two cases were the same and the President of the United States took the same standpoint in addressing the German Government, i.e., the rights of humanity. But Germany had violated its pledged word, and therefore an ultimatum was delivered. If Germany should not accept the American view or, having accepted it, should fail again to fulfil its promises, there must necessarily follow the severance of diplomatic relations and the possibility of war. None of the *Lusitania* notes amounted to an ultimatum, and the United States was not as near to war in 1915 as it was a year later. But the statements official and otherwise made by the President and the Secretary of State in the *Lusitania* and

Sussex cases must be regarded as paving the road to the high ground on which President Wilson was to stand some day in the future when the United States would find itself actually faced with war. If he were to lead his country into the European conflict it would be for some cause immeasurably greater than the vindication of the rights of the United States and of its citizens.

Fortunately the German reply,¹ dated May 4, 1916, was capable of such interpretation as to be acceptable to the United States government. Later, May 8th, formal apology and reparation were offered. Germany, however, tried to condition its promise to conduct submarine warfare against merchant vessels according to the principles of international law on the cessation by Great Britain of alleged unlawful methods of warfare. At this time, as well as at other times, the German government took the position that a neutral nation, in order to vindicate its rights as a neutral and thus to prove its neutrality, must do more than simply protest against violation of its rights, and therefore that the United States, because it

¹ The German reply promised to "draw" the appropriate "consequences" if the German investigation of the *Sussex* case supported the American claim, and announced that no more merchant ships would be sunk "without warning and without saving human lives." It was expected that the United States would in return insist that Great Britain observe the rules of international law, and the German promise for the future was explicitly conditioned in the following words: "Should steps taken by the Government of the United States not attain the object it desires to have the laws of humanity followed by all belligerent nations, the German Government would then be facing a new situation, in which it must reserve itself complete liberty of action." See Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 3, pp. 302-306.

refused to use force or even retaliatory measures against Great Britain, was guilty of a breach of neutrality in spite of its protests. The German view was that failure to supplement the protests with more effective measures proved the acquiescence of the United States in the illegal interference with neutral commerce by Great Britain. The German foreign office did not seem able to grasp two very plain facts. On the one hand, without exception, every item in the controversy with Great Britain was of a justiciable nature; there was nothing in dispute that could not be arbitrated, and the United States was bound by its treaty with Great Britain to arbitrate such matters. On the other hand, whether the matters involved could be settled peaceably or not, the controversy between the United States and Great Britain and the one between the United States and the German Empire were two entirely different controversies, which not only could have been but should have been dealt with without reference to each other.

Another note was therefore necessary to make it plain that the United States held Germany singly, absolutely and unconditionally responsible for the acts of German naval officers. (*Statement No. 58.*) This was apparently accepted by Germany; at any rate, for a few months there seemed to be an abatement of the submarine campaign as it affected neutrals. Nevertheless, in the absence of formal assurance by Germany it was to be assumed that it still adhered to its position. The problem re-

remained an unsolved one, and as such was an ever present source of danger.¹

MEXICO

In the lull between this crisis in the relations with Germany and the next crisis in the relations with Mexico, the President talked before the National Press Club at Washington May 15, 1916. (*Statement No. 59.*) He again declared the necessity for the United States to keep out of war, but he again revealed his apprehension by emphasizing that "in foreign affairs the chief element is where action is going on in other quarters of the world and not where thought is going in the United States." He was still thinking, as were thousands of his countrymen, along the lines expressed in his "preparedness" speeches — the actions of other peoples might force the United States from the ways of peace.²

Unfriendly action from another people came next from across the southern boundary of the United States. There was an increase in the hostility of the Mexican people and government toward the maintenance of an American force in Mexico. Conferences between General Carranza's Minister of War Obregon and Generals Scott and Funston during late April and early May did not relieve the

¹ *Infra*, p. 126 for the renewal in October, 1916, of German submarine warfare.

² For a summary of the attitude of official Washington in the spring of 1916 see F. M. Davenport, "President Wilson's Foreign Policy," *Outlook*, CXIII, 142 (May 17, 1916).

tension, which approached the breaking point on May 22, 1916. On that day Carranza, in an exceedingly ill-tempered communication to the Department of State, characterized the punitive expedition as "an invasion without Mexico's consent, without its knowledge, and without the co-operation of its authorities," and demanded the immediate withdrawal of General Pershing's troops. The United States answer, dated June 20, 1916, declined to accede to Carranza's demand as long as the American forces in Mexico constituted "the only check upon further bandit outrages." At the same time the representatives at Washington of the Latin-American republics were advised of this action, and informed that should hostilities eventuate the object of the United States would be "not intervention in Mexican affairs . . . but the defence of American territory from further invasion by armed Mexicans."¹

Next day, June 21, 1916, at Carrizal an attack by Carranza's troops upon a detachment of United States cavalry resulted in the capture of some of the latter. This act and a bellicose note from Carranza June 24, 1916, elicited from the Secretary of State a demand (dated June 25, 1916) for the release of the prisoners and a definite statement as to the Mexican government's purposes. The prisoners were immediately released and on July 4, 1916, several governments of South and Central America as well as that of Spain having meanwhile offered mediation, Car-

¹ For the correspondence referred to in this and the succeeding paragraph see *American Journal of International Law*, X, Supplement, 179-225.

ranza proposed that the offer of mediation be accepted. The American reply was a suggestion for conferences to arrange for a settlement, which, having been accepted, a joint commission was decided upon July 28, 1916. Again a peaceful way out of the Mexican trouble was sought, and this in spite of the extremity of the situation and the vociferous demands in some parts of the United States for armed intervention.

PROGRAM OF THE PRESIDENT

During the latter part of May President Wilson delivered two addresses that revealed how far his thought had moved during the past year. Before the League to Enforce Peace, May 27, 1916, he advocated, for the first time in concrete terms and wholly without reserve, what he had hinted ever since the spring of 1915,—the permanent participation of the United States in world affairs. (*Statement No. 60.*) It came upon the country as a shock to find its president apparently abandoning the traditional policy of aloofness and isolation which had for its entire history characterized the attitude of the United States in international matters which did not concern its interests at home, in the western hemisphere, or in the Far East.

“We are participants,” President Wilson said, “whether we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also. . . . What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the affair of the nations of Europe and of Asia. . . . Henceforth

. . . there must be a common agreement for a common object, and . . . at the heart of that common object must lie the inviolable rights of peoples and mankind. . . . We believe these fundamental things: First, that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live. . . . Second, that the small states of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon. And, third, that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin in aggression and disregard of the rights of peoples and nations."

With this statement of aims the President went on to give expression to his belief regarding the means to attain them. He was convinced that there should be "an universal association of nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent any war begun either contrary to treaty covenant or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world,—a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence." And he ventured to assert, with full consciousness of his position as spokesman for his people as well as for his government, "that the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible association of nations formed in order to realize these objects and make them secure against violation." If the President were to be forced into a war, by the neces-

sity to defend the freedom of the seas, the great purpose to be achieved had at last become clear.

On Memorial Day, 1916, at Arlington National Cemetery, the President came back to the same theme in answer to criticism which had recalled with emphatic approval Washington's warning¹ against "entangling alliances." (*Statement No. 61.*) He said: "I shall never myself consent to an entangling alliance, but I would gladly assent to a disentangling alliance — an alliance which would disentangle the peoples of the world from those combinations in which they seek their own separate and private interests and unite the people of the world to preserve the peace of the world upon a basis of common right and justice. There is liberty there, not limitation. There is freedom, not entanglement. There is achievement of the highest things for which the United States has declared its principle." And he reaffirmed his belief "that the people of the United States were ready to become partners in any alliance of the nations that would guarantee public right above selfish aggression."

During these six months, December, 1915, to June, 1916, President Wilson advanced the first half of his preparedness program,— the military half, the strengthening of the army and navy of the United States. Doubtless he regarded other kinds of preparedness as of even greater

¹ Washington's advice had been used before in criticism of Wilson at the time of the "A. B. C." mediation in Mexico. *Infra*, p. 37.

importance, but he did something in behalf of an increase in American military power which he had done for no other of his policies,— he left his desk and appeared on the platform to emphasize this great need before the nation. Just how great the necessity was appeared when the administration faced the two most difficult crises in foreign relations it had yet met, one with Germany and one with Mexico. Both of these crises were settled by peaceful means before the year was out, but not without revealing the precariousness of the position of the United States in such a greatly disordered world. Perhaps it was the painful realization of the futility of the use of diplomacy not backed by force and the utter abhorrence of the use of naked military power alone to make secure national rights that induced the President to seek a new sanction for international law in a league of nations. In the beginning of the period, in December, he proposed to the states of the new world an association to eliminate the causes of strife among themselves by guaranteeing their mutual independence and integrity. At the end of the period in May he publicly advocated that the United States enter a confederation of the world to keep the peace of the world.

CHAPTER VI

FORMULATION OF THE ISSUE

New Conception of the Position of the United States in the World—Opportunities and Obstacles—Treatment of Mexico—Preparedness in the Caribbean—Redeeming Promises in the Philippines—Controlling Spirit of Wilson's Foreign Policy—America's Chance to Serve the World—Foundations of Peace and Forces Endangering it—The Ends for which the United States Will Fight—Need for Defining the Purposes of the Great War—An International Confederation for International Peace.

THE note which President Wilson struck with such certainty and emphasis in his League to Enforce Peace speech, continued to be the keynote of his public addresses during the remainder of the year. He let pass no opportunity to remind the people of the United States of the lofty principles for which the United States stood and its mission as the guardian of those principles, and to hint that in the discharge of this duty to mankind, a duty which other nations had abandoned, the United States ought to be ready to play a high part whenever it became necessary. Even in the purely political speeches delivered in the latter part of the campaign for the presidency, whether or not his main theme were foreign affairs, the President rarely failed to emphasize that the United States was intended to serve mankind and should

shape all its policy to that end. He was making his countrymen see the necessity they were under of taking a new view as to the place of the United States in the world.

In the address delivered June 13, 1916, to the cadets graduating from West Point all the lines of the President's thought respecting the foreign policy of the United States were brought to a focus. (*Statement No. 62.*) He spoke significantly of the prospects before these new officers of the United States army. Theirs was to be, perhaps, a service much different from the dull routine of life in a Western army post. Of course, the future of the world could not be foreseen, but whatever it should be the United States was to have a share in it. At the least, though it wanted nothing for itself "that it has to get by war," the United States was obliged to "see that its life is not interfered with by anybody else who wants something." That great free commonwealth compounded by all the peoples of the world out of their hopes for the future of mankind had to be prepared to make itself and its ideals safe, for it carries the "guiding lights of liberty and principle and justice" for the world. The United States was not only a spiritual partner with the other states of the western hemisphere; it stood ready to swing "into the field of action whenever liberty and independence and political integrity are threatened anywhere in the Western Hemisphere." But the United States would do more. The American people was ready, so the President thought, to join with the other nations of the world in see-

ing that the kind of justice it believed in prevailed everywhere in the world. A note of warning as to the future, a call to the service of high ideals, a pledging of the United States to play an unselfish part in the councils of a better ordered world — this was the message of the President to these young soldiers and to his fellow citizens as well.

MEXICO

The events in Mexico previously related,— the battle of Carrizal, the peremptory demands for the release of the American soldiers, the renewed negotiations for the settlement of difficulties,¹— occurred before President Wilson again had occasion to speak. The country was in no temper to listen to words of moderation, but the President, before the Associated Advertising Clubs, at Philadelphia on June 29, 1916, administered a rebuke to those who were advocating actual conquest in Mexico, when he asserted that “at whatever cost America should be just to other peoples and treat other peoples as she demands that they should treat her. She has a right to demand that they treat her with justice and respect, and she has a right to insist that they treat her in that fashion, but she cannot with dignity or self-respect insist upon that unless she is willing to act in the same fashion toward them.” (*Statement No. 63.*) And the President added, “That I am ready to fight for at any cost to myself.”

Doubtless he was keenly aware that it was costing him a great deal in current reputation to maintain this attitude

¹ *Infra*, p. 106.

toward Mexico, but he was even more emphatic when addressing the Press Club, at New York, the next day, June 30, 1916. (*Statement No. 64.*) He was of course fully cognizant of the duty of the government to defend the territory and people of the United States. "It goes without saying," he said, "that it is the duty of the administration to have constantly in mind with the utmost sensitiveness every point of national honor." But he was not convinced that it was the duty of the administration to intervene in the affairs of another people by force, for "force had never accomplished anything that was permanent." He pointed out that the permanent things are accomplished afterwards "when the opinion of mankind is brought to bear upon the issues." He knew that the easiest thing was to strike, but he thought that striking was no way to conserve the honour of the nation, no matter what else might thus be conserved.

It was after these speeches were delivered that events took a different turn in Mexico; General Carranza adopted a conciliatory attitude and a peaceful settlement of the controversy was made possible. The President had applied in this case the general principles which actuated him in other cases, and which he was to continue to emphasize at this time — principles of justice and fairness. On July 4, 1916, at the dedication of the new headquarters of the American Federation of Labour in Washington, while speaking of the necessity for "common counsel and common understanding" among the people of the United States in their own affairs, he reverted to the ideas in the

forefront of his thought. (*Statement No. 65.*) America is great on account of its ideals of freedom and justice; therefore he said, "no man ought to suffer injustice in America. No man ought in America to fail to see the dictates of humanity."

The next week at Detroit, when on July 10, 1916, he addressed the Salesmanship Congress in a speech which dealt mostly with the possibilities of American trade expansion, he could not help referring not only to the situation in Mexico but to the possibilities of the future of the world. (*Statement No. 66.*) He declared that it would have brought no good to have forced Mexico; that the way for the United States to serve itself and the rest of America in Mexico was to try to serve Mexico itself; that the sovereignty of Mexico must be respected; that there must be respect for the right of its people "to do anything they please with their own country and their own government"; that the United States must look well to the spirit in which it was to undertake new responsibilities in the world; that the United States must play a great part in the world whether it chooses it or not; that it must, for example, finance the world, and for it must have a broad vision and an understanding of the world.

THE CARIBBEAN POLICY

In July and August the Department of State was concerned chiefly in conducting the negotiations with Mexico,¹ and in keeping the record clear for a future settle-

¹ The commission provided for in June was appointed in August

ment of the account of the United States against Great Britain.¹ Since there was no change of policy involved in dealing with these matters nothing is gained by discussing them. Of true significance, however, was the further development of the administration's practice in its dealings with the countries bordering on the Caribbean Sea.

It is not clear that the attitude of the Wilson government toward those states had ever been greatly different from that of its predecessors, except with regard to Colombia, Venezuela, and some of the Central American states. The United States was under treaty obligations to maintain order in Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Panama; the administration could not be expected to neglect its duties even if it did not approve of these treaties. Indeed, during the entire summer and autumn of 1916 United States marines had been in occupancy of various parts of the Dominican Republic for the purpose of preserving order and protecting property.² Moreover, the treaty with Haiti is doubtless evidence that, whether the

and began its sessions September 6th. A protocol was signed November 24, providing for the withdrawal of American troops within 40 days after ratification. December 28th Carranza finally refused to accept the terms of the agreement.

¹ The particular grievances of the United States at this time were the extension of the doctrine of contraband, the "blacklisting" of American firms with which British subjects were forbidden to trade, the interference with the mails, and the misuse of censorship.

² On November 29, 1916, military occupation of the Dominican Republic was proclaimed by Captain Knapp of the United States Navy. Military government was established under control of United States officers and was maintained throughout the succeeding months.

administration approved of the previous American policy in that part of the world or not, it felt constrained to follow it.

That policy apparently comprehends three elements: (1) The Monroe Doctrine, as interpreted for a quarter of a century by preceding administrations, seemed to impose upon the United States the responsibility of compelling the small states of the western hemisphere at least to meet their international obligations. (2) The preponderance of American interest in the industry and trade of all the countries adjacent to the Caribbean Sea, seemed to require the United States to pay a great deal of attention to the maintenance of stable governments in those countries. (3) The obligations of the United States respecting the Panama Canal seemed to force it to forestall any possible chance of interference by other powers with its control of the canal. Apparently all three of these elements are present in the relations of the United States with Cuba, and in the case of the Haitian protectorate.¹

But neither the Monroe Doctrine, by any interpretation, nor the trade interests of the United States obliged it to buy the Danish West Indies.² The consummation of this transfer, after years of effort, may be regarded as a

¹ For a satisfactory discussion of this whole subject see C. L. Jones, *Caribbean Interests of the United States* (1916).

² The treaty with Denmark for the purchase of those islands was signed August 4, 1916, was ratified by the United States, September 7, 1916, and by Denmark, December 22, 1916. A plebiscite in Denmark on December 14, 1916, resulted in favour of the sale by a large majority. The text of this treaty is published in *American Journal of International Law*, XI, Supplement, 53.

step in the administration's preparedness program. The islands constitute an important link in the chain of defence for the Panama Canal. By taking them and by establishing a protectorate over Haiti the United States effectually removed from the great European powers the temptation to occupy the two best harbours in the Caribbean. Thus doubtless it saved itself future difficulties, and at the same time strengthened itself to deal with difficulties which might arise. These events considered in conjunction with the failure during 1916 to press the treaty with Colombia,¹ have been regarded in some quarters as proof that the Department of State under President Wilson had become convinced that the evolution begun with the Spanish War and continued with the building of the Panama Canal was inevitable.²

In still another field the administration seemed to some to be approaching more closely to the policy of its Republican predecessors. The Democratic platforms since 1904 had committed that party in favour of early independence of the Philippines under the same sort of guarantee which the United States maintains over Cuba. In prac-

¹ The treaty with Colombia, signed April 7, 1914, and ratified by Colombia June 9, 1914, offered full reparation for the secession of Panama. The text is published in the *Congressional Record*, LIII, appendix, pp. 443-445; and in the *Review of Reviews*, XLIX, 682. The treaty met with much opposition in the United States and was withdrawn in the Senate in April, 1917, pending the negotiation of a new treaty.

² See J. H. Latané, "The Effects of the Panama Canal on our Relations with Latin America," *Annals of the American Academy*, LIV, 84.

tice the party had contented itself with proposing a considerable extension of native participation in the government of the islands. The Jones bill, which had been before Congress since 1911, was approved by President Wilson and its passage urged by him in all three of his annual messages to Congress. On February 4, 1916, the Senate passed the bill with an amendment, introduced by Senator Clarke, of Arkansas, which proposed to grant independence to the Philippines within four years, their neutrality to be assured by international agreement, or failing this, the United States to guarantee independence. The President apparently approved the purpose of the Clarke amendment, but the House of Representatives did not, and the bill as finally passed retained the original expression of intent to grant independence to the Filipinos as soon as they were capable of self-government. The President, when he signed the bill August 29, 1916, declared it "a very satisfactory advance" in the policy of extending to the Philippine people "self-government and control of their own affairs," for, as he said, "it is only by such means that any people comes into contentment and into political capacity." ¹

¹ *American Year Book*, 1916, p. 10. The Act provides for the election by the Filipino electorate of the upper as well as of the lower house of the legislature, and while strengthening the position of the Governor-General, who remains an appointee of the president, divides his appointing power with the upper house. For comparison with the President's promises see *infra*, p. 19, and Part III, Statement No. 9.

DEFENCE OF POLICY

Woodrow Wilson's satisfaction with the entire foreign policy of his administration was emphatically expressed in his address September 2, 1916, accepting the nomination of the Democratic party for a second term in the presidency. (*Statement No. 67.*) There was no apologetic defence in the following words: "In foreign affairs we have been guided by principles clearly conceived and consistently lived up to. Perhaps they have not been fully comprehended because they have hitherto governed international affairs only in theory, not in practice. They are simple, obvious, easily stated, and fundamental to American ideals." The principles underlying the difference in the methods of dealing with England and Germany were stated with sharp distinction: ". . . Property rights can be vindicated by claims for damages, and no modern nation can decline to arbitrate such claims; but the fundamental rights of humanity cannot be. The loss of life is irreparable. Neither can direct violation of a nation's sovereignty await vindication in suits for damages. The nation that violates these essential rights must expect to be checked and called to account by direct challenge and resistance." As a candidate, Mr. Wilson invited the judgment on the record of any who wished "to know the truth about it."

With respect to Mexico he admitted that he doubtless had made mistakes in the "perplexing business," but they were not mistakes in "purpose or object." That purpose

was to respect the sovereignty of the Mexican people and assist them to achieve deliverance from misrule and from the control of their opportunities by foreign influences. He boldly met the criticism of his opponents in these words: "The Mexican people are entitled to attempt their liberty from such influences; and so long as I have anything to do with the action of our great Government I shall do everything in my power to prevent any one standing in their way." He replied to the charge that the presence of the Pershing expedition in Mexico violated these principles. United States troops had entered Mexican territory to vindicate a violation of its own sovereignty which Mexican authorities were powerless to prevent; but in so doing the United States had "committed there no single act of hostility or interference even with the sovereign authority of the Republic of Mexico herself." To those who condemned the policy of non-recognition of Huerta he repeated the declaration he made in the early days of his administration, in these words: "So long as the power of recognition rests with me the Government of the United States will refuse to extend the hand of welcome to any one who obtains power in a sister republic by treachery or violence."

He did not expect that the United States would be drawn into the European war; but in the days after the war the nation would face "great and exacting problems" which would require for their solution not only thought and courage and resourcefulness, but also "in some matters radical reconsiderations of policy." "No

nation," he declared, "can any longer remain neutral as against any wilful disturbance of the peace of the world. . . . The nations of the world must unite in joint guarantees that whatever is done to disturb the whole world's life must first be tested in the court of the whole world's opinion before it is attempted." In the building of these new foundations of world peace the President expected the United States to contribute the full force of its enthusiasm and authority as a nation generously and without too much thought of its separate interests.

AN INTERNATIONAL PURPOSE

During the next two months most of Mr. Wilson's public statements were campaign speeches,—many of them were frankly partisan in character. But the basis of principle lay underneath them all, and in asking for reelection he was careful to make clear at all times, as he did in the speech of acceptance, just what his attitude was to be regarding the place of the United States in world affairs. His address September 4, 1916, accepting for the nation the Lincoln Memorial at Hodgenville, Kentucky, was an exception—it was not a campaign speech and it did not concern the foreign policy of this country. (*Statement No. 68.*) But the President, unconsciously perhaps, gave expression even on that occasion to the thought that was uppermost in his mind throughout this period. The American democracy is to "lift a great light for the guidance of the nations," and the American people

must therefore "be in deed and in truth real democrats and servants of mankind."

This idea he brought out over and over again, and he touched upon it in all but a few of his political addresses whether he were dealing with foreign or domestic matters. In Baltimore on September 25th, before an audience composed largely of members of the Grain Dealers' National Association, he talked mostly of America's place in the world's commerce. (*Statement No. 69.*) But he pointed out that in this field as in the others the mission of America is to serve, not to conquer — or rather to conquer by service; the all-important matter was "releasing the intelligence of America for the service of mankind." On October 5th to the Omaha Commercial Club he said: "for the next decade . . . we have got to serve the world . . . in a way that will deserve the confidence of the world"; "American purposes are going to be tested by the purposes of mankind, and not by the purposes of national ambition." (*Statement No. 71.*) Late in the campaign, to an audience at Shadow Lawn, his vacation home, on November 4th, he declared it to be "an unprecedented thing in the world that any nation in determining its foreign relations should be unselfish," and that America should set "the great example"; for the destiny of America "is not divided from the destiny of the world; . . . her purpose is justice and love of mankind." (*Statement No. 78.*)

All through the campaign a great deal was said, as was

quite natural, in support of the President on the ground that "he has kept us out of war." Of course Mr. Wilson knew that his supporters were making this plea and doubtless he did not disapprove of this claim in his behalf, but it is significant that he scarcely mentioned it himself. For it is a striking fact that in asking as a candidate for the judgment of the voters on the record of his administration, President Wilson when dealing with domestic matters pointed to the results achieved, whereas, when dealing with foreign affairs he spoke emphatically and almost exclusively of the principles which guided his policy. He was determined that the United States should have peace, but he was well aware that, if his policy continued to be based on the principles he had laid down, his country might inevitably be drawn into war. True, in one of the few cases where he spoke of the United States being at peace, at Shadow Lawn, October 28th, he seems to count on its continuation. (*Statement No. 77.*) For, in his own words: "We have a peace founded upon the definite understanding that the United States, because it is powerful, self-possessed, because it has definite objects does not need to make a noise about them; because it knows that it can vindicate its right at any time, does not have to proclaim its right in terms of violent exaggeration. . . ."

Nevertheless, his speeches indicate plainly that he was apprehensive. During the latter part of the year the United States became involved anew in vexatious controversies with both belligerents, at first on account of the

attempt of Germany to use American ports as harbours of refuge for its naval prizes,¹ and later because of the presence in American waters of German submarines, both commercial² and military.³ The restrictions placed upon neutral commerce by the Entente Allies were daily becoming more irritating. And most appalling of all there was a recrudescence of the "terrorising" submarine campaign of the Central Powers.⁴ Vessels were being torpedoed

¹ The British steamer *Appam* captured by the German raider *Moewe* was brought into Newport News, February 1, 1916, under a prize crew. The German government claimed that under a treaty of 1799 its naval prizes had the right to remain indefinitely in American waters. A United States District Court, however, in awarding the *Appam* to its British owners, denied this claim. For discussion, see J. B. Scott, "The Case of the *Appam*," *American Journal of International Law*, X, 809; A. Burchard, "The Case of the *Appam* and the Law of Nations," *ibid.*, XI, 270; F. R. Coudert, "The *Appam* Case," *ibid.*, XI, 302.

² The German merchant submarine *Deutschland*, unarmed, visited the United States in July, 1916. The English contention that it was potentially a warship, and therefore not entitled to remain in a neutral port, is so weak as to scarce deserve notice.

³ The *U-53*, a German war submarine, entered the port of Newport, R. I., October 7, 1916, and after a few hours' stay departed. Operating 45 miles from the nearest American territory it sank six vessels. The Allies protested that these exploits were in violation of American neutrality. The United States government, however, decided that the *U-53* had adhered to the rules of international law.

⁴ The following sinkings involving Americans occurred after May 8, 1916, the date of the *Sussex* settlement: British steamer *Rovanmore*, two Americans and five Filipinos aboard, sunk without warning, October 26, 1916; British steamer *Marina*, six Americans lost, sunk without warning, October 28, 1916; American steamer *Lanao*, sunk October 28, 1916; British steamer *Arabia*, American passengers, sunk without warning, November 6, 1916; American steamer *Columbian*, sunk November 8, 1916; American steamer *Chemung*, sunk November 28, 1916; Italian steamer *Palermo*, Americans aboard, sunk December 4, 1916; British horse

without warning and, what made the matter the more exasperating, under circumstances which made it difficult to fix responsibility or to find legal ground to justify American action. In the face of the impending ruin of neutral rights the President may well have doubted that the United States could remain at peace much longer.

Toward the end of the campaign, feeling certain that his country would not shrink from war if war came, President Wilson exerted himself to formulate for the American people a purpose in waging war as high and noble as their own best conception of their national ideals. In this "critical juncture in the affairs of the world," he said at Shadow Lawn, October 7th, "the affairs of the world touch America very nearly. She does not stand apart. . . . There is nothing human that does not concern her." (*Statement No. 72.*) At Omaha, October 5th, in the very centre of the region in which the President's success in keeping the United States at peace was most emphasized, he declared: "We are holding off, not because we do not feel concerned, but because when we exert the force of this nation we want to know what we are exerting it for." No one could discern clearly what Europe was fighting for, but the force of America should always be held to fight "not merely for the rights of property or of national ambition, but for the rights of mankind." (*Statement No. 70.*) At Indianapolis, October 12th, he asserted that America should "not

transport *Russian*, seventeen Americans lost, sunk December 14, 1916.

stand for national aggression, but . . . for the just conceptions and bases of peace, for the competition of merit alone, and for the generous rivalry of liberty." (*Statement No. 73.*) And at Shadow Lawn, October 16th, he came to the same topic again. The United States by circumstances which it did not choose or control "has been thrust out into the great game of mankind, on the stage of the world itself . . . and no nation in the world must doubt that all her forces are gathered and organized in the interest of justice, righteousness, and humane government." (*Statement No. 75.*)

An emphatic and definite forecast of the future in respect to the part the United States was to play appeared in an address at Shadow Lawn, October 14th, when he said: "It has been said . . . that the people of the United States do not want to fight about anything. . . . But . . . they want to be sure that they are fighting for the things that will bring to the world justice and peace. Define the elements; let us know that we are not fighting for the prevalence of this nation over that, for the ambitions of this nation over that, for the ambitions of this group of nations as compared with the ambitions of that group of nations; let us once be convinced that we are called in to a great combination to fight for the rights of mankind, and America will unite her force and spill her blood for the great things which she has always believed in and followed. America is always willing to fight for things which are American." (*Statement No. 74.*)

He was no less emphatic and even more bold at Cin-

cinnati on October 26th. (*Statement No. 76.*) "This is the last war . . . of any kind that involves the world," he said, "that the United States can keep out of. . . . I believe the business of neutrality is over, not because I want it to be over but . . . war now has such a scale that the position of neutrals sooner or later becomes intolerable. . . . America must hereafter be ready as a member of the family of nations to exert her whole force, moral and physical, to the assertion of those rights throughout the round globe."

While thus preparing the minds of his countrymen to accept the possibility of war and putting before their minds the ideals for which they could honourably fight, President Wilson did not forget the concrete ends to be achieved. Whether the United States were drawn into the great European conflict or not, when that conflict was over the United States had a great duty to perform. "It will be the duty of America to join with the other nations of the world in some kind of league for the maintenance of peace," he said at Indianapolis, October 12th. (*Statement No. 73.*) The United States was saving itself in order that it might "unite in that final league of nations in which it shall be understood that there is no neutrality where any nation is doing wrong," was his assertion at Shadow Lawn, October 14th. (*Statement No. 74.*) "The nations of the world must get together and say, 'Nobody can hereafter be neutral as respects the disturbance of the world's peace for an object which the world's opinion can not sanction,' " he declared at Cincinnati, Oc-

tober 26th. (*Statement No. 76.*) Never again could the United States be "provincial and isolated and unconnected with the great forces of the world"; it was now "in the great drift of humanity which is to determine the politics of every country in the world." Such were his thoughts at the close of the campaign in a speech at Shadow Lawn, November 4th. (*Statement No. 78.*)

Thus during the summer and autumn did the President labour on the other and more important half of his preparedness program,—the preparation of the people of the United States to accept a new attitude toward their relations to the rest of the world. Standing on the firm basis of the principles enunciated during his whole administration from the refusal to recognize Huerta down to the *Susser* ultimatum, he dwelt continuously on the high ideals which should actuate a democracy and the great purposes it should serve. He boldly cut loose from the old policy of isolation from Europe and advocated a union of the nations of the world in league to keep the world at peace. He warned his countrymen that they might have to enter the Great War sooner or later, and his own words made clear to them the issues at stake in that war. By repeatedly emphasizing the obscurity of the origin of that war and of the purposes of the belligerents in it he foreshadowed the demand he was to make, on the 18th of December, of the warring nations that they state clearly, so that the opinion of mankind could judge, what their aims were.

CHAPTER VII

WAR TO INSURE PEACE

Position of President Wilson (December, 1916)—Interest of the United States in the Settlement of the European War—"Peace without Victory"—Bases of Durable Peace—Germany vs. Neutral Nations—American Decision—"Armed Neutrality"—German Proposals to Mexico—Effect of the Russian Revolution—United States Enters the War—Principles of the United States—Restatements of Purpose.

THE time had come for President Wilson to take the action which his previous utterances had foreshadowed and which impelling events now made so necessary. Inasmuch as the Central Powers had taken steps in early December to bring about a negotiation for peace in Europe,¹ it was essential, if the United States was to have a part in the readjustment at the close of hostilities, that the President present at once his plans for the basis of permanent peace and international co-operation.² Such a step was natural at this time, even if the Central Powers had not acted. Nor could it well have been taken earlier. With the recent verdict of the American electorate as an endorsement of his administration of foreign

¹ Text of the proposals of the Central Powers in *Current History*, (*New York Times*,) V, 588-590.

² Address of May 27, 1916, before the League to Enforce Peace was an unofficial utterance, as were subsequent speeches in which he had urged the same procedure.

affairs, the President was free to proceed, as he had not been during the presidential campaign and as he could not have been at this time had he been defeated and been preparing to turn over the government to a successor.

With the responsibility his own, President Wilson on December 18, 1916, asked the belligerents to state the terms upon which they would deem it possible to make peace. (*Statement No. 79.*) He was careful to say that he was not proposing peace nor even mediation. To have done so and succeeded in bringing about a conference might have defeated the very ends he sought. His interest was in the preliminaries that must precede a successful peace conference. He was not desirous of simply stopping the war, as he had been two years earlier. He and his country and the world had gone beyond that. He was asking the belligerents in the name of the neutral world to state their purposes, not in the general terms in which each group had indulged again and again, but definitely, so that the world might know them and that a comparison might be made of them.

The United States, affected vitally by the war, had to consider its future course if the war was to continue. Not only because of vital national interests was this true. Above them there was a greater question. The United States was interested in the settlement of the war in such a way that a stable peace was to be assured after the war. If the war was to continue for purely national aims, the possibility of a league of the nations at the close of hostilities grew increasingly remote.

It is a great mistake, then, to call this a peace note. It is not the statement of a possible mediator, as Wilson had been pictured in the early months of the war. It is the utterance of a statesman with an international vision taking the next step in the program outlined by him seven months earlier.¹ Speaking for the neutral world, President Wilson chose this moment to apply the test of purpose to the belligerent powers. Rather than a peace note, it was a declaration of purpose to participate in a conference to arrange for the safety of the world after peace had come, and an intention to discover by this means the real enemies of international co-operation.

Secretary Lansing in commenting upon the note made it even plainer that the United States felt the need of a statement of aims.² As the United States drew nearer to the verge of war this need was increasingly patent. Public opinion quite generally interpreted Mr. Lansing's statement to mean that the administration was contemplating a change in policy. In a second statement Mr. Lansing indicated that the administration had no intention of forsaking its policy of neutrality. But the President and the Secretary were thinking of the desirability of having the purposes of the belligerents clearly before the American people if, forced to participate, the United States were to choose to use its power to assist in the organization of league of nations. Moreover it

¹ *Infra*, Part III, Statement No. 60.

² Note was published December 21, 1916, and Secretary Lansing gave out two statements on that day. *New York Times*, December 22, 1916.

was true that irrespective of the desires of the United States it did come nearer the verge of war as the new year opened. For the controversy with Germany was not settled, and it had been postponed in such a way as to make certain the participation of the United States the moment Germany reopened it.¹

It was natural in view of the recent German overtures for peace that there should have been some thought that the President's action favoured the German cause. Such a view overlooked the President's previous acts and oft repeated statements of purpose, as well as the pending controversies between the two countries. However, the nature of the President's action became more clear when the German response of December 26, 1916, was found to be a general acceptance only and decidedly not a response in the spirit of the President's request.² On the other hand, the response of the Entente Allies, on January 10, 1917, in spite of the earlier manifestation of disapproval in England, was more detailed in statement of aim and purpose, and thus came much nearer meeting the President's request.³ Their definiteness, however, in conjunction with the rejection by the Entente of the German proposal of December 12, 1916, gave opportunity to the German government to declare that "the full responsibility for the continuation of bloodshed" rested upon its enemies.⁴

¹ *Infra*, p. 105.

² Text, *Current History* (New York Times) V, 783.

³ Text, *ibid.*, V, 783-785.

⁴ Text, *ibid.*, V, 789-790.

Great Britain, in a supplementary note of January 13, 1917, presented on January 17, 1917, stated in significant words its position upon the question of a durable peace. Three conditions were stipulated: causes of international unrest must be removed or weakened, aggressive aims of the governments of the Central Powers must fall into disrepute among their peoples, and some form of international sanction must be given to international law and treaty agreements.¹ Premier Lloyd George on January 11, 1917, in a public address predicted the formation of a league of peace.

The next step in the President's program was to reveal his reaction to the replies of the belligerents. This he did in an address to the Senate on January 22, 1917. (*Statement No. 80.*) From the attitude of the Entente he found reason to believe that a satisfactory conference was not impossible, for in their willingness to state their aims he saw progress toward the organization of a concert of power. The President was not ignorant of the storm of criticism that had come upon him in the Senate because of his suggestion in the note of December 18, 1916, that the United States have a part in an international agreement.² He was proceeding upon his way, yet he said in the address to the Senate, and his action in coming emphasized it, that he felt it due that body, associated as it was with him in the final determination of the international obligations of the United States, that he inform it of the

¹ Text, *ibid.*, V, 786-788.

² The Senate had finally endorsed the note, January 5, 1917, by a vote of 48-17. *Congressional Record*, LIV, 897.

convictions which had been taking shape in his mind. As President Wilson saw it, the United States had long been preparing for this opportunity. American purposes and principles pointed in no other direction. It was the right of the world to know definitely the conditions upon which the United States could join a league of nations. The President then proceeded to state those conditions. The conclusive proof that the plan foreshadowed by his note of December 18, 1916, was not a peace project is found in this elaboration of program.

The President suggested "peace without victory," for his interest was in the possible basis for an international concert of power which might be found in the terms on which the war was to be ended. "No covenant of co-operative peace that does not include the peoples of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe against war; and yet there is only one sort of peace that the peoples of America could join in guaranteeing." "Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe." Just as with reference to Mexico he had been concerned for the people rather than the government, so in Europe he wanted no victory over a people. Small nations were to find in the world after the war a protection that rested in the general acceptance of the principle that in rights all nations, large and small, are equal. Furthermore, governments in the stable world, of which the President was speaking, must "derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed." "Any peace that does not recognize and accept this principle will inevitably be upset."

But the war had raised more than the question of Belgium or Poland and their right to exist in Europe; the war had forced upon the whole world the primary question involved in the "freedom of the seas." From the outset in spite of the natural limitations of diplomatic notes the President had a freedom of the seas in mind that differed from the contention of either Germany or England.¹ Here now he stated it. "And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free, . . . the free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is an essential part of the process of peace and of development." An arrangement such as the President was outlining would remove for ever a misuse of the seas, and it would close also, and here the emphasis should be placed, the opportunity sought by Germany to force a way to freedom by denying the use of the sea to all peaceful peoples. The highway of the sea belonged to the whole world. The consent of the governed should here be the guide.

Mr. Wilson must have known that apart from the change that had to be accomplished in the minds of European statesmen before his program could in any measure be accepted, there was for him the need of bringing the American people to the support of such a program. Without change in the popular conception of American foreign policy all effort to establish the United States in an advantageous position prior to the conclusion of a peace would be vain. To conclude, then, he found in this

¹ *Infra*, p. 89.

proposal no break in the traditions or policy of the American people.¹ For he was asking merely, that no nation aggress upon another, that there be no entangling alliances, and that the "consent of the governed" be the guide in the rule of the sea.

The way in which the President proposed to use the power of the United States was to throw all its weight toward the formation of a concert of power. He so stated the case in this address of January 22, 1917, that, if his proposal of "peace without victory" failed of acceptance, that nation, or group of nations, which came nearest to his position upon the matter of a durable peace, could be supported by him openly and for greater than national reasons in the next crisis. Mr. Wilson's own comment upon this address is significant of his conception of leadership: "I have said what everybody has been longing for, but has thought impossible. Now it appears to be possible." ²

The next crisis Germany brought on and in a way to indicate that those in control in Germany had not the slightest appreciation of the strength of purpose of the American administration. Indeed the manner in which Germany forced the issue made it clear to those hitherto sceptical that the President's proposal of January 22,

¹ See J. H. Latané, "The Monroe Doctrine and the American Policy of Isolation in Relation to a Just and Durable Peace," in *Annals of American Academy*, LXXII, 100.

² Ex-President Taft stated in an interview that this address marked "an epoch in the history of our foreign policy." Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Bryan commented adversely, although each gave different reasons for so doing.

1917, was the last possible move of the United States, short of war itself, for participation in a conference of nations. As Germany saw fit to challenge the basic position of the United States, i.e., its insistence upon adherence to law, the United States had but one course open,—to wage war for an international ideal.

On January 31, 1917, the Imperial German government announced that on and after February 1st it would adopt a policy of sinking all ships met in the "barred sea zone." The justification for this move the German government found in the Entente rejection of the German proposal of December 12, 1916. All weapons on land, sea and air were to be used to force a decision. The President pointed out in his address to Congress on February 3, 1917 (*Statement No. 81*), that this was a repudiation of the promise made on May 4, 1916.

It was this repudiation that made a break with Germany inevitable at this point.¹ But the speech of the President on May 27, 1916, his note of December 18, 1916, and his address of January 22, 1917, all raised the matter high above the question of a break with the government of Germany. The time had come when a break meant that the United States was to throw its power against the disturbers of world peace. It was indeed a time to talk of rights of humanity and the welfare of mankind. To Woodrow Wilson do the people of the United States owe the fact that when diplomatic relations were broken on the 3rd

¹ Because of the American ultimatum of April 18, 1916. See editorial comment, *American Journal of International Law*, XI, 380. Also, *infra*, p. 102.

of February, they were broken for the purpose of advancing an international cause. The President did not ask Congress to declare war, but stated that he should take no further steps toward war until overt acts of the German government forced him to do so. It was not that he really doubted the determined purpose of the German government but that he had another step to take in the particular course that he was following.

On the next day, February 4, 1917, the Department of State asked neutrals to join with the United States in taking a position in conformity with the President's address of January 22, 1917. The German order that led to the rupture of diplomatic relations with the United States was not directed particularly or only at the United States. Consequently President Wilson urged a wider basis for the action of the United States. The statement included a definite reference to the address of January 22, 1917, as a guide and stated that a unity of action upon the part of all neutrals would make for progress toward peace for the world.¹

The President was proceeding on a way habitual with him. He had moved forward one more step in his program of January 22, 1917. He now proposed to wait until the American people had not only endorsed it with enthusiasm, as they did, but until they comprehended its implication and enabled him to make the next move safely and as a ruler in a democracy should.²

¹ For a summary of action of neutrals, see the *World Court*, III, 154-163; 234-237.

² The American government in answer to a memorandum pre-

As the German submarine campaign proceeded it became evident that overt acts compelled action.¹ But, instead of asking for a declaration of war, the President on February 26, 1917, a week before the adjournment of Congress, asked that authority be granted him to arm ships for entrance into the barred sea zone. (*Statement No. 82.*) He wished to protect as completely as possible the rights of the citizens of the United States on the high seas without having to resort to war. It may be pointed out also that the action proposed would have sharply distinguished the case of an American in the war zone upon an unarmed merchant vessel from that of an American in the war zone under protecting American guns; and would thus have served to emphasize the character of German warfare as an attack on the sovereignty of neutral states as well as a violation of the rights of their citizens. The break in diplomatic relations having failed, as had earlier forms of protest, to impress the German government with the seriousness of the purpose of the United States, there was but one course open to the President, if his government was to continue, as the most powerful of neutrals, to lead in the defence of the rights of neutral nations, and that was to use some form of force

sent by the Swiss minister at the request of the German government declined on February 11, 1917, to negotiate unless the decree of January 31, 1917, was first withdrawn.

¹In February these reports were undisputed: February 3, 1917, American steamship *Housatonic* sunk by submarine; February 13, 1917, American schooner *Lyman M. Law* torpedoed in the Mediterranean; February 24, 1917, *Laconia*, Cunard liner, sunk without warning, two Americans lost.

against the aggressions of a belligerent. And the President was careful to emphasize that he was moving for more than purely national defence. Said he: "I am thinking, not only of the rights of Americans to go and come about their proper business by way of the sea, but also of something much deeper, much more fundamental than that. I am thinking of those rights of humanity without which there is no civilization." His request was not granted because of determined opposition in the Senate.¹ Notwithstanding this fact, authorization to arm ships was given to American shipmasters by presidential proclamation on March 12, 1917.

In the midst of this exciting controversy as to the wisdom of the course pursued by the administration it became known on February 28, 1917, through the publication of a letter of the German Foreign Secretary Zimmermann to the German minister at Mexico City, that on January 19, 1917, a proposal was made by Germany for an alliance with Mexico with the definite end that, in the event that the United States ceased to be a neutral, Mexico with the financial support of Germany should make war upon the United States. It was further suggested that Mexico offer to mediate between Japan and Germany to the end that Japan might enter into alliance with Mex-

¹ The House had voted this power, 403 to 14. *Congressional Record*, LIV, 4692. A majority of the Senate were prevented from like action by the opposition of eleven members who were able under rules of the Senate to prevent a decisive vote. The statement of seventy-five members of the Senate may be found in the *Congressional Record*, LIV, 4988.

ico and Germany.¹ The publication of this letter created a tremendous sensation, although the preceding months of pro-German propaganda had prepared the people of the United States for this revelation of the purpose and plans of the German government.

In his second inaugural address on March 5, 1917, President Wilson affirmed his adherence to armed neutrality, but intimated that a more active assertion of power might soon be necessary. "We are provincials no longer," said he. Yet the people of the United States were to be no less Americans in the coming days "if we but remain true to the principles in which we have been bred." He again restated the things that the United States stood for, whether in war or in peace. (*Statement No. 83.*)

On March 9, 1917, the President issued a proclamation calling the new Congress in extra session. In the interval prior to its convening events in Russia took general attention from all other developments, in America or upon the sea. A revolution in Russia resulted in the abdication of the Czar and the establishment of a provisional government. The new government of Russia was formally recognized by the United States on March 22, 1917.² The

¹ The Department of States testified to the authenticity of the published note on March 1, 1917, and on March 3, 1917, Secretary Zimmermann acknowledged that it was genuine. It should be noted that on February 5, 1917, the last detachment of American troops had withdrawn from Mexico and on March 3, 1917, the new American ambassador, H. P. Fletcher, had presented his credentials at Mexico City.

² The United States was the first nation to recognize the new government. *American Journal of International Law*, XI, 419.

overthrow of autocratic government was to work a profound change in the attitude of many Americans toward the cause of the Entente Allies. It was apparent at once in the increased emphasis laid upon the existence of an autocratic government in Germany and its part in forcing war upon the world.¹

Early in April the President was prepared to indicate the necessity of declaring war upon Germany. To the Congress on April 2, 1917, he recounted the recent German acts in detail. (*Statement No. 84.*) "International law had its origin in the attempt to set up some law which would be respected and observed upon the seas, where no nation had right of dominion, and where lay the free highways of the world. By painful stage after stage has that law been built up with meagre enough results, indeed, after all was accomplished that could be accomplished, but always with a clear view, at least, of what the heart and conscience of mankind demanded." But said the President, "The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind. It is a war against all nations." Armed neutrality was not sufficient in such a crisis. "I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States."²

¹ In the month of March five American vessels had been sunk without warning and at least twenty American citizens lost.

² For careful comment see J. B. Scott, "The United States at War with the Imperial German Government," *American Journal of International Law*, XI, 617. Citation of causes as they appeared to Congress are here given in convenient form. See also Report of Com-

After pointing out the practical steps for participation that must be taken, the President returned to the theme of purpose. He reiterated his proposals of January 22, 1917. "Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles." Having such an aim, peace among free peoples, the President could logically point out that against the German people there was no grievance. The purpose of the United States was to help thwart the aims of a government that declared an autocratic purpose, and it was sound to assert that such a government could be dissociated from a people who had no control over the actions of that government.

"We shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts"—for democracy, for self-government, for the rights of small nations, for a concert of free peoples, for a world peace. Thus the President could justly say that, as he had formed the purpose of the nation, it was a warfare for mankind and for the peace of the world. On April 16, 1917, in an address to the American people (*Statement No. 85*) the President asked of them that they "speak, act and serve together" for the high purposes outlined in the address of January 22, 1917, and in the message to Congress on April 2, 1917.

mittee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, *Congressional Record (Daily)*, LV, 191 (April 5, 1917).

So high an ideal inevitably encountered the charge that it was not sincere, that the language of the President was but a cloak to an ambition he dare not aver; in short, that he was as leaders of other nations were, in the war for national ends. The record of acts as well as words of the President gives this its answer. On May 22, 1917, the President felt called upon to denounce efforts to weaken preparation by questioning purpose, when in a letter to Representative Heflin, he said: "We have entered the war for our own reasons and with our own objects clearly stated and shall forget neither the reasons nor the objects." (*Statement No. 86.*)

In addressing an audience at Arlington National Cemetery on Memorial Day the President showed the turn his thought had taken when he called for action, not words. (*Statement No. 87.*) The time had come to show that American principles were living principles. Inasmuch as these principles had been attacked as idealistic throughout his administration, the President doubtless felt the greater need for rapid action.

On June 9, 1917, the President in a communication to the new government of Russia again reverted to the mistaken and misleading statements as to the objects of the United States in entering the war. (*Statement No. 88.*) In the hope of the cordial co-operation of the peoples of Russia and the United States he stated the objects once more. Of his own country the President said in unmistakable terms: "She seeks no material profit or aggrandizement of any kind. She is fighting for no advantage

or selfish object of her own, but for the liberation of peoples everywhere from the aggressions of autocratic force. . . . We are fighting for the liberty, the self-government, and undictated development of all peoples, and every feature of the settlement that concludes this war must be conceived and executed for that purpose. . . . But they must follow a principle, and that principle is plain. No people must be forced under sovereignty under which it does not wish to live." Again the President called for a practical treatment of practical questions. "We ought not," said he, "to consider remedies merely because they have a pleasing and sonorous sound."

On Flag Day, June 14, 1917, he took occasion to answer the general query, "Why was the United States about to send an army to Europe?" His answer was found in the new purpose, as that had been formed in a new conception of American duty, not only to her own future, but to that of the world at large. The President's own conception had grown sharper and clearer. "The military masters of Germany denied us the right to be neutral." (*Statement No. 89.*) Undeniably such words could have been used by a man forcing a war, and endeavouring to delude his people and the world as to his real purpose. But the answer to any such charge may be found in the record of his administration. As the choice of peoples had had no part in launching the European war, it was natural to say that the American war was not upon the German people. The war upon which the United States had entered was a war on

behalf of "peoples," a war for freedom and justice and self-government for all the nations of the world. This statement was emphasized by the pledge given to the Belgian War Mission on June 18, 1917, that Belgium at the close of the war should be restored "to the place she has so richly won among the self-respecting and respected nations of the earth."

Confusion has often been confessed by commentators in discussing the entrance of the United States into the war. They express difficulty in reconciling the address of January 22, 1917, with the subsequent acts of the President. This arises primarily out of a lack of knowledge of the steps which led up to the address of January 22, 1917, particularly the note of December 18, 1916, and the address of May 27, 1916. A careful reading of the President's statements, particularly after April 19, 1915, in accompaniment with a record of German acts, should make this confusion disappear. There are Americans who see either only the national issue or only the international cause. It is of vital importance to clear thinking that these aims be not dissociated.¹

Secretary Lansing doubtless had this in mind when on July 29, 1917, he said: "The immediate cause of our war with Germany — the breaking of her promises as to indiscriminate submarine warfare — has a far deeper meaning, a meaning which has been growing more evident as the war progresses and which needed but this act of

¹ See a brilliant exposition of President Wilson's course by W. Lippmann, "The World Conflict in its Relation to American Democracy," *Annals of American Academy*, LXXII, 1.

perfidy to bring it home to all thinking Americans. . . . We know now that that government is inspired with ambitions which menace human liberty; and that to gain its end, it does not hesitate to break faith, to violate the most sacred rights, or to perpetrate intolerable acts of inhumanity."

This deeper purpose of the course against the German government, not the mere desire for a crushing victory over German arms, again actuated the President in his reply to the Pope on August 27, 1917. "We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting." (*Statement No. 90.*)

CHAPTER VIII

LEADERSHIP OF WOODROW WILSON

Components of Foreign Policy — Fundamental Principles of Mr. Wilson — Conditions Affecting Practice — Importance of Public Opinion — Sincerity of the President — Application of Principles — Faith in Democracy — Equality of Nations — Fair Dealing between Nations — Supremacy of Law — War for Humanity — Importance of Consistency — Bases for Judgment — Position of the United States in 1917.

It is now possible to state definitely the several elements of which President Wilson's foreign policy was compounded. There were in the first place the fundamental beliefs of the man himself — the unshakable convictions which had become his after years of study of the efforts of the peoples of the world to govern themselves. The primary and basic principle was a faith in democracy, both as an ideal and as a practice. Upon the soundness of the democratic principle he rested all his other beliefs.

Because he believed in democracy he believed that every nation should regard every other nation as its equal; that fair dealing was the best means of preserving friendship and peace between nations; that the guidance of established law was essential to international justice and fair dealing; and that, if unhappily disputes should arise between nations, the proper means for settling them was a reasoned consideration before a court of arbitration of the

controversies in the light of the law. Finally, he believed not that force should never be used by nations against each other, but that it should be relied upon only to combat criminal aggression and to further great humanitarian purposes.

Principles alone, however, did not make the Wilson foreign policy. His beliefs and his own actions based thereon the President could control; there were also external modifying circumstances for the most part outside of his direction. Chief of these were obviously the events in international relations having their origin in other governments or nations,—events which could not possibly be foreseen or controlled by the President, and which thus constituted the chief danger to the successful application of principles. Only slightly less difficult to control were the acts and speeches of United States officers at home and abroad and the activities of the governments of the various members of the American union. There were, moreover, the constitution and laws of his country, the treaties, the obligations incurred by previous administrations, and the accepted rules of international law,—in brief the whole body of public law which set the boundaries to the exercise of power by the President.

There was still another element conditioning the direction of foreign affairs by President Wilson. That was the public opinion of the nation, with its almost imperceptible and sometimes incomprehensible shifts. It was true of course that, in the performance of duties imposed upon him by the Constitution, the chief executive of the United

States might by the direction of diplomacy and otherwise have brought his country to a pass where it was dangerous to go forward and dishonourable to withdraw,—all without reference to the attitude of the public mind. But President Wilson's faith in democracy was too deep to permit the exclusion of foreign affairs from as much popular control as was possible. When he moved he wished to move in accord with the desires of the people, and he was quick to realize what moves in international relations the people would approve. He was not unmindful, however, of the unrivalled opportunity for great leadership which the presidency offered its incumbent, and he did not neglect this opportunity. His speeches and even his formal state papers, his messages and proclamations, seem to have been directed toward informing and moulding public opinion.

A careful and unbiased study of the record of President Wilson reveals convincingly the sincerity with which he held the principles he affirmed. It was not mere facility of expression which made it possible for him to restate in so many ways and with such telling effect the time-honoured ideals of a great democratic people. No charlatan of politics, however facile, however adroit, could have maintained his hold upon public opinion through four such trying years. The profound convictions of a scientist as to the fundamentals of political philosophy, wrought into his thinking in the years when there was no thought of his entering public life, were the guides President Wilson followed as leader and servant of his people.

It is important to know that President Wilson sincerely believed in what he professed to believe. But the true significance attaches to his rigid adherence to his beliefs in practice. Others have held the same principles, and quite as sincerely. If they have rarely applied them as practical guides in foreign relations it is because there was lacking either the intellectual ability to perceive the necessity for so applying them or the moral courage to follow the difficult road that must be travelled in so applying them. It remains to be shown how President Wilson consistently and faithfully lived up to his professions at a time when the opportunity for service was so great and failure to serve would have been so disastrous.

His faith in the democratic principle led him habitually to submit his foreign policy to the test of public opinion in the United States; if public opinion did not support him, his policy must be modified or the public mind educated; and his way of educating public opinion was to announce a general policy and allow it to be discussed among the people. His belief in democracy impelled him to insist on granting to the Filipino people a greater measure of self-government and to promise them a still wider participation as they learned to use their new powers. It impelled him likewise to leave the Mexican people free as far as possible to work out their own solution — as the European nations had for centuries been doing — of their own problems. And finally it impelled him to make that important distinction between the German people and the German Imperial government on which he

based his declaration that German guarantees of peace could be accepted only when supported by the unmistakable will of the German people.

His belief in the equality of nations led him to feel as much pride in the fact that the first of the "Bryan peace treaties" to be ratified was with Salvador, as he would have felt had it been with Great Britain. It inevitably impelled him to refuse to permit the United States to assume such responsibilities toward its own citizens that it must incur the risk of interfering with the political life of another people; better it was that the less advanced peoples of the world should do without the help of America than that the United States in order to give its aid should seem to take a mortgage on their future independence and integrity.

His reliance on justice and fair dealing between nations moved him to be scrupulously punctilious in the observance of treaty obligations, as when he insisted upon the repeal of the tolls exemption clause of the Panama Canal Act. It led him, even in the absence of treaties and when the right of the United States was unquestioned, to deal with other nations according to principles of equity, as, for example, in trying to meet the complaint of the Japanese against the laws of California and of the United States. It obliged him while professing friendship for a nation to actually act toward it in a friendly manner; it was impossible for him while trying to conduct the case of the United States against Germany in 1915 by diplomatic means to have been all the time preparing and strength-

ening and mobilizing the military and naval power of the United States.

His adherence to established law led him to insist that the "orderly processes" of constitutional method be followed in changing administrations in the states of the new world; appearance of intrigue and assassination in the elevation of Huerta to the presidency of Mexico could not be condoned by recognition of him. The same principle obliged him to insist on the strict observance by all belligerents in the Great War of the rights of neutrals under the sacred agreements and customs of international law, and that those rules should not be altered in any respect by any one belligerent nor to the detriment of neutral rights by all the belligerents.

His conviction that arbitration was the most desirable means of composing international disagreements led his administration not only to renew the arbitration treaties concluded by previous administrations, but to take a step forward by negotiating a series of treaties providing for "commissions of inquiry." It led him, and would have done so had there been no agreement to arbitrate, to defer the settlement of disputes with Great Britain until after the war when matters at issue could be decided on a basis of justice. It impelled him to propose mediation between the warring powers of Europe and to accept without hesitation the mediation of Latin America in the dispute with Mexico.

Finally, his belief that war should not be resorted to until other means of resolving difference between nations

had been exhausted, and then only for purposes which were bound up with the welfare of mankind, led him to use every diplomatic method for bringing the German government to realize the gravity of its offence against civilization and humanity, and to defer actual warfare until the American people could assure themselves that they were really to fight for a great world-wide and age-old human purpose.

The moves in Wilson's foreign policy, with few and justified exceptions, were consistent with each other. Had he not taken for the United States the ground he did take in 1913 and held it during four years in spite of enormous difficulties, the United States could not have stood on that ground and fought from that vantage point in 1917. Had he not yielded to Great Britain the utmost of its rights under treaty with the United States he could not have later honestly demanded from Great Britain and from Germany the observance of all neutral rights under international obligations. Had he cynically ignored the results of official iniquity in Mexico in the first weeks of his administration he could not four years later convincingly have condemned — as he did in his note to Pope Benedict XV — the gross iniquity of officialdom in Germany. Had his government ever infringed upon the sovereignty of less powerful peoples he could not, without exciting derision, have ever championed the rights of Poland and Belgium and the Balkan states. Had the United States, under his presidency, demanded indemnities of Mexico or attempted by conquest to annex Mexican

territory, the United States could not have admonished the world that there should be no conquests as the result of the Great War. Had his administration not dealt fairly with the Mexicans, the Chinese, the Filipinos in the first years of his responsibilities, he could not have expected the English, the Russians, the French, least of all the Germans, to rely with confidence on his assurance of intent to deal fairly with them in the later years. In short, had he not, during his entire incumbency, conducted himself as the first servant of a democracy should, he could not have expected to carry conviction when, on April 2, 1917, he asked the United States to go to war to make the world "safe for democracy."

If President Wilson's foreign policy had led immediately to the restoration of order in Mexico and had secured from European nations the demands of the United States without involving it in the conflict, it would have been hailed as tremendously successful. But it would have merited praise no more than it did deserve it, those results not having been accomplished. The motives which actuated it, the ends which it tried to achieve, the principles which guided it and the means which it used would have been precisely the same. There are so many variables in the facts of national and international affairs and their relationships are so complex, that the same principles applied by the same methods in two apparently precisely similar sets of circumstances may work to a happy result in the one case, and by the merest accident, to an unhappy one in the other. The prin-

ciples and methods alone are under true control of statesmen, and they ought to be judged, not primarily by immediate results, but with reference to their permanent value to serve the desirable permanent purposes they are calculated to serve.

But the results of the Wilson policy themselves justify the policy. It was a result of that policy that the American people finally saw the imperative necessity for their participation in the Great War. It was a result of that policy that the war, a European quarrel originating obscurely in petty dynastic ambition, in greedy economic rivalry, and in base national hatred, was transformed, by the entrance of the United States, into a world conflict with the united forces of democracy and international peace ranged squarely against autocracy and continued world struggle. It was a result of that policy that the United States,—not England, not France, not even new Russia,—became the leader, the bearer of the “great light for the guidance of the nations,” in the magnificent new venture of democracy to league the peoples of the world together to serve the ends of peace and justice.

PART II

MORE IMPORTANT EVENTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

PART II

MORE IMPORTANT EVENTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

1913.

- March 11. *President Wilson announced the Administration's policy toward the republics of Central and South America. (Statement No. 1.)*
- March 18. *The Administration declined to request American bankers to participate in the proposed Six-Power loan to China. (Statement No. 2.)*
- April 4. *The Japanese ambassador to the United States presented an informal protest against the proposed anti-alien land legislation in California.*
- April 22. *The President urged California authorities not to enact legislation discriminating against the Japanese. (Statement No. 3.)*
- April 24. *Secretary Bryan presented to the diplomatic corps in Washington the Administration's plans for the establishment of international peace. (Statement No. 4.)*
- May 2. *The United States recognized the Republic of China.*
- May 9. *The Japanese ambassador to the United States presented a formal protest against the anti-alien land bill passed by the California legislature on May 3.*
- May 9. *Victoriano Huerta, provisional president of Mexico, denied diplomatic standing to the American ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson, the United States not having recognized the de facto government of Mexico.*
- May 11. *The President, through Secretary Bryan, urged Governor Johnson of California to withhold approval of the anti-alien land bill. (Statement No. 5.)*

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- May 19. The California anti-alien land bill was signed by Governor Johnson.
- May 19. *The United States, in reply to the Japanese protest of May 9, maintained that the California anti-alien land law did not violate treaty rights of Japanese citizens. (Statement No. 6.)*
- May 30. *Secretary Bryan announced the receipt of favourable responses to the Administration's peace plan from Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Sweden, Brazil, Peru, Norway.*
- May 31. The arbitration treaty with Great Britain was renewed.
- June 2. The Japanese ambassador to the United States informed Secretary Bryan that Japan accepted the peace plan in principle.
- June 4. The Japanese ambassador to the United States presented a second formal protest against the California anti-alien land law.
- June 28. An agreement was signed at Washington for the renewal of the arbitration treaty between the United States and Japan.
- July 16. *The United States replied to the Japanese protest of June 4. (Statement No. 7.)*
- July 19. *Secretary Bryan presented to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations the draft of a proposed treaty with Nicaragua, which conferred upon the United States virtual control of Nicaragua's foreign relations.*
- August 1. General Huerta declared that he would neither resign nor permit foreign interference.
- August 4. *President Wilson sent John Lind to Mexico as his personal representative.*
- August 14. *President Wilson's suggestions for the restoration of order in Mexico were presented to General Huerta by Mr. Lind.*
- August 16. General Huerta rejected the suggestions of the government of the United States.
- August 26. The Japanese ambassador to the United States presented another protest against the California legislation.
- August 27. *The President addressed Congress upon the*

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relations between the United States and Mexico. (Statement No. 8.)

September 30. Japan again protested against the California legislation.

October 6. *The President's message to the citizens of the Philippine Islands was delivered by Governor-General Harrison. (Statement No. 9.)*

October 14. *President Wilson informed General Huerta that the United States would not recognize the impending Mexican election as constitutional.*

October 27. *President Wilson elaborated the Administration's policy respecting Latin America in an address before the Southern Commercial Congress at Mobile. (Statement No. 12.)*

December 2. *The President's annual address to the regular session of Congress dealt partly with the relations of the United States with Mexico and its policy respecting its insular possessions. (Statement No. 13.)*

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January 27. *The United States landed marines in Haiti to aid in the maintenance of order during an insurrection there.*

February 3. *The President issued a proclamation lifting the embargo on the shipment of military supplies to Mexico. (Statement No. 14.)*

February 12. *The United States formally recognized the provisional government established as a result of revolution in Peru.*

February 21. *The United States Senate ratified the general arbitration treaties with Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, thus renewing those which had expired on various dates in 1913.*

February 22. *The British ambassador to the United States requested the Department of State to investigate the killing by Mexican revolutionists of a British subject named Benton.*

March 5. *The President addressed Congress asking the repeal of the provision in the Panama Canal Act which exempted American coast-wise ship-*

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- ping from the payment of canal tolls. (Statement No. 15.)*
- April 3. *Mr. Lind left Vera Cruz for the United States.*
- April 8. *A treaty between the United States and Colombia was signed at Bogota. It would have awarded Colombia \$25,000,000 for its losses through the revolt of Panama in 1903.*
- April 14. *The President ordered the Atlantic fleet to Tampico, Mexico, to enforce the demands made by United States officers as a result of attack on American sailors on April 9.*
- April 18. *The United States demanded of General Huerta compliance with its requests before 6 o'clock p.m., April 19.*
- April 19. *General Huerta refused to comply with the demands of the United States.*
- April 20. *The President addressed Congress on the Mexican situation. (Statement No. 16.)*
- April 21. *The President ordered the seizure of the custom house at Vera Cruz.*
- April 22. *Nelson O'Shaughnessy, chargé d'affaires of the United States at Mexico City, was handed his passports by the Huerta government.*
- April 23. *The Mexican chargé at Washington asked for and received his passports from the United States Department of State.*
- April 23. *The President restored the embargo on the shipment of military supplies into Mexico.*
- April 25. *The United States accepted the offer of Argentina, Brazil and Chile to mediate between it and Mexico.*
- June 10. *The Japanese ambassador to the United States reminded the Department of State that Japan's last protest against the California anti-alien land tenure legislation remained unanswered.*
- June 15. *The President signed the repeal of the tolls exemption provision of the Panama Canal Act passed by Congress, June 11 and 12.*
- July 1. *The conference at Niagara Falls inaugurated by Argentina, Brazil and Chile to bring about a resolution of the difficulties between the*

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- United States and Mexico came to an end without positive results.
- July 4. *President Wilson discussed the principles underlying his foreign policy in an address at Philadelphia. (Statement No. 20.)*
- July 5. General Huerta was re-elected president of Mexico. He resigned July 15 and left Mexico July 20 on a German warship.
- July 24. Arbitration treaties were signed at Washington with representatives of Argentina, Brazil and Chile.
- August 4. *The President issued a proclamation of the neutrality of the United States in the European war.*
- August 5. *President Wilson informed the rulers of the belligerent European powers that the United States would welcome an opportunity to act in the interest of European peace.*
- August 6. *The United States presented an identic note to the belligerent powers suggesting general acceptance of the laws of naval warfare laid down in the Declaration of London.*
- August 10. *President Wilson sent a commission of personal representatives to the Dominican Republic with a plan for the restoration of peace in that country.*
- August 13. *The United States Senate ratified treaties with eighteen countries providing for commissions of inquiry.*
- August 15. *Secretary Bryan announced that the Administration considered that lending money by American bankers to belligerent powers was inconsistent with the true spirit of neutrality.*
- August 18. *President Wilson issued to the American people a statement respecting their conduct as neutrals. (Statement No. 21.)*
- August 22. *The United States transmitted to Japan a statement of its attitude toward Japan's operations in German territory in China.*
- September 15. Treaties for commissions of inquiry were signed at Washington with representatives of

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Great Britain, France, Spain and China. Those with Great Britain, France and Spain were ratified by the United States Senate September 25, 1914.

September 15. *The President ordered the withdrawal of United States troops from Vera Cruz.*

September 16. *President Wilson in reply to the protests of Germany and Belgium stated the attitude of the United States concerning violations of the rules of warfare. (Statement No. 22.)*

October 1. *A treaty with Russia providing for a commission of inquiry, was signed at Washington. It was ratified by the United States Senate October 13.*

October 19. *United States Marines were landed in Haiti to maintain order.*

October 22. *The United States informed Great Britain that its suggestion regarding the Declaration of London was withdrawn, and that it would base its rights on the existing rules of international law. (Same to Germany October 24.)*

November 23. *The United States troops were withdrawn from Vera Cruz.*

December 8. *The President's annual message to Congress dealt in part with development of trade with Latin America and with increased self-government in the Philippines. (Statement No. 24.)*

December 26. *The United States entered a general protest to Great Britain against the British naval policy toward neutral shipping. (Statement No. 25.)*

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January 7. *Great Britain replied to the United States note of December 26, 1914.*

January 20. *Secretary Bryan in a letter to Senator Stone denied the charges of discrimination by the United States against Germany and Austria. (Statement No. 27.)*

February 4. *The German Admiralty issued a proclamation declaring a "war zone" about the British Isles and warning neutral ships of the dangers therein; to take effect February 18.*

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- February 10. *The United States protested to Great Britain against the use of the American flag on a British vessel, the Lusitania.*
- February 10. *The United States protested to Germany in defence of the rights of American citizens on the high seas. (Statement No. 29.)*
- February 10. Great Britain made a more complete reply to the United States note of December 26, 1914.
- February 16. Germany replied to the American protest regarding its "war zone" decree.
- February 20. *The United States addressed identic notes to Great Britain and Germany suggesting a modus vivendi in naval warfare. (Statement No. 30.)*
- March 1. Germany replied to the American proposal of February 20, accepting it on condition that Great Britain make concessions.
- March 15. Great Britain in a note to the United States refused to make the concessions asked by Germany.
- March 30. *The United States replied to the British notes of March 13 and 15 respecting the Orders in Council governing trade with Germany.*
- April 4. The German ambassador to the United States delivered to the Department of State a memorandum on the American attitude respecting British interference with American commerce and American trade in munitions of war.
- April 21. *The United States replied to the note of the German ambassador of April 4. (Statement No. 34.)*
- May 13. *The United States presented to Germany a note protesting against the submarine policy which culminated in the sinking of the Lusitania on May 7. (Statement No. 36.)*
- May 28. Germany replied to the American note of May 13.
- June 2. *The United States addressed a note to the warring factions in Mexico advising the leaders to come to an early agreement. (Statement No. 38.)*
- June 9. *The United States presented to Germany a sec-*

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- and note upon the sinking of the Lusitania.*
(Statement No. 39.)
- June 22. Great Britain submitted a memorandum to the Department of State denying that there was substantial loss to neutral shipping on account of its Orders in Council.
- July 8. Germany replied to the American note of June 9.
- July 21. *The United States presented a third note to Germany upon the sinking of the Lusitania.* (Statement No. 40.)
- July 28. *United States marines were landed in Haiti on account of insurrections there.*
- August 5. Representatives of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala and Uruguay met with Secretary Lansing to consider means of ending chaos in Mexico.
- August 11. *A joint appeal by Secretary Lansing and the representatives of six South American States was dispatched to the leaders of the Mexican factions.* (Statement No. 41.)
- September 1. The German ambassador to the United States announced that thereafter liners would not be sunk without warning by German submarines. Endorsed by the German foreign office Sept. 14, 1915.
- September 8. *The United States demanded the recall of the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, Dr. Constantin Thcodor Dumba.*
- September 18. After conference, Secretary Lansing and the representatives of six South American states agreed to recognize as the *de facto* government of Mexico the faction which at the end of three weeks had best demonstrated its ability to maintain order.
- October 9. The conference of representatives of the United States and six South American states decided to recognize General Venustiano Carranza as provisional president of Mexico.
- October 19. *The United States recognized the Carranza gov-*

1915.

- October 21. *ernment as the de facto government of Mexico. The United States presented an important note to Great Britain in which, after protesting again against British interference with American shipping, it assumed the task of championing neutral rights. (Statement No. 45.)*
- November 4. *President Wilson, in an address before the Manhattan Club at New York, presented the Administration's preparedness program. (Statement No. 46.)*
- November 29. *The German government notified Ambassador Gerard that American vessels would be sunk only when carrying absolute contraband and when passengers and crew could reach port safely.*
- December 7. *The President's annual address to the regular session of Congress dealt with preparedness for defence. (Statement No. 47.)*
- December 10. *In conformity with demands of the United States the German government recalled Captains Boy-Ed and von Papen, attachés of the German embassy at Washington, on account of improper activities.*

1916.

- January 6. *President Wilson, in an address before the second Pan-American Scientific Congress in Washington, declared that the states of North and South America should unite in guaranteeing to each other political independence and territorial integrity. (Statement No. 48.)*
- January 7. *The German ambassador to the United States announced that submarines in the Mediterranean had received orders to conform to general principles of international law.*
- January 18. *The United States, in confidential informal notes to the Entente Allies, asked whether those governments would subscribe to a declaration of principles regarding submarine warfare therein set forth. (Statement No. 49.)*
- February 10. *The German and Austro-Hungarian govern-*

1916.

- ments notified the United States of their intention to treat armed merchantment as war vessels after February 29.
- February 15. *The Administration declared the right of American citizens to travel on belligerent merchant vessels armed for defence.*
- February 18. *The United States Senate ratified a treaty with Nicaragua respecting its canal route and a naval base.*
- February 24. *President Wilson, in a letter to Senator Stone, defended the right of American citizens to travel on armed merchantmen. (Statement No. 51.)*
- February 28. *The United States Senate ratified a treaty with Haiti respecting finance and police in that republic.*
- March 13. *The United States accepted General Carranza's proposed reciprocal agreement for the pursuit of bandits across the Mexican frontier.*
- March 15. *The United States sent a punitive expedition into Mexico in pursuit of Villa, who had attacked Columbus, N. M., March 9.*
- March 23. *The Entente Allies replied rejecting the proposals of the United States in the confidential note of January 18.*
- March 25. *The Department of State issued a memorandum defining the status of armed merchant vessels. Made public April 26, 1916. (Statement No. 54.)*
- April 10. *The German reply to American inquiry as to the sinking of the *Sussex*, March 24, denied that a German submarine was responsible.*
- April 18. *The United States addressed an ultimatum to Germany regarding its submarine policy. (Statement No. 56.)*
- April 19. *The President addressed the Congress on the relations with Germany. (Statement No. 57.)*
- April 21. *The Japanese ambassador to the United States presented a protest against certain provisions in the immigration bill pending in Congress.*
- May 4. *The German reply to the American note of*

1916.

- April 18 agreed to the contention of the United States with conditions.
- May 8. *The United States accepted the assurances in the German note of May 4, but rejected the conditions. (Statement No. 58.)*
- May 22. *The de facto government of Mexico protested to the United States against the violation of Mexican sovereignty and insisted on the immediate withdrawal of United States forces.*
- May 27. *President Wilson, in an address before the League to Enforce Peace, at Washington, declared that the United States was willing to join any feasible association of nations for the purpose of guaranteeing territorial and political integrity of states and to preserve peace. (Statement No. 60.)*
- June 20. *The United States in reply to the Mexican note of May 22 refused to withdraw its punitive expedition while anarchy continued in northern Mexico.*
- June 21. *The United States, in a note to Austria-Hungary, demanded an apology and reparation for the attack on the American steamer Petrolite by an Austrian submarine.*
- June 22. *The United States informed the South American states that the object of the punitive expedition in Mexico was not intervention in Mexican affairs but defence of American territory.*
- June 25. *The United States asked of the de facto government of Mexico a statement of its intended course of action respecting the punitive expedition and demanded release of American soldiers taken as prisoners at Carrizal, June 21. Prisoners released June 28.*
- July 4. *The de facto government of Mexico suggested mediation by Latin American states of its differences with the United States.*
- July 7. *The United States replied to the Mexican note of July 4, agreeing to the proposal for negotiations.*

1916.

- July 28. *The United States, in reply to the Mexican note of July 11, accepted the proposal of a joint commission to settle outstanding differences.*
- August 29. *The President signed the act of Congress increasing the participation of the people of the Philippines in their government.*
- August 31. *The United States, in reply to the Entente notes of August 22, declared the existing rules of international law applicable to submarines in American ports.*
- September 2. *President Wilson, in his speech accepting the Democratic nomination for the presidency, defended the foreign policy of the Administration and restated its principles. (Statement No. 67.)*
- September 7. *The United States Senate ratified the treaty providing for the purchase of the Danish West Indies.*
- September 14. *The Department of State at Washington announced that in response to its inquiry Japan and Russia had given assurances that the new Russo-Japanese convention was not intended to modify the "Open Door" in China.*
- November 24. *The protocol, signed by the United States and Mexican Commissioners, provided for the withdrawal of United States troops if order were restored in northern Mexico.*
- December 16. *The President transmitted to the Entente Allies the German offer to negotiate peace made December 12.*
- December 18. *The President suggested to the nations at war that they make an avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be ended. (Statement No. 79.)*
- December 21. *Secretary Lansing issued a statement declaring that the United States was being drawn "nearer to the verge of war." In a later statement he denied that the United States government was considering any change in its policy of neutrality.*
- December 26. *The German reply to the note of the President*

1916.

contained no statement of terms and proposed a conference of belligerents.

1917.

January 10.

The reply of the Entente Allies to the note of the President indicated the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of reparation upon which a satisfactory peace might be based.

January 11.

The United States received from Germany a communication in which the German attitude toward a settlement of the war was made more clear.

January 13.

Great Britain, in a supplemental reply to the President's note of December 18, 1916, amplified the terms on which a durable peace might be based. International co-operation to preserve peace was suggested.

January 15.

The American-Mexican joint commission was dissolved after endeavouring for four months to reach an agreement on border control.

January 22.

The President addressed the Senate giving his idea of the steps necessary for world peace. (Statement No. 80.)

January 31.

Germany announced the renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare within a large war zone.

February 2.

Anti-alien land tenure bills were withdrawn in the Idaho and Oregon legislatures after protest on the part of the Japanese ambassador.

February 3.

The United States severed diplomatic relations with Germany. The President addressed Congress on the subject. (Statement No. 81.)

February 4.

The United States Department of State suggested to neutral nations that they take action against Germany similar to that of the United States.

February 5.

The United States punitive expedition in Mexico returned to American territory.

February 12.

The United States Department of State, in reply to a communication from the Swiss minister, announced that it would refuse to discuss matters of difference with Germany unless Germany first recalled its decree of January 31.

1917.

- February 14. *The United States government announced that it would not recognize a government in Cuba set up as a result of organized revolt.*
- February 26. *The President requested of Congress the power to arm merchant ships. (Statement No. 82.)*
- March 1. *The President informed the Senate that the "Zimmermann note," proposing an alliance between Germany and Mexico dated January 19, was authentic.*
- March 5. *The second inaugural address of President Wilson dealt with basic principles of American policy. (Statement No. 83.)*
- March 12. *The United States government announced an armed guard would be placed on all American merchant vessels sailing through the "war zone."*
- March 22. *The United States formally recognized the new government of Russia set up as a result of revolution.*
- March 26. *The United States refused the proposal of Germany to interpret and supplement the Prussian treaty of 1799.*
- April 2. *The President addressed the Congress asking it to declare the existence of a state of war with Germany. (Statement No. 84.)*
- April 6. *The President signed the joint resolution of Congress and issued a proclamation declaring the existence of a state of war with Germany.*
- April 8. *Austria-Hungary announced that it had decided to sever diplomatic relations with the United States.*
- April 15. *President Wilson in a message to the American people asks them to "speak, act and serve together." (Statement No. 85.)*
- April 20. *The Turkish government announced that it had decided to sever diplomatic relations with the United States.*
- June 9. *A communication from President Wilson sent to the provisional government of Russia by the United States mission to Russia was made public at Washington. (Statement No. 88.)*

1917.

- June 14. *President Wilson, in an address at Washington, amplified the case of neutrals against Germany. (Statement No. 89.)*
- July 29. *Secretary Lansing, in an address at Madison Barracks, N. Y., related the immediate causes for the entrance of the United States into the war to the deeper meaning of the conflict.*
- August 1. *Pope Benedict XV addressed a peace note to the powers at war.*
- August 27. *President Wilson replied to the Pope's note of August 1. (Statement No. 90.)*

PART III

MORE IMPORTANT UTTERANCES OF
THE ADMINISTRATION

TOPICAL GUIDE TO STATEMENTS

(See also the Table of Contents)

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PART III

RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH LATIN AMERICA

I. *Statement of President Wilson. March 11, 1913*

(*American Journal of International Law*, VII, 331)

In view of questions which are naturally uppermost in the public mind just now, the President issues the following statement:

One of the chief objects of my administration will be to cultivate the friendship and deserve the confidence of our sister republics of Central and South America, and to promote in every proper and honorable way the interests which are common to the peoples of the two continents. I earnestly desire the most cordial understanding and co-operation between the peoples and leaders of America and, therefore, deem it my duty to make this brief statement.

Co-operation is possible only when supported at every turn by the orderly processes of just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force. We hold, as I am sure all thoughtful leaders of republican government everywhere hold, that just government rests always upon the consent of the governed, and that there can be no freedom without order based upon law and upon the public conscience and approval. We shall look to make these principles the basis of mutual intercourse, respect, and helpfulness between our sister republics and ourselves. We shall lend our influence of every kind to the realization of these principles in fact and practice, knowing that disorder, personal intrigue and defiance of constitutional rights weaken

and discredit government and injure none so much as the people who are unfortunate enough to have their common life and their common affairs so tainted and disturbed. We can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests or ambition. We are the friends of peace, but we know that there can be no lasting or stable peace in such circumstances. As friends, therefore, we shall prefer those who act in the interests of peace and honor, who protect private rights and respect the restraints of constitutional provision. Mutual respect seems to us the indispensable foundation of friendship between states, as between individuals.

The United States has nothing to seek in Central and South America except the lasting interests of the peoples of the two continents, the security of governments intended for the people and for no special group or interest, and the development of personal and trade relationships between the two continents which shall redound to the profit and advantage of both and interfere with the rights and liberties of neither.

From these principles may be read so much of the future policy of this government as it is necessary now to forecast; and in the spirit of these principles I may, I hope, be permitted with as much confidence as earnestness to extend to the governments of all the republics of America the hand of genuine disinterested friendship and to pledge my own honor and the honor of my colleagues to every enterprise of peace and amity that a fortunate future may disclose.

AMERICAN BANKERS AND LOANS TO CHINA

2. *Statement of President Wilson. March 18, 1913*

(*American Journal of International Law*, VII, 338.)

We are informed that at the request of the last administration a certain group of American bankers undertook to participate in the loan now desired by the Government of China (approximately \$125,000,000). . . . The present administration has been asked by this group of bankers whether it would also request them to participate in the loan. The representatives of the bankers through whom the administration was approached declared that they would continue to seek their share of the loan under the proposed agreements only if expressly requested to do so by the government. The administration has declined to make such request because it did not approve the conditions of the loan or the implications of responsibility on its own part which it was plainly told would be involved in the request.¹

The conditions of the loan seem to us to touch very nearly the administrative independence of China itself; and this administration does not feel that it ought, even by implication, to be a party to those conditions. The responsibility on its part which would be implied in requesting the bankers to undertake the loan might conceivably go to the length in some unhappy contingency of forcible interference in the financial, and even the political, affairs of that great oriental state, just now awakening to a consciousness of its power and of its obligations to its people. The conditions include not only the pledging of particular taxes, some of them antiquated and burdensome, to secure the loan, but also the administration of those taxes by foreign agents.

¹ The official announcement of the withdrawal of the American group of bankers, issued March 19, 1913, may be found in *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, XCVI, 825.

The responsibility on the part of our government implied in the encouragement of a loan thus secured and administered is plain enough and is obnoxious to the principles upon which the government of our people rests.

The Government of the United States is not only willing, but earnestly desirous, of aiding the great Chinese people in every way that is consistent with their untrammelled development and its own immemorial principles. The awakening of the people of China to a consciousness of their possibilities under free government is the most significant, if not the most momentous event of our generation. With this movement and aspiration the American people are in profound sympathy. They certainly wish to participate, and participate very generously, in opening to the Chinese and to the use of the world the almost untouched and perhaps unrivalled resources of China.

The Government of the United States is earnestly desirous of promoting the most extended and intimate trade relationships between this country and the Chinese Republic. . . . This is the main material interest of its citizens in the development of China. Our interests are those of the open door — a door of friendship and mutual advantage. This is the only door we care to enter.

ANTI-ALIEN LAND TENURE LEGISLATION IN CALIFORNIA

3. *Extract from Telegram of the President to Governor Johnson of California. April 22, 1913*

(*New York Times*, April 23, 1913)

. . . I . . . appeal with the utmost confidence to the people, the Governor, and the Legislature of California to act in the matter now under consideration in a manner that can-

not from any point of view be fairly challenged or called in question. If they deem it necessary to exclude all aliens who have not declared their intention to become citizens from the privileges of land ownership they can do so along lines already followed in the laws of many of the other States and of many foreign countries, including Japan herself. Insidious discrimination will inevitably draw in question the treaty obligations of the Government of the United States. . . .

ADMINISTRATION'S PLANS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

4. *Statement of Secretary Bryan to the Press.*

April 24, 1913

(Commercial and Financial Chronicle, XCVI, 1184)

The statement presented to the representatives [i. e., the diplomatic corps at Washington] is only intended to set forth the main proposition, namely that the President desires to enter into an agreement with each nation severally for the investigation of all questions of every nature whatever. This agreement is intended to supplement the arbitration treaties now in existence and those that may be made hereafter. Arbitration treaties always exempt some question from arbitration. The agreement proposed by the President is intended to close the gap and leave no dispute that can become a cause of war without investigation.

It will be noticed that each party is to reserve the right to act independently after the report is submitted, but it is not likely that a nation will declare war after it has had an opportunity to confer during the investigation with the opposing nation.

But whether or not the proposed agreement accomplishes

as much as is hoped for it, it is at least a step in the direction of universal peace, and I am pleased to be the agent through whom the President presents this proposition to the Powers represented here.¹

ANTI-ALIEN LAND TENURE LEGISLATION IN CALIFORNIA

5. *Extract from Telegram of Secretary Bryan to Governor Johnson of California. May 11, 1913*

(*New York Times*, May 12, 1913)

. . . He [the President] is fully alive to the importance of removing any root of discord which may create antagonism between American citizens and the subjects of Oriental nations residing here, but he is impelled by a sense of duty to express the hope that you will see fit to allow time for diplomatic effort.

The nations affected by the proposed law are friendly nations — nations that have shown themselves willing to co-operate in the establishment of harmonious relations between their people and ours. . . .

6. *Extract from a Communication of Secretary Bryan to the Japanese Ambassador at Washington.*

May 19, 1913

(*American-Japanese Discussions Relating to Land Tenure Law of California*, Department of State, p. 5)

The Government of the United States regrets most sincerely that the Imperial Government of Japan should regard

¹ The plan in detail may be found in the text of the first of the treaties, published in *American Journal of International Law*, VII, 824-5.

this legislation as an indication of unfriendliness toward their people. . . .

. . . we feel that the Imperial Government has been misled in its interpretation of the spirit and object of the legislation in question. It is not political. It is not part of any general national policy which would indicate unfriendliness or any purpose inconsistent with the best and most cordial understanding between the two nations. It is wholly economic. It is based upon the particular economic conditions existing in California as interpreted by her own people, who wish to avoid certain conditions of competition in their agricultural activities.

. . . your note¹ calls attention to certain provisions of the California law which you conceive to be inconsistent with and to violate existing treaty stipulations between the two countries, and thus to threaten to impair vested rights of property. The law, however, in terms purports to respect and preserve all rights under existing treaties. Such is its declared intent. But in case it should be alleged that the law had in its operation failed to accomplish that intent, your Government is no doubt advised that by the Constitution of the United States the stipulations of treaties made in pursuance thereof are the supreme law of the land, and that they are expressly declared to be binding upon State and Federal courts alike to the end that they may be judicially enforced in all cases. For this purpose the courts, Federal and State, are open to all persons who may feel themselves to have been deprived of treaty rights and guarantees; and in this respect the alien enjoys under our laws a privilege which to one of our own citizens may not be in all cases available, namely, the privilege of suing in

¹ The full text of this note dated May 9, 1913, may be found in *American-Japanese Discussions Relating to Land Tenure Law of California*, Department of State, p. 3.

the Federal courts. In precisely the same way, our citizens resort and are obliged to resort to the courts for the enforcement of their constitutional and legal rights. Article XIV of the treaty, to which your excellency refers, appears to relate solely to the rights of commerce and navigation. These the California statute does not appear to be designed in any way to affect. The authors of the law seem to have been careful to guard against any invasion of contractual rights.

Your excellency raises, very naturally and properly, the question how the case would stand should explicit treaties between the two countries expire or cease to be in force while, nevertheless, relations of entire amity and good will still continue to exist between them. I can only reply that in such circumstances the Government of the United States would always deem it its pleasure, as well as a manifest dictate of its cordial friendship for Japan and the Japanese people, to safeguard the rights of trade and intercourse between the two peoples now secured by treaty. I need not assure your excellency that this Government will co-operate with the Imperial Government in every possible way to maintain with the utmost cordiality the understandings which bind the two nations together in honor and in interest. Its obligations of friendship would not be lessened or performed in niggardly fashion in any circumstances. It values too highly the regard of Japan and her co-operation in the great peaceful tasks of the modern world to jeopard them in any way; and I feel that I can assure your excellency that there is no reason to feel that its policy in such matters would be embarrassed or interfered with by the legislation of any State of the Union. The economic policy of a single State with regard to a single kind of property can not turn aside these strong and abiding currents of generous and profitable intercourse and good feeling. . . .

7. *Extract from a Communication of Secretary Bryan
to the Japanese Ambassador at Washington.*

July 16, 1913

(*American-Japanese Discussions Relating to Land Tenure Law of
California*, Department of State, p. 15)

In my note of the 19th of May I did not omit to point out that the California statute, far from being indicative of any national discriminatory policy, was not even to be regarded as an expression of political or racial antagonism, but was rather to be considered as the emanation of economic conditions, which were in this instance of a local character. I can not help feeling that in the representations submitted by your excellency¹ the supposition of racial discrimination occupies a position of prominence which it does not deserve and which is not justified by the facts. I am quite prepared to admit that all differences between human beings — differences in appearance, differences in manner, differences in speech, differences in opinion, differences in nationality, and differences in race — may provoke a certain antagonism; but none of these differences is likely to produce serious results unless it becomes associated with an interest of a contentious nature, such as that of the struggle for existence. In this economic contest the division no doubt may often take place on racial lines, but it does so not because of racial antagonism but because of the circumstance that the traditions and habits of different races have developed or diminished competitive efficiency. The contest is economic; the racial difference is a mere mark or incident of the economic struggle.

¹ The representations here referred to consist of a note by the Japanese ambassador dated June 4, 1913, published in Department of State, *American-Japanese Discussions Relating to Land Tenure Law of California*, p. 6.

All nations recognize this fact, and it is for this reason that each nation is permitted to determine who shall and who shall not be permitted to settle in its dominions and become a part of the body politic, to the end that it may preserve internal peace and avoid the contentions which are so likely to disturb the harmony of international relations.

That the Imperial Government of Japan accept and act upon these principles precise proof is not wanting. . . .

In connection with the question of land ownership your excellency refers to the subject of naturalization in the United States, . . . Your excellency very properly acknowledges the fact that the question of naturalization "is a political problem of national and not international concern."

I gladly assume that your excellency, in saying that Japanese subjects are "as a nation" denied the right to acquire American nationality, has not intended to convey the impression that the naturalization laws of the United States make any distinction that may be specifically considered as national either in terms or in effect. Nor would it appear, if the legal provisions in question were historically examined, that the Government and people of Japan have any ground to feel that any discrimination against them was intended. . . .

RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH MEXICO

8. *Address of the President to the Congress.*

August 27, 1913

(Congressional Record, L, 3803)

Gentlemen of the Congress, it is clearly my duty to lay before you, very fully and without reservation, the facts

concerning our present relations with the Republic of Mexico. The deplorable posture of affairs in Mexico I need not describe, but I deem it my duty to speak very frankly of what this Government has done and should seek to do in fulfillment of its obligation to Mexico herself, as a friend and neighbor, and to American citizens whose lives and vital interests are daily affected by the distressing conditions which now obtain beyond our southern border.

Those conditions touch us very nearly. Not merely because they lie at our very doors. That of course makes us more vividly and more constantly conscious of them, and every instinct of neighborly interest and sympathy is aroused and quickened by them; but that is only one element in the determination of our duty. We are glad to call ourselves the friends of Mexico, and we shall, I hope, have many an occasion, in happier times as well as in these days of trouble and confusion, to show that our friendship is genuine and disinterested, capable of sacrifice and every generous manifestation. The peace, prosperity, and contentment of Mexico mean more, much more, to us than merely an enlarged field for our commerce and enterprise. They mean an enlargement of the field of self-government and the realization of the hopes and rights of a nation with whose best aspirations, so long suppressed and disappointed, we deeply sympathize. We shall yet prove to the Mexican people that we know how to serve them without first thinking how we shall serve ourselves.

But we are not the only friends of Mexico. The whole world desires her peace and progress; and the whole world is interested as never before. Mexico lies at last where all the world looks on. Central America is about to be touched by the great routes of the world's trade and intercourse running free from ocean to ocean at the Isthmus. The future has much in store for Mexico, as for all the States of

Central America; but the best gifts can come to her only if she be ready and free to receive them and to enjoy them honorably. America in particular — America north and south and upon both continents — waits upon the development of Mexico; and that development can be sound and lasting only if it be the product of a genuine freedom, a just and ordered government founded upon law. Only so can it be peaceful or fruitful of the benefits of peace. Mexico has a great and enviable future before her, if only she choose and attain the paths of honest constitutional government.

The present circumstances of the Republic, I deeply regret to say, do not seem to promise even the foundations of such a peace. We have waited many months, months full of peril and anxiety, for the conditions there to improve, and they have not improved. They have grown worse, rather. The territory in some sort controlled by the provisional authorities at Mexico City has grown smaller, not larger. The prospect of the pacification of the country, even by arms, has seemed to grow more and more remote; and its pacification by the authorities at the capital is evidently impossible by any other means than force. Difficulties more and more entangle those who claim to constitute the legitimate government of the Republic. They have not made good their claim in fact. Their successes in the field have proved only temporary. War and disorder, devastation and confusion, seem to threaten to become the settled fortune of the distracted country. As friends we could wait not longer for a solution which every week seemed further away. It was our duty at least to volunteer our good offices — to offer to assist, if we might, in effecting some arrangement which would bring relief and peace and set up a universally acknowledged political authority there.

Accordingly, I took the liberty of sending the Hon. John

Lind, formerly governor of Minnesota, as my personal spokesman and representative, to the City of Mexico, with the following instructions:

Press very earnestly upon the attention of those who are now exercising authority or wielding influence in Mexico the following considerations and advice:

The Government of the United States does not feel at liberty any longer to stand inactively by while it becomes daily more and more evident that no real progress is being made toward the establishment of a government at the City of Mexico which the country will obey and respect.

The Government of the United States does not stand in the same case with the other great Governments of the world in respect of what is happening or what is likely to happen in Mexico. We offer our good offices, not only because of our genuine desire to play the part of a friend, but also because we are expected by the powers of the world to act as Mexico's nearest friend.

We wish to act in these circumstances in the spirit of the most earnest and disinterested friendship. It is our purpose in whatever we do or propose in this perplexing and distressing situation not only to pay the most scrupulous regard to the sovereignty and independence of Mexico—that we take as a matter of course to which we are bound by every obligation of right and honor—but also to give every possible evidence that we act in the interest of Mexico alone, and not in the interest of any person or body of persons who may have personal or property claims in Mexico which they may feel that they have the right to press. We are seeking to counsel Mexico for her own good and in the interest of her own peace, and not for any other purpose whatever. The Government of the United States would deem itself discredited if it had any selfish or ulterior purpose in transactions where the peace, happiness, and prosperity of a whole people are involved. It is acting as its friendship for Mexico, not as any selfish interest, dictates.

The present situation in Mexico is incompatible with the fulfillment of international obligations on the part of Mexico, with the civilized development of Mexico herself, and with the maintenance of tolerable political and economic conditions in Central America. It is upon no common occasion, therefore, that the United States offers her counsel and assistance. All America cries out for a settlement.

A satisfactory settlement seems to us to be conditioned on—

(a) An immediate cessation of fighting throughout Mexico, a

definite armistice solemnly entered into and scrupulously observed.

(b) Security given for an early and free election in which all will agree to take part.

(c) The consent of Gen. Huerta to bind himself not to be a candidate for election as President of the Republic at this election.

(d) The agreement of all parties to abide by the results of the election and cooperate in the most loyal way in organizing and supporting the new administration.

The Government of the United States will be glad to play any part in this settlement or in its carrying out which it can play honorably and consistently with international right. It pledges itself to recognize and in every way possible and proper to assist the administration chosen and set up in Mexico in the way and on the conditions suggested.

Taking all the existing conditions into consideration, the Government of the United States can conceive of no reasons sufficient to justify those who are now attempting to shape the policy or exercise the authority of Mexico in declining the offices of friendship thus offered. Can Mexico give the civilized world a satisfactory reason for rejecting our good offices? If Mexico can suggest any better way in which to show our friendship, serve the people of Mexico, and meet our international obligations, we are more than willing to consider the suggestion.

Mr. Lind executed his delicate and difficult mission with singular tact, firmness, and good judgment, and made clear to the authorities at the City of Mexico not only the purpose of his visit but also the spirit in which it had been undertaken. But the proposals he submitted were rejected, in a note the full text of which I take the liberty of laying before you.¹

I am led to believe that they were rejected partly because the authorities at Mexico City had been grossly misinformed and misled upon two points. They did not realize the spirit of the American people in this matter, their earnest friendliness and yet sober determination that some just solution be found for the Mexican difficulties; and they did not

¹ The reply of General Huerta's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, F. Gamboa, dated August 16, 1913, may be found in *American Journal of International Law*, VII, Supplement, 284.

believe that the present administration spoke, through Mr. Lind, for the people of the United States. The effect of this unfortunate misunderstanding on their part is to leave them singularly isolated and without friends who can effectually aid them. So long as the misunderstanding continues we can only await the time of their awakening to a realization of the actual facts. We can not thrust our good offices upon them. The situation must be given a little more time to work itself out in the new circumstances; and I believe that only a little while will be necessary. For the circumstances are new. The rejection of our friendship makes them new and will inevitably bring its own alterations in the whole aspect of affairs. The actual situation of the authorities at Mexico City will presently be revealed.

Meanwhile, what is it our duty to do? Clearly, everything that we do must be rooted in patience and done with calm and disinterested deliberation. Impatience on our part would be childish, and would be fraught with every risk of wrong and folly. We can afford to exercise the self-restraint of a really great nation which realizes its own strength and scorns to misuse it. It was our duty to offer our active assistance. It is now our duty to show what true neutrality will do to enable the people of Mexico to set their affairs in order again and wait for a further opportunity to offer our friendly counsels. The door is not closed against the resumption, either upon the initiative of Mexico or upon our own, of the effort to bring order out of the confusion by friendly cooperative action, should fortunate occasion offer.

While we wait the contest of the rival forces will undoubtedly for a little while be sharper than ever, just because it will be plain that an end must be made of the existing situation, and that very promptly; and with the increased activity of the contending factions will come, it is to be

feared, increased danger to the noncombatants in Mexico as well as to those actually in the field of battle. The position of outsiders is always particularly trying and full of hazard where there is civil strife and a whole country is upset. We should earnestly urge all Americans to leave Mexico at once, and should assist them to get away in every way possible — not because we would mean to slacken in the least our efforts to safeguard their lives and their interests, but because it is imperative that they should take no unnecessary risks when it is physically possible for them to leave the country. We should let every one who assumes to exercise authority in any part of Mexico know in the most unequivocal way that we shall vigilantly watch the fortunes of those Americans who can not get away, and shall hold those responsible for their sufferings and losses to a definite reckoning. That can be and will be made plain beyond the possibility of a misunderstanding.

For the rest, I deem it my duty to exercise the authority conferred upon me by the law of March 14, 1912, to see to it that neither side to the struggle now going on in Mexico receive any assistance from this side the border. I shall follow the best practice of nations in the matter of neutrality by forbidding the exportation of arms or munitions of war of any kind from the United States to any part of the Republic of Mexico — a policy suggested by several interesting precedents and certainly dictated by many manifest considerations of practical expediency. We can not in the circumstances be the partisans of either party to the contest that now distracts Mexico or constitute ourselves the virtual umpire between them.

I am happy to say that several of the great Governments of the world have given this Government their generous moral support in urging upon the provisional authorities at the City of Mexico the acceptance of our proffered

good offices in the spirit in which they were made. We have not acted in this matter under the ordinary principles of international obligation. All the world expects us in such circumstances to act as Mexico's nearest friend and intimate adviser. This is our immemorial relation toward her. There is nowhere any serious question that we have the moral right in the case or that we are acting in the interest of a fair settlement and of good government, not for the promotion of some selfish interest of our own. If further motive were necessary than our own good will toward a sister Republic and our own deep concern to see peace and order prevail in Central America, this consent of mankind to what we are attempting, this attitude of the great nations of the world toward what we may attempt in dealing with this distressed people at our doors, should make us feel the more solemnly bound to go to the utmost length of patience and forbearance in this painful and anxious business. The steady pressure of moral force will before many days break the barriers of pride and prejudice down, and we shall triumph as Mexico's friends sooner than we could triumph as her enemies — and how much more handsomely, with how much higher and finer satisfactions of conscience and of honor!

GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

9. *Message of President Wilson to the Citizens of the Philippine Islands. October 6, 1913*

(*The Weekly Times* (Manila, P. I.), October 10, 1913)

We regard ourselves as trustees acting not for the advantage of the United States but for the benefit of the people of the Philippine Islands.

Every step we take will be taken with a view to the ulti-

mate independence of the Islands and as a preparation for that independence. And we hope to move toward that end as rapidly as the safety and the permanent interests of the Islands will permit. After each step taken experience will guide us to the next.

The administration will take one step at once and will give to the native citizens of the Islands a majority in the appointive Commission and thus in the upper as well as in the lower house of the legislature a majority representation will be secured to them.

We do this in the confident hope and expectation that immediate proof will be given, in the action of the Commission under the new arrangement, of the political capacity of those native citizens who have already come forward to represent and to lead their people in affairs.¹

NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND SELF- GOVERNMENT

10. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson at
Swarthmore College. October 25, 1913*

(*Congressional Record*, L, 5862)

. . . Sometimes we have been laughed at — by foreigners in particular — for boasting of the size of the American Continent, the size of our own domain as a nation; for they have, naturally enough, suggested that we did not make it. But I claim that every race and every man is as big as the thing that he takes possession of, and that the size of America is in some sense a standard of the size and

¹ The address of Governor-General Harrison in presenting this message was published in the *Weekly Times* (Manila, P. I.), October 10, 1913.

capacity of the American people. And yet the mere extent of the American conquest is not what gives America distinction in the annals of the world, but the professed purpose of the conquest which was to see to it that every foot of this land should be the home of free, self-governed people, who should have no government whatever which did not rest upon the consent of the governed. I would like to believe that all this hemisphere is devoted to the same sacred purpose and that nowhere can any government endure which is stained by blood or supported by anything but the consent of the governed.

II. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson at Congress Hall in Philadelphia. October 25, 1913*

(*Congressional Record*, L, 5809)

We have stumbled upon many unhappy circumstances in the hundred years that have gone by since the event that we are celebrating. Almost all of them have come from self-centered men, men who saw in their own interest the interest of the country, and who did not have vision enough to read it in wider terms, in the universal terms of equity and justice and the rights of mankind. . . . The Declaration of Independence was . . . the first audible breath of liberty, . . . The men of that generation did not hesitate to say that every people has a right to choose its own forms of government, not once but as often as it pleases, and to accommodate those forms of government to its existing interests and circumstances. Not only to establish but to alter is the fundamental principle of self-government.

. . . Liberty inheres in the circumstances of the day. . . . Every day problems arise which wear some new phase and aspect, and I must fall back, if I would serve my conscience,

upon those things which are fundamental rather than upon those things which are superficial, and ask myself this question, How are you going to assist in some small part to give the American people and, by example, the peoples of the world more liberty, more happiness, more substantial prosperity; and how are you going to make that prosperity a common heritage instead of a selfish possession? . . .

No man can boast that he understands America. No man can boast that he has lived the life of America, . . . No man can pretend that except by common counsel he can gather into his consciousness what the varied life of this people is. The duty that we have to keep open eyes and open hearts and accessible understandings is a very . . . difficult duty to perform. . . . Yet how . . . important that it should be performed, for fear we make infinite and irreparable blunders. The city of Washington is in some respects self-contained, and it is easy there to forget what the rest of the United States is thinking about. . . . You are so apt to forget that the comparatively small number of persons, numerous as they seem to be when they swarm, who come to Washington to ask for things, do not constitute an important proportion of the population of the country, that it is constantly necessary to come away from Washington and renew one's contacts with the people who do not swarm there, who do not ask for anything, but who do trust you without their personal counsel to do your duty. Unless a man gets these contacts he grows weaker and weaker. . . . If you lifted him up too high or he lifts himself too high, he loses the contact and therefore loses the inspiration.

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12. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson at
Mobile, Alabama. October 27, 1913*

(*Congressional Record*, L, 5845)

. . . I want to speak of our present and prospective relations with our neighbors to the south. I deemed it a public duty, as well as a personal pleasure, to be here to express for myself and for the Government I represent the welcome we all feel to those who represent the Latin American States.

The future . . . is going to be very different for this hemisphere from the past. These States lying to the south of us, which have always been our neighbors, will now be drawn closer to us by innumerable ties, and, I hope, chief of all, by the tie of a common understanding of each other. Interest does not tie nations together; it sometimes separates them. But sympathy and understanding does unite them, and I believe that by the new route that is just about to be opened, while we physically cut two continents asunder, we spiritually unite them. It is a spiritual union which we seek.

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There is one peculiarity about the history of the Latin American States which I am sure they are keenly aware of. You hear of "concessions" to foreign capitalists in Latin America. You do not hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in the United States. They are not granted concessions. They are invited to make investments. The work is ours, though they are welcome to invest in it. We do not ask them to supply the capital and do the work. It is an invitation, not a privilege; and States that are obliged, because their territory does not lie within the main field of modern enterprise and action, to grant concessions are in this condition, that foreign interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs, a condition of affairs always danger-

ous and apt to become intolerable. What these States are going to see, therefore, is an emancipation from the subordination, which has been inevitable, to foreign enterprise and an assertion of the splendid character which, in spite of these difficulties, they have again and again been able to demonstrate. The dignity, the courage, the self-possession, the self-respect of the Latin American States, their achievements in the face of all these adverse circumstances, deserve nothing but the admiration and applause of the world. They have had harder bargains driven with them in the matter of loans than any other peoples in the world. Interest has been exacted of them that was not exacted of anybody else, because the risk was said to be greater; and then securities were taken that destroyed the risk — an admirable arrangement for those who were forcing the terms! I rejoice in nothing so much as in the prospect that they will now be emancipated from these conditions, and we ought to be the first to take part in assisting in that emancipation. I think some of these gentlemen have already had occasion to bear witness that the Department of State in recent months has tried to serve them in that wise. In the future they will draw closer and closer to us because of circumstances of which I wish to speak with moderation and, I hope, without indiscretion.

We must prove ourselves their friends and champions upon terms of equality and honor. You can not be friends upon any other terms than upon the terms of equality. You can not be friends at all except upon the terms of honor. We must show ourselves friends by comprehending their interest whether it squares with our own interest or not. It is a very perilous thing to determine the foreign policy of a nation in the terms of material interest. It not only is unfair to those with whom you are dealing, but it is degrading as regards your own actions.

Comprehension must be the soil in which shall grow all the fruits of friendship, and there is a reason and a compulsion lying behind all this which is dearer than anything else to the thoughtful men of America. I mean the development of constitutional liberty in the world. Human rights, national integrity, and opportunity as against material interests — that, . . . is the issue which we now have to face. I want to take this occasion to say that the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest. She will devote herself to showing that she knows how to make honorable and fruitful use of the territory she has, and she must regard it as one of the duties of friendship to see that from no quarter are material interests made superior to human liberty and national opportunity. I say this, not with a single thought that any one will gainsay it, but merely to fix in our consciousness what our real relationship with the rest of America is. It is the relationship of a family of mankind devoted to the development of true constitutional liberty. We know that that is the soil out of which the best enterprise springs. We know that this is a cause which we are making in common with our neighbors, because we have had to make it for ourselves.

Reference has been made here to-day to some of the national problems which confront us as a Nation. What is at the heart of all our national problems? It is that we have seen the hand of material interest sometimes about to close upon our dearest rights and possessions. We have seen material interests threaten constitutional freedom in the United States. Therefore we will now know how to sympathize with those in the rest of America who have to contend with such powers, not only within their borders but from outside their borders also.

I know what the response of the thought and heart of

America will be to the program I have outlined, because America was created to realize a program like that. This is not America because it is rich. This is not America because it has set up for a great population great opportunities of material prosperity. America is a name which sounds in the ears of men everywhere as a synonym with individual opportunity because a synonym of individual liberty. I would rather belong to a poor nation that was free than to a rich nation that had ceased to be in love with liberty. But we shall not be poor if we love liberty, because the nation that loves liberty truly sets every man free to do his best and be his best, and that means the release of all the splendid energies of a great people who think for themselves. A nation of employees can not be free any more than a nation of employers can be.

In emphasizing the points which must unite us in sympathy and in spiritual interest with the Latin American peoples we are only emphasizing the points of our own life, and we should prove ourselves untrue to our own traditions if we proved ourselves untrue friends to them. Do not think, therefore, . . . that the questions of the day are mere questions of policy and diplomacy. They are shot through with the principles of life. We dare not turn from the principle that morality and not expediency is the thing that must guide us and that we will never condone iniquity because it is most convenient to do so. It seems to me that this is a day of infinite hope, of confidence in a future greater than the past has been, for I am fain to believe that in spite of all the things that we wish to correct the nineteenth century that now lies behind us has brought us a long stage toward the time when, slowly ascending the tedious climb that leads to the final uplands, we shall get our ultimate view of the duties of mankind. We have breasted a considerable part of that climb and shall presently — it may be in a gen-

eration or two — come out upon those great heights where there shines unobstructed the light of the justice of God.

REVIEW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

13. *Extract from the Annual Message of the President.* *December 2, 1913*

(*Congressional Record*, LI, 43)

The country, I am thankful to say, is at peace with all the world, and many happy manifestations multiply about us of a growing cordiality and sense of community of interest among the nations, foreshadowing an age of settled peace and good will. More and more readily each decade do the nations manifest their willingness to bind themselves by solemn treaty to the processes of peace, the processes of frankness and fair concession. So far the United States has stood at the front of such negotiations. She will, I earnestly hope and confidently believe, give fresh proof of her sincere adherence to the cause of international friendship by ratifying the several treaties of arbitration awaiting renewal by the Senate. In addition to these, it has been the privilege of the Department of State to gain the assent, in principle, of no less than 31 nations, representing four-fifths of the population of the world, to the negotiation of treaties by which it shall be agreed that whenever differences of interest or of policy arise which can not be resolved by the ordinary processes of diplomacy they shall be publicly analyzed, discussed, and reported upon by a tribunal chosen by the parties before either nation determines its course of action.

There is only one possible standard by which to determine controversies between the United States and other nations, and that is compounded of these two elements: Our

own honor and our obligations to the peace of the world. A test so compounded ought easily to be made to govern both the establishment of new treaty obligations and the interpretation of those already assumed.

There is but one cloud upon our horizon. That has shown itself to the south of us, and hangs over Mexico. There can be no certain prospect of peace in America until Gen. Huerta has surrendered his usurped authority in Mexico; until it is understood on all hands, indeed, that such pretended governments will not be countenanced or dealt with by the Government of the United States. We are the friends of constitutional government in America; we are more than its friends, we are its champions; because in no other way can our neighbors, to whom we would wish in every way to make proof of our friendship, work out their own development in peace and liberty. Mexico has no government. The attempt to maintain one at the City of Mexico has broken down, and a mere military despotism has been set up which has hardly more than the semblance of national authority. It originated in the usurpation of Victoriano Huerta, who, after a brief attempt to play the part of constitutional President, has at last cast aside even the pretense of legal right and declared himself dictator. As a consequence, a condition of affairs now exists in Mexico which has made it doubtful whether even the most elementary and fundamental rights either of her own people or of the citizens of other countries resident within her territory can long be successfully safeguarded, and which threatens, if long continued, to imperil the interests of peace, order, and tolerable life in the lands immediately to the south of us. Even if the usurper had succeeded in his purposes, in despite of the constitution of the Republic and the rights of its people, he would have set up nothing but a precarious and hateful power, which could

have lasted but a little while, and whose eventual downfall would have left the country in a more deplorable condition than ever. But he has not succeeded. He has forfeited the respect and the moral support even of those who were at one time willing to see him succeed. Little by little he has been completely isolated. By a little every day his power and prestige are crumbling and the collapse is not far away. We shall not, I believe, be obliged to alter our policy of watchful waiting. And then, when the end comes, we shall hope to see constitutional order restored in distressed Mexico by the concert and energy of such of her leaders as prefer the liberty of their people to their own ambitions.

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... outside the charmed circle of our own national life in which our affections command us, as well as our consciences, there stand out our obligations toward our territories oversea. Here we are trustees. Porto Rico, Hawaii, the Philippines, are ours, indeed, but not ours to do what we please with. Such territories, once regarded as mere possessions, are no longer to be selfishly exploited; they are part of the domain of public conscience and of serviceable and enlightened statesmanship. We must administer them for the people who live in them and with the same sense of responsibility to them as toward our own people in our domestic affairs. No doubt we shall successfully enough bind Porto Rico and the Hawaiian Islands to ourselves by ties of justice and interest and affection, but the performance of our duty toward the Philippines is a more difficult and debatable matter. We can satisfy the obligations of generous justice toward the people of Porto Rico by giving them the ample and familiar rights and privileges accorded our own citizens in our own territories and our obligations toward the people of Hawaii by perfecting

the provisions for self-government already granted them, but in the Philippines we must go further. We must hold steadily in view their ultimate independence, and we must move toward the time of that independence as steadily as the way can be cleared and the foundations thoughtfully and permanently laid.

Acting under the authority conferred upon the President by Congress, I have already accorded the people of the islands a majority in both houses of their legislative body by appointing five instead of four native citizens to the membership of the commission. I believe that in this way we shall make proof of their capacity in counsel and their sense of responsibility in the exercise of political power, and that the success of this step will be sure to clear our view for the steps which are to follow. Step by step we should extend and perfect the system of self-government in the islands, making test of them and modifying them as experience discloses their successes and their failures; that we should more and more put under the control of the native citizens of the archipelago the essential instruments of their life, their local instrumentalities of government, their schools, all the common interests of their communities, and so by counsel and experience set up a government which all the world will see to be suitable to a people whose affairs are under their own control. At last, I hope and believe, we are beginning to gain the confidence of the Filipino peoples. By their counsel and experience, rather than by our own, we shall learn how best to serve them and how soon it will be possible and wise to withdraw our supervision. Let us once find the path and set out with firm and confident tread upon it and we shall not wander from it or linger upon it.

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EXPORTATION OF ARMS INTO MEXICO

14. *Statement of President Wilson. February 3, 1914*

(*New York Times*, February 4, 1914)

The Executive order¹ under which the exportation of arms and ammunition into Mexico is forbidden was a departure from the accepted practices of neutrality — a deliberate departure from those practices under a well-considered joint resolution of Congress, determined upon in circumstances which have now ceased to exist. It was intended to discourage incipient revolts against the regularly constituted authorities of Mexico.

Since that order was issued the circumstances of the case have undergone a radical change. There is now no Constitutional Government in Mexico; and the existence of this order hinders and delays the very thing the Government of the United States is now insisting upon, namely, that Mexico shall be left free to settle her own affairs and as soon as possible put them on a constitutional footing by her own force and counsel. The order is, therefore, rescinded.

PANAMA CANAL TOLLS EXEMPTION15. *Address of the President to the Congress.*

March 5, 1914

(*Congressional Record*, LI, 4313)

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, gentlemen of the Congress: I have come to you upon an errand which can be very briefly performed, but I beg that you will not measure its importance by the number of sentences in which I state it.

¹ The order by President Taft, dated March 14, 1912, continued under the Wilson administration.

No communication I have addressed to the Congress carried with it graver or more far-reaching implications as to the interest of the country, and I come now to speak upon a matter with regard to which I am charged in a peculiar degree, by the Constitution itself, with personal responsibility.

I have come to ask you for the repeal of that provision of the Panama Canal Act of August 24, 1912, which exempts vessels engaged in the coastwise trade of the United States from payment of tolls, and to urge upon you the justice, the wisdom, and the large policy of such a repeal with the utmost earnestness of which I am capable.

In my own judgment, very fully considered and maturely formed, that exemption constitutes a mistaken economic policy from every point of view, and is, moreover, in plain contravention of the treaty with Great Britain concerning the canal concluded on November 18, 1901.¹ But I have not come to urge upon you my personal views. I have come to state to you a fact and a situation. Whatever may be our own differences of opinion concerning this much debated measure, its meaning is not debated outside the United States. Everywhere else the language of the treaty is given but one interpretation, and that interpretation precludes the exemption I am asking you to repeal. We consented to the treaty; its language we accepted, if we did not originate; and we are too big, too powerful, too self-respecting a Nation to interpret with too strained or refined a reading the words of our own promises just because we have power enough to give us leave to read them as we please. The large thing to do is the only thing that we can afford to do, a voluntary withdrawal from a position

¹ The Hay-Pauncefote treaty. For text see *Treaties, Conventions, etc. between United States and other Powers*, 61st Congress, 2d session, Senate Document No. 357, I, 782.

everywhere questioned and misunderstood. We ought to reverse our action without raising the question whether we were right or wrong, and so once more deserve our reputation for generosity and for the redemption of every obligation without quibble or hesitation.¹

I ask this of you in support of the foreign policy of the administration. I shall not know how to deal with other matters of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence if you do not grant it to me in ungrudging measure.¹

RELATIONS WITH MEXICO: TAMPICO

16. *Address of the President to the Congress.*

April 20, 1914

(Congressional Record, LI, 6908)

Gentlemen of the Congress: It is my duty to call your attention to a situation which has arisen in our dealings with Gen. Victoriano Huerta at Mexico City which calls for action, and to ask your advice and cooperation in acting upon it. On the 9th of April a paymaster of the *U. S. S. Dolphin* landed at the Iturbide Bridge landing at Tampico with a whaleboat and boat's crew to take off certain supplies needed by his ship, and while engaged in loading the boat was arrested by an officer and squad of men of the army of Gen. Huerta. Neither the paymaster nor any one of the boat's crew was armed. Two of the men were in the boat when the arrest took place, and were obliged to leave it and submit to be taken into custody, notwithstanding the fact that the boat carried, both at her bow and at her stern, the flag of the United States. The officer who made the arrest was proceeding up one of the streets of the town

¹ For President Wilson's own explanations of this sentence see *The World's Work*, XXVIII, 490.

with his prisoners when met by an officer of higher authority, who ordered him to return to the landing and await orders; and within an hour and a half from the time of the arrest orders were received from the commander of the Huertista forces at Tampico for the release of the paymaster and his men. The release was followed by apologies from the commander and later by an expression of regret by Gen. Huerta himself. Gen. Huerta urged that martial law obtained at the time at Tampico; that orders had been issued that no one should be allowed to land at the Iturbide Bridge; and that our sailors had no right to land there. Our naval commanders at the port had not been notified of any such prohibition; and, even if they had been, the only justifiable course open to the local authorities would have been to request the paymaster and his crew to withdraw and to lodge a protest with the commanding officer of the fleet. Admiral Mayo regarded the arrest as so serious an affront that he was not satisfied with the apologies offered, but demanded that the flag of the United States be saluted with special ceremony by the military commander of the port.

The incident can not be regarded as a trivial one, especially as two of the men arrested were taken from the boat itself—that is to say, from the territory of the United States—but had it stood by itself it might have been attributed to the ignorance or arrogance of a single officer. Unfortunately, it was not an isolated case. A series of incidents have recently occurred which can not but create the impression that the representatives of Gen. Huerta were willing to go out of their way to show disregard for the dignity and rights of this Government and felt perfectly safe in doing what they pleased, making free to show in many ways their irritation and contempt. A few days after the incident at Tampico an orderly from the *U. S. S. Min-*

nesota was arrested at Vera Cruz while ashore in uniform to obtain the ship's mail and was for a time thrown into jail. An official dispatch from this Government to its embassy at Mexico City was withheld by the authorities of the telegraphic service until peremptorily demanded by our chargé d'affaires in person. So far as I can learn, such wrongs and annoyances have been suffered to occur only against representatives of the United States. I have heard of no complaints from other Governments of similar treatment. Subsequent explanations and formal apologies did not and could not alter the popular impression, which it is possible it had been the object of the Huertista authorities to create, that the Government of the United States was being singled out, and might be singled out with impunity, for slights and affronts in retaliation for its refusal to recognize the pretensions of Gen. Huerta to be regarded as the constitutional provisional President of the Republic of Mexico.

The manifest danger of such a situation was that such offenses might grow from bad to worse until something happened of so gross and intolerable a sort as to lead directly and inevitably to armed conflict. It was necessary that the apologies of Gen. Huerta and his representatives should go much further; that they should be such as to attract the attention of the whole population to their significance and such as to impress upon Gen. Huerta himself the necessity of seeing to it that no further occasion for explanations and professed regrets should arise. I therefore felt it my duty to sustain Admiral Mayo in the whole of his demand and to insist that the flag of the United States should be saluted in such a way as to indicate a new spirit and attitude on the part of the Huertistas.

Such a salute Gen. Huerta has refused, and I have come to ask your approval and support in the course I now purpose to pursue.

This Government can, I earnestly hope, in no circumstances be forced into war with the people of Mexico. Mexico is torn by civil strife. If we are to accept the tests of its own constitution, it has no government. Gen. Huerta has set his power up in the City of Mexico, such as it is, without right and by methods for which there can be no justification. Only part of the country is under his control. If armed conflict should unhappily come as a result of his attitude of personal resentment toward this Government, we should be fighting only Gen. Huerta and those who adhere to him and give him their support, and our object would be only to restore to the people of the distracted Republic the opportunity to set up again their own laws and their own Government.

But I earnestly hope that war is not now in question. I believe that I speak for the American people when I say that we do not desire to control in any degree the affairs of our sister Republic. Our feeling for the people of Mexico is one of deep and genuine friendship, and everything that we have so far done or refrained from doing has proceeded from our desire to help them, not to hinder or embarrass them. We would not wish even to exercise the good offices of friendship without their welcome and consent. The people of Mexico are entitled to settle their own domestic affairs in their own way, and we sincerely desire to respect their right. The present situation need have none of the grave implications of interference if we deal with it promptly, firmly, and wisely.

No doubt I could do what is necessary in the circumstances to enforce respect for our Government without recourse to the Congress and yet not exceed my constitutional powers as President, but I do not wish to act in a matter possibly of so grave consequence except in close conference and cooperation with both the Senate and House. I there-

fore come to ask your approval that I should use the armed forces of the United States in such ways and to such an extent as may be necessary to obtain from Gen. Huerta and his adherents the fullest recognition of the rights and dignity of the United States, even amidst the distressing conditions now unhappily obtaining in Mexico.

There can in what we do be no thought of aggression or of selfish aggrandizement. We seek to maintain the dignity and authority of the United States only because we wish always to keep our great influence unimpaired for the uses of liberty, both in the United States and wherever else it may be employed for the benefit of mankind.

RELATIONS WITH MEXICO: A. B. C. MEDIATION

17. *Communication of Secretary Bryan. April 25, 1914*

(*American Journal of International Law*, VIII, 583)

The Government of the United States is deeply sensible of the friendliness, the good feeling, and the generous concern for the peace and welfare of America manifested in the joint note ¹ just received from your Excellencies, tendering the good offices of your Governments to effect, if possible, a settlement of the present difficulties between the Government of the United States and those who now claim to represent our sister Republic of Mexico.

Conscious of the purpose with which the proffer is made, this Government does not feel at liberty to decline it. Its own chief interest is in the peace of America, the cordial intercourse of her republics and their people, and the happiness and prosperity which can spring only out of frank,

¹ The text of the joint note of the representatives of Argentina, Brazil and Chile is printed in *American Journal of International Law*, VIII, 583.

mutual understandings and the friendship which is created by common purpose.

The generous offer of your Governments is therefore accepted. This Government hopes most earnestly that you may find those who speak for the several elements of the Mexican people willing and ready to discuss terms of satisfactory, and therefore permanent, settlement. If you should find them willing, this Government will be glad to take up with you for discussion in the frankest and most conciliatory spirit any proposals that may be authoritatively formulated, and will hope that they may prove feasible and prophetic of a new day of mutual co-operation and confidence in America.

This Government feels bound in candor to say that its diplomatic relations with Mexico being for the present severed, it is not possible for it to make sure of an uninterrupted opportunity to carry out the plan of intermediation which you propose. It is, of course, possible that some act of aggression on the part of those who control the military forces of Mexico might oblige the United States to act, to the upsetting of hopes of immediate peace; but this does not justify us in hesitating to accept your generous suggestion.

We shall hope for the best results within a time brief enough to relieve our anxiety lest ill-considered hostile demonstrations should interrupt negotiations and disappoint our hopes of peace.

THE AMERICAN SPIRIT AND A WAR OF
SERVICE

18. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

May 11, 1914¹

(From the official printed text; for the entire address see *Congressional Record*, LI, 8426)

We have gone down to Mexico to serve mankind, if we can find out the way. We do not want to fight the Mexicans. We want to serve the Mexicans, if we can, because we know how we would like to be free and how we would like to be served if there were friends standing by in such case ready to serve us. A war of aggression is not a war in which it is a proud thing to die, but a war of service is a thing in which it is a proud thing to die.

Notice how truly these men were of our blood. I mean of our American blood, which is not drawn from any one country, which is not drawn from any one stock, which is not drawn from any one language of the modern world; but free men everywhere have sent their sons and their brothers and their daughters to this country in order to make that great compounded Nation which consists of all the sturdy elements and of all the best elements of the whole globe. I listened again to this list of the dead with a profound interest because of the mixture of the names, for the names bear the marks of the several national stocks from which these men came. But they are not Irishmen or Germans or Frenchmen or Hebrews or Italians any more. They were not when they went to Vera Cruz; they were Americans, every one of them, and with no difference in their American-

¹ At the memorial services at the Brooklyn Navy Yard for the men killed at Vera Cruz.

ism because of the stock from which they came. They were in a peculiar sense of our blood, and they proved it by showing that they were of our spirit, that no matter what their derivation, no matter where their people came from, they thought and wished and did the things that were American; and the flag under which they served was a flag in which all the blood of mankind is united to make a free Nation.

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TRUE AMERICANISM VERSUS HYPHENATED AMERICANISM

19. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

May 16, 1914

(*Congressional Record*, LI, 9243)

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What does the United States stand for, then, that our hearts should be stirred by the memory of the men who set her Constitution up? John Barry fought, like every other man in the Revolution, in order that America might be free to make her own life without interruption or disturbance from any other quarter. You can sum the whole thing up in that, that America had a right to her own self-determined life; and what are our corollaries from that? You do not have to go back to stir your thoughts again with the issues of the Revolution. Some of the issues of the Revolution were not the cause of it, but merely the occasion for it. There are just as vital things stirring now that concern the existence of the Nation as were stirring then, and every man who worthily stands in this presence should examine himself and see whether he has the full conception of what it means that America should live her own life. Washington saw it when he wrote his farewell address. It

was not merely because of passing and transient circumstances that Washington said that we must keep free from entangling alliances. It was because he saw that no country had yet set its face in the same direction in which America had set her face. We can not form alliances with those who are not going our way; and in our might and majesty and in the confidence and definiteness of our own purpose we need not and we should not form alliances with any nation in the world. Those who are right, those who study their consciences in determining their policies, those who hold their honor higher than their advantage, do not need alliances. You need alliances when you are not strong, and you are weak only when you are not true to yourself. You are weak only when you are in the wrong; you are weak only when you are afraid to do the right; you are weak only when you doubt your cause and the majesty of a nation's might asserted.

There is another corollary. John Barry was an Irishman, but his heart crossed the Atlantic with him. He did not leave it in Ireland. And the test of all of us — for all of us had our origins on the other side of the sea — is whether we will assist in enabling America to live her separate and independent life, retaining our ancient affections, indeed, but determining everything that we do by the interests that exist on this side of the sea. Some Americans need hyphens in their names, because only part of them has come over; but when the whole man has come over, heart and thought and all, the hyphen drops of its own weight out of his name. This man was not an Irish-American; he was an Irishman who became an American. I venture to say if he voted he voted with regard to the questions as they looked on this side of the water and not as they affected the other side; and that is my infallible test of a genuine American, that when he votes or when he acts or when he fights

his heart and his thought are centered nowhere but in the emotions and the purposes and the policies of the United States.

This man illustrates for me all the splendid strength which we brought into this country by the magnet of freedom. Men have been drawn to this country by the same thing that has made us love this country — by the opportunity to live their own lives and to think their own thoughts and to let their whole natures expand with the expansion of a free and mighty Nation. We have brought out of the stocks of all the world all the best impulses, and have appropriated them and Americanized them and translated them into the glory and majesty of a great country.

So, ladies and gentlemen, when we go out from this presence we ought to take this idea with us that we, too, are devoted to the purpose of enabling America to live her own life, to be the justest, the most progressive, the most honorable, the most enlightened Nation in the world. Any man that touches our honor is our enemy. Any man who stands in the way of the kind of progress which makes for human freedom can not call himself our friend. Any man who does not feel behind him the whole push and rush and compulsion that filled men's hearts in the time of the Revolution is no American. No man who thinks first of himself and afterwards of his country can call himself an American. America must be enriched by us. We must not live upon her; she must live by means of us.

I, for one, come to this shrine to renew the impulses of American democracy. I would be ashamed of myself if I went away from this place without realizing again that every bit of self-seeking must be purged from our individual consciences, and that we must be great, if we would be great at all, in the light and illumination of the example

of men who gave everything that they were and everything that they had to the glory and honor of America.

IDEALS AND PURPOSES OF FOREIGN POLICY

20. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

July 4, 1914

(Congressional Record, LI, Appendix, 707)

In one sense the Declaration of Independence has lost its significance. It has lost its significance as a declaration of national independence. Nobody outside America believed when it was uttered that we could make good our independence; now nobody anywhere would dare to doubt that we are independent and can maintain our independence. As a declaration of independence, therefore, it is a mere historic document. Our independence is a fact so stupendous that it can be measured only by the size and energy and variety and wealth and power of one of the greatest nations in the world. But it is one thing to be independent and it is another thing to know what to do with your independence. It is one thing to come to your majority and another thing to know what you are going to do with your life and your energies; and one of the most serious questions for sober-minded men to address themselves to in the United States is this, What are we going to do with the influence and power of this great Nation? Are we going to play the old rôle of using that power for our aggrandizement and material benefit only? You know what that may mean. It may upon occasion mean that we shall use it to make the peoples of other nations suffer in the way in which we said it was intolerable to suffer when we uttered our Declaration of Independence.

The Department of State at Washington is constantly called upon to back up the commercial enterprises and the industrial enterprises of the United States in foreign countries, and it at one time went so far in that direction that all its diplomacy came to be designated as "dollar diplomacy." It was called upon to support every man who wanted to earn anything anywhere if he was an American. But there ought to be a limit to that. There is no man who is more interested than I am in carrying the enterprise of American business men to every quarter of the globe. I was interested in it long before I was suspected of being a politician. I have been preaching it year after year as the great thing that lay in the future for the United States, to show her wit and skill and enterprise and influence in every country in the world. But observe the limit to all that which is laid upon us perhaps more than upon any other nation in the world. We set this Nation up—at any rate, we professed to set it up—to vindicate the rights of men. We did not name any differences between one race and another. We did not set up any barriers against any particular people. We opened our gates to all the world and said, "Let all men who wish to be free come to us and they will be welcome." We said, "This independence of ours is not a selfish thing for our own exclusive private use. It is for everybody to whom we can find the means of extending it." We can not with that oath taken in our youth, we can not with that great ideal set before us when we were a young people and numbered only a scant three millions, take upon ourselves, now that we are a hundred million strong, any other conception of duty than we then entertained. If American enterprise in foreign countries, particularly in those foreign countries which are not strong enough to resist us, takes the shape of imposing upon and exploiting the mass of the people of that country, it ought

to be checked and not encouraged. I am willing to get anything for an American that money and enterprise can obtain except the suppression of the rights of other men. I will not help any man buy a power which he ought not to exercise over his fellow beings.

You know, my fellow countrymen, what a big question there is in Mexico. Eighty-five per cent of the Mexican people have never been allowed to have any genuine participation in their own government or to exercise any substantial rights with regard to the very land they live upon. All the rights that men most desire have been exercised by the other 15 per cent. Do you suppose that that circumstance is not sometimes in my thought? I know that the American people have a heart that will beat just as strong for those millions in Mexico as it will beat or has beaten for any other millions elsewhere in the world, and that when once they conceive what is at stake in Mexico, they will know what ought to be done in Mexico. I hear a great deal said about the loss of property in Mexico and the loss of the lives of foreigners, and I deplore these things with all my heart. Undoubtedly upon the conclusion of the present disturbed conditions in Mexico those who have been unjustly deprived of their property or in any wise unjustly put upon ought to be compensated. Men's individual rights have no doubt been invaded, and the invasion of those rights has been attended by many deplorable circumstances which ought sometime in the proper way to be accounted for. But back of it all is the struggle of a people to come into its own; and while we look upon the incidents in the foreground let us not forget the great tragic reality in the background, which towers above the whole picture.

A patriotic American is a man who is not niggardly and selfish in the things he enjoys that make for human liberty

and the rights of man. He wants to share them with the whole world, and he is never so proud of the great flag under which he lives as when it comes to mean to other people as well as to himself a symbol of hope and liberty. I would be ashamed of this flag if it ever did anything outside America that we would not permit it to do inside of America.

The world is becoming more complicated every day, my fellow citizens. No man ought to be foolish enough to think that he understands it all. And therefore I am glad that there are some simple things in the world. One of the simple things is principle. Honesty is a perfectly simple thing. It is hard for me to believe that in most circumstances when a man has a choice of ways he does not know which is the right way and which is the wrong way. No man who has chosen the wrong way ought even to come into Independence Square; it is holy ground which he ought not to tread upon. He ought not to come where immortal voices have uttered the great sentences of such a document as this Declaration of Independence upon which rests the liberty of a whole nation.

And so I say that it is patriotic sometimes to prefer the honor of the country to its material interest. Would you rather be deemed by all the nations of the world incapable of keeping your treaty obligations in order that you might have free tolls for American ships? The treaty under which we gave up that right may have been a mistaken treaty, but there was no mistake about its meaning.

When I have made a promise as a man I try to keep it, and I know of no other rule permissible to a nation. The most distinguished nation in the world is the nation that can and will keep its promises, even to its own hurt. And I want to say parenthetically that I do not think anybody was hurt. I can not be enthusiastic for subsidies to a

monopoly; but let those who are enthusiastic for subsidies ask themselves whether they prefer subsidies to unsullied honor.

The most patriotic man is sometimes the man who goes in the direction that he thinks right, even when he sees half the world against him. It is the dictate of patriotism to sacrifice yourself, if you think that that is the path of honor and of duty. Do not blame others if they do not agree with you. Do not die with bitterness in your heart because you did not convince the rest of the world; but die happy because you believe that you tried to serve your country by not selling your soul. Those were grim days, the days of 1776. Those gentlemen did not attach their names to the Declaration of Independence on this table expecting a holiday on the next day, and that 4th of July was not itself a holiday. They attached their signatures to that significant document knowing that if they failed it was certain that every one of them would hang for the failure. They were committing treason in the interest of the liberty of 3,000,000 people in America. All the rest of the world was against them and smiled with cynical incredulity at the audacious undertaking. Do you think that if they could see this great Nation now they would regret anything that they did to draw the gaze of a hostile world upon them? Every idea must be started by somebody, and it is a lonely thing to start anything. Yet if it is in you, you must start it if you have a man's blood in you, and if you love the country that you profess to be working for.

I am sometimes very much interested when I see gentlemen supposing that popularity is the way to success in America. The way to success in this great country, with its fair judgments, is to show that you are not afraid of anybody except God and His final verdict. If I did not believe that, I would not believe in democracy. If I did

not believe that, I would not believe that people can govern themselves. If I did not believe that the moral judgment would be the last judgment, the final judgment, in the minds of men as well as at the tribunal of God, I could not believe in popular government. But I do believe these things, and therefore I earnestly believe in the democracy not only of America but of every awakened people that wishes and intends to govern and control its own affairs.

It is very inspiring, my friends, to come to this that may be called the original fountain of independence and liberty in America and here drink draughts of patriotic feeling which seem to renew the very blood in one's veins. Down in Washington sometimes when the days are hot and the business presses intolerably and there are so many things to do that it does not seem possible to do anything in the way it ought to be done it is always possible to lift one's thought above the task of the moment and, as it were, to realize that great thing of which we are all parts, the great body of American feeling and American principle. No man could do the work that has to be done in Washington if he allowed himself to be separated from that body of principle. He must make himself feel that he is a part of the people of the United States; that he is trying to think not only for them but with them, and then he can not feel lonely. He not only can not feel lonely, but he can not feel afraid of anything.

My dream is that as the years go on and the world knows more and more of America it will also drink at these fountains of youth and renewal; that it also will turn to America for those moral inspirations which lie at the basis of all freedom; that the world will never fear America unless it feels that it is engaged in some enterprise which is inconsistent with the rights of humanity; and that America will come into the full light of the day when all shall know that

she puts human rights above all other rights, and that her flag is the flag not only of America, but of humanity.

What other great people has devoted itself to this exalted ideal? To what other nation in the world can all eyes look for an instant sympathy that thrills the whole body politic when men anywhere are fighting for their rights? I do not know that there will ever be a declaration of independence and of grievances for mankind, but I believe that if any such document is ever drawn it will be drawn in the spirit of the American Declaration of Independence, and that America has lifted high the light which will shine unto all generations and guide the feet of mankind to the goal of justice and liberty and peace.

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY

21. *Extract from an Appeal of President Wilson to the American People. August 18, 1914*¹

(Department of State. *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 2, p. 17)

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The effect of the war upon the United States will depend upon what American citizens say and do. Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. The spirit of the Nation in this critical matter will be determined largely by what individuals and society and those gathered in public meetings do and say, upon what newspapers and magazines contain, upon

¹ The first formal proclamation of neutrality was issued August 4, 1914; others followed from time to time as various nations were drawn into the war. For typical text see Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 2, 15.

what ministers utter in their pulpits, and men proclaim as their opinions on the streets.

The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them with regard to the issues and circumstances of the conflict. Some will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle. It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it. Those responsible for exciting it will assume a heavy responsibility, responsibility for no less a thing than that the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its Government should unite them as Americans all, bound in honor and affection to think first of her and her interests, may be divided in camps of hostile opinion, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion, if not in action.

Such divisions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend.

I venture, therefore, my fellow countrymen, to speak a solemn word of warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking sides. The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another.

My thought is of America. I am speaking, I feel sure,

the earnest wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this great country of ours, which is, of course, the first in our thoughts and in our hearts, should show herself in this time of peculiar trial a Nation fit beyond others to exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action; a Nation that neither sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world. . . .

22. *Extract from a Communication of President Wilson to the German Emperor. September 16, 1914*¹

(*American Journal of International Law*, VIII, 857)

You will, I am sure, not expect me to say more. Presently, I pray God very soon, this war will be over. The day of accounting will then come when I take it for granted the nations of Europe will assemble to determine a settlement. Where wrongs have been committed their consequences and the relative responsibility involved will be assessed.

The nations of the world have fortunately by agreement made a plan for such a reckoning and settlement. What such a plan cannot compass the opinion of mankind, the final arbiter in such matters, will supply. It would be unwise, it would be premature, for a single Government, however fortunately separated from the present struggle, it would even be inconsistent with the neutral position of any nation which like this has no part in the contest, to form or express a final judgment.

I speak thus frankly because I know that you will expect and wish me to do so as one friend speaks to another, and

¹ A similar communication was made to a Belgian Delegation.

because I feel sure that such a reservation of judgment until the end of the war, when all its events and circumstances can be seen in their entirety and in their true relations, will commend itself to you as a true expression of sincere neutrality.

BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

23. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.* *October 20, 1914*

(From the official printed text; for the entire address see *Congressional Record*, LI, 10812)

Mr. President, Gentlemen of the American Bar Association: I am very deeply gratified by the greeting that your president has given me and by your response to it. My only strength lies in your confidence.

We stand now in a peculiar case. Our first thought, I suppose, as lawyers, is of international law, of those bonds of right and principle which draw the nations together and hold the community of the world to some standards of action. We know that we see in international law, as it were, the moral processes by which law itself came into existence. I know that as a lawyer I have myself at times felt that there was no real comparison between the law of a nation and the law of nations, because the latter lacked the sanction that gave the former strength and validity. And yet, if you look into the matter more closely, you will find that the two have the same foundations, and that those foundations are more evident and conspicuous in our day than they have ever been before.

The opinion of the world is the mistress of the world; and the processes of international law are the slow processes by which opinion works its will. What impresses me is the

constant thought that that is the tribunal at the bar of which we all sit. I would call your attention, incidentally, to the circumstance that it does not observe the ordinary rules of evidence; which has sometimes suggested to me that the ordinary rules of evidence had shown some signs of growing antique. Everything, rumor included, is heard in this court, and the standard of judgment is not so much the character of the testimony as the character of the witness. The motives are disclosed, the purposes are conjectured, and that opinion is finally accepted which seems to be, not the best founded in law perhaps, but the best founded in integrity of character and of morals. That is the process which is slowly working its will upon the world, and what we should be watchful of is not so much jealous interests as sound principles of action. The disinterested course is always the biggest course to pursue not only, but it is in the long run the most profitable course to pursue. If you can establish your character, you can establish your credit.

. . . in this time of world change, in this time when we are going to find out just how, in what particulars, and to what extent the real facts of human life and the real moral judgments of mankind prevail, it is worth while looking inside our municipal law and seeing whether the judgments of the law are made square with the moral judgments of mankind. For I believe that we are custodians, not of commands but of a spirit. We are custodians of the spirit of righteousness, of the spirit of equal-handed justice, of the spirit of hope which believes in the perfectibility of the law with the perfectibility of human life itself.

Public life, like private life, would be very dull and dry if it were not for this belief in the essential beauty of the human spirit and the belief that the human spirit could be translated into action and into ordinance. Not

entire. You can not go any faster than you can advance the average moral judgments of the mass, but you can go at least as fast as that, and you can see to it that you do not lag behind the average moral judgments of the mass. I have in my life dealt with all sorts and conditions of men, and I have found that the flame of moral judgment burned just as bright in the man of humble life and limited experience as in the scholar and the man of affairs. And I would like his voice always to be heard, not as a witness, not as speaking in his own case, but as if he were the voice of men in general, in our courts of justice, as well as the voice of the lawyers, remembering what the law has been. My hope is that, being stirred to the depths by the extraordinary circumstances of the time in which we live, we may recover from those depths something of a renewal of that vision of the law with which men may be supposed to have started out in the old days of the oracles, who communed with the intimations of divinity.

FOREIGN TRADE AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

24. *Extract from Message of the President.*

December 8, 1914

(Congressional Record, LII, 18)

Moreover,¹ our thoughts are now more of the future than of the past. While we have worked at our tasks of peace the circumstances of the whole age have been altered by war. What we have done for our own land and our own people we did with the best that was in us, whether of character or of intelligence, with sober enthusiasm and with

¹ A review of the events of the year 1914 preceded the President's discussion of foreign affairs.

a confidence in the principles upon which we were acting which sustained us at every step of the difficult undertaking; but it is done. It has passed from our hands. It is now an established part of the legislation of the country. Its usefulness, its effects, will disclose themselves in experience. What chiefly strikes us now, as we look about us during these closing days of a year which will be forever memorable in the history of the world, is that we face new tasks, have been facing them these six months, must face them in the months to come — face them without partisan feeling, like men who have forgotten everything but a common duty and the fact that we are representatives of a great people whose thought is not of us but of what America owes to herself and to all mankind in such circumstances as these upon which we look amazed and anxious.

War has interrupted the means of trade not only but also the processes of production. In Europe it is destroying men and resources wholesale and upon a scale unprecedented and appalling. There is reason to fear that the time is near, if it be not already at hand, when several of the countries of Europe will find it difficult to do for their people what they have hitherto been always easily able to do — many essential and fundamental things. At any rate, they will need our help and our manifold services as they have never needed them before; and we should be ready, more fit and ready than we have ever been.

It is of equal consequence that the nations whom Europe has usually supplied with innumerable articles of manufacture and commerce, of which they are in constant need and without which their economic development halts and stands still, can now get only a small part of what they formerly imported, and eagerly look to us to supply their all but empty markets. This is particularly true of our own neighbors, the States, great and small, of Central and South

America. Their lines of trade have hitherto run chiefly athwart the seas, not to our ports but to the ports of Great Britain and of the older Continent of Europe. I do not stop to inquire why or to make any comment on probable causes. What interests us just now is not the explanation but the fact, and our duty and opportunity in the presence of it. Here are markets which we must supply, and we must find the means of action. The United States, this great people for whom we speak and act, should be ready as never before to serve itself and to serve mankind; ready with its resources, its energies, its forces of production, and its means of distribution.

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And there is another great piece of legislation which awaits and should receive the sanction of the Senate¹—I mean the bill which gives a larger measure of self-government to the people of the Philippines. How better, in this time of anxious questioning and perplexed policy, could we show our confidence in the principles of liberty, as the source as well as the expression of life, how better could we demonstrate our own self-possession and steadfastness in the courses of justice and disinterestedness than by thus going calmly forward to fulfill our promises to a dependent people, who will look more anxiously than ever to see whether we have indeed the liberality, the unselfishness, the courage, the faith we have boasted and professed. I can not believe that the Senate will let this great measure of constructive justice await the action of another Congress. Its passage would nobly crown the record of these two years of memorable labor.

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¹ The Philippine bill had passed the House of Representatives, October 14, 1914.

The other topic I shall take leave to mention goes deeper into the principles of our national life and policy. It is the subject of national defense.

It can not be discussed without first answering some very searching questions. It is said in some quarters that we are not prepared for war. What is meant by being prepared? Is it meant that we are not ready upon brief notice to put a nation in the field, a nation of men trained to arms? Of course we are not ready to do that; and we never shall be in time of peace so long as we retain our present political principles and institutions. And what is it that it is suggested we should be prepared to do? To defend ourselves against attack? We have always found means to do that, and shall find them whenever it is necessary without calling our people away from their necessary tasks to render compulsory military service in time of peace.

Allow me to speak with great plainness and directness upon this great matter and to avow my convictions with deep earnestness. I have tried to know what America is, what her people think, what they are, what they most cherish and hold dear. I hope that some of their finer passions are in my own heart — some of the great conceptions and desires which gave birth to this Government and which have made the voice of this people a voice of peace and hope and liberty among the peoples of the world; and that speaking my own thoughts, I shall, at least in part, speak theirs also, however faintly and inadequately, upon this vital matter.

We are at peace with all the world. No one who speaks counsel based on fact or drawn from a just and candid interpretation of realities can say that there is any reason to fear that from any quarter our independence or the integrity of our territory is threatened. Dread of the power of any other nation we are incapable of. We are not jealous of rivalry in the fields of commerce or of any other peaceful

achievement. We mean to live our own lives as we will; but we mean also to let live. We are, indeed, a true friend to all the nations of the world, because we threaten none, covet the possessions of none, desire the overthrow of none. Our friendship can be accepted and is accepted without reservation, because it is offered in a spirit and for a purpose which no one need ever question or suspect. Therein lies our greatness. We are champions of peace and of concord. And we should be very jealous of this distinction which we have sought to earn. Just now we should be particularly jealous of it, because it is our dearest present hope that this character and reputation may presently, in God's providence, bring us an opportunity such as has seldom been vouchsafed any nation, the opportunity to counsel and obtain peace in the world and reconciliation and a healing settlement of many a matter that has cooled and interrupted the friendship of nations. This is the time above all others when we should wish and resolve to keep our strength by self-possession, our influence by preserving our ancient principles of action.

From the first we have had a clear and settled policy with regard to military establishments. We never have had, and while we retain our present principles and ideals we never shall have, a large standing army. If asked, Are you ready to defend yourselves? We reply, Most assuredly, to the utmost. And yet we shall not turn America into a military camp. We will not ask our young men to spend the best years of their lives making soldiers of themselves. There is another sort of energy in us. It will know how to declare itself and make itself effective should occasion arise. And especially when half the world is on fire we shall be careful to make our moral insurance against the spread of the conflagration very definite and certain and adequate indeed.

Let us remind ourselves, therefore, of the only thing we can do or will do. We must depend in every time of na-

tional peril, in the future as in the past, not upon a standing army, nor yet upon a reserve army, but upon a citizenry trained and accustomed to arms. It will be right enough, right American policy, based upon our accustomed principles and practices, to provide a system by which every citizen who will volunteer for the training may be made familiar with the use of modern arms, the rudiments of drill and maneuver, and the maintenance and sanitation of camps. We should encourage such training and make it a means of discipline which our young men will learn to value. It is right that we should provide it not only, but that we should make it as attractive as possible, and so induce our young men to undergo it at such times as they can command a little freedom and can seek the physical development they need, for mere health's sake, if for nothing else. Every means by which such things can be stimulated is legitimate, and such a method smacks of true American ideas. It is right, too, that the National Guard of the States should be developed and strengthened by every means which is not inconsistent with our obligations to our own people or with the established policy of our Government. And this, also, not because the time or occasion specially calls for such measures, but because it should be our constant policy to make these provisions for our national peace and safety.

More than this carries with it a reversal of the whole history and character of our polity. More than this, proposed at this time, permit me to say, would mean merely that we had lost our self-possession, that we had been thrown off our balance by a war with which we have nothing to do, whose causes can not touch us, whose very existence affords us opportunities of friendship and disinterested service which should make us ashamed of any thought of hostility or fearful preparation for trouble. This is assuredly the opportunity for which a people and a government like ours

were raised up, the opportunity not only to speak but actually to embody and exemplify the counsels of peace and amity and lasting concord which is based on justice and fair and generous dealing.

BRITISH RESTRAINTS ON COMMERCE

25. *Extract from a Communication of Secretary Bryan. December 26, 1914*¹

(Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 1, p. 39)

The present condition of American foreign trade resulting from the frequent seizures and detentions of American cargoes destined to neutral European ports has become so serious as to require a candid statement of the views of this Government in order that the British Government may be fully informed as to the attitude of the United States toward the policy which has been pursued by the British authorities during the present war.

You will, therefore, communicate the following to His Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, but in doing so you will assure him that it is done in the most friendly spirit and in the belief that frankness will better serve the continuance of cordial relations between the two countries than silence, which may be misconstrued into acquiescence in a course of conduct which this Government can not but consider to be an infringement upon the rights of American citizens.

It is needless to point out to His Majesty's Government, usually the champion of the freedom of the seas and the rights of trade, that peace, not war, is the normal relation

¹ An earlier protest had been made October 21, 1914.

between nations and that the commerce between countries which are not belligerents should not be interfered with by those at war unless such interference is manifestly an imperative necessity to protect their national safety, and then only to the extent that it is a necessity. It is with no lack of appreciation of the momentous nature of the present struggle in which Great Britain is engaged and with no selfish desire to gain undue commercial advantage that this Government is reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the present policy of His Majesty's Government toward neutral ships and cargoes exceeds the manifest necessity of a belligerent and constitutes restrictions upon the rights of American citizens on the high seas which are not justified by the rules of international law or required under the principle of self-preservation.

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Not only is the situation a critical one to the commercial interests of the United States, but many of the great industries of this country are suffering because their products are denied long-established markets in European countries, which, though neutral, are contiguous to the nations at war. Producers and exporters, steamship and insurance companies are pressing, and not without reason, for relief from the menace of trans-Atlantic trade which is gradually but surely destroying their business and threatening them with financial disaster.

The Government of the United States, still relying upon the deep sense of justice of the British Nation, which has been so often manifested in the intercourse between the two countries during so many years of uninterrupted friendship, expresses confidently the hope that his Majesty's Government will realize the obstacles and difficulties which their present policy has placed in the way of commerce between the United States and the neutral countries of Europe, and

will instruct its officials to refrain from all unnecessary interference with the freedom of trade between nations which are sufferers, though not participants, in the present conflict; and will in their treatment of neutral ships and cargoes conform more closely to those rules governing the maritime relations between belligerents and neutrals, which have received the sanction of the civilized world, and which Great Britain has, in other wars, so strongly and successfully advocated.

In conclusion, it should be impressed upon His Majesty's Government that the present condition of American trade with the neutral European countries is such that, if it does not improve, it may arouse a feeling contrary to that which has so long existed between the American and British peoples. Already it is becoming more and more the subject of public criticism and complaint. There is an increasing belief, doubtless not entirely unjustified, that the present British policy toward American trade is responsible for the depression in certain industries which depend upon European markets. The attention of the British Government is called to this possible result of their present policy to show how widespread the effect is upon the industrial life of the United States and to emphasize the importance of removing the cause of complaint.¹

¹ The reply of Great Britain, dated January 7, 1915, is published in Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 1, p. 41.

SELF-GOVERNMENT IN MEXICO

26. *Extract from Address of President Wilson.*

January 8, 1915

(Congressional Record, LII, 1279)

Now, there is one thing I have got a great enthusiasm about — I might almost say a reckless enthusiasm — and that is human liberty. The governor has just now spoken about watchful waiting in Mexico. I want to say a word about Mexico, or not so much about Mexico as about our attitude toward Mexico. I hold it as a fundamental principle, and so do you, that every people has the right to determine its own form of government; and until this recent revolution in Mexico, until the end of the Diaz reign, 80 per cent of the people of Mexico never had a “look-in” in determining who should be their governor or what their Government should be. Now, I am for the 80 per cent. It is none of my business, and it is none of your business, how long they take in determining it. It is none of my business and it is none of yours how they go about the business. The country is theirs. The Government is theirs. The liberty, if they can get it, and Godspeed them in getting it, is theirs. And so far as my influence goes while I am President nobody shall interfere with them.

That is what I mean by a great emotion, the great emotion of sympathy. Do you suppose that the American people are ever going to count a small amount of material benefit and advantage to people doing business in Mexico against the liberties and the permanent happiness of the Mexican people? Have not European nations taken as long as they wanted and spilt as much blood as they pleased in settling their affairs, and shall we deny that to Mexico

because she is weak? No, I say! I am proud to belong to a strong nation that says: "This country, which we could crush, shall have just as much freedom in her own affairs as we have. If I am strong, I am ashamed to bully the weak. In proportion to my strength is my pride in withholding that strength from the oppression of another people." And I know when I speak of these things — not merely from the generous response with which they have just met from you, but from my long-time knowledge of the American people — that that is the sentiment of the American people.

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DEFENSE OF THE NEUTRALITY OF THE UNITED STATES

27. *Extract from a Letter of Secretary Bryan.*
January 20, 1915

(Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 2, p. 58)

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If any American citizens, partisans of Germany and Austria-Hungary, feel that this administration is acting in a way injurious to the cause of those countries, this feeling results from the fact that on the high seas the German and Austro-Hungarian naval power is thus far inferior to the British. It is the business of a belligerent operating on the high seas, not the duty of a neutral, to prevent contraband from reaching an enemy. Those in this country who sympathize with Germany and Austria-Hungary appear to assume that some obligation rests upon this Government in the performance of its neutral duty to prevent all trade in contraband, and thus to equalize the difference due to the relative naval strength of the belligerents. No such obliga-

tion exists; it would be an unneutral act, an act of partiality on the part of this Government to adopt such a policy if the Executive had the power to do so. If Germany and Austria-Hungary can not import contraband from this country, it is not, because of that fact, the duty of the United States to close its markets to the allies. The markets of this country are open upon equal terms to all the world, to every nation, belligerent or neutral.

The foregoing categorical replies to specific complaints is sufficient answer to the charge of unfriendliness to Germany and Austria-Hungary.

IMMIGRATION

28. *Extract from a Message of the President.*

January 28, 1915

(Congressional Record, LII, 2481)

In two particulars of vital consequence this bill ¹ embodies a radical departure from the traditional and long-established policy of this country, a policy in which our people have conceived the very character of their Government to be expressed, the very mission and spirit of the Nation in respect of its relations to the peoples of the world outside their borders. It seeks to all but close entirely the gates of asylum which have always been open to those who could find nowhere else the right and opportunity of constitutional agitation for what they conceived to be the natural and inalienable rights of men; and it excludes those to whom the opportunities of elementary education have been denied, without

¹ The bill referred to is the immigration bill passed by the Sixty-Third Congress in the middle of January, 1915. President Wilson vetoed a similar bill in January, 1917, but it was later passed over his veto.

regard to their character, their purpose, or their natural capacity.

Restrictions like these adopted earlier in our history as a nation, would very materially have altered the course and cooled the humane ardors of our politics. The right of political asylum has brought to this country many a man of noble character and elevated purpose who was marked as an outlaw in his own less fortunate land, and who has yet become an ornament to our citizenship and to our public councils. The children and the compatriots of these illustrious Americans must stand amazed to see the representatives of their Nation now resolved, in the fullness of our national strength and at the maturity of our great institutions, to risk turning such men back from our shores without test of quality or purpose. It is difficult for me to believe that the full effect of this feature of the bill was realized when it was framed and adopted, and it is impossible for me to assent to it in the form in which it is here cast.

The literacy test and the tests and restrictions which accompany it constitute an even more radical change in the policy of the Nation. Hitherto we have generously kept our doors open to all who were not unfitted by reason of disease or incapacity for self-support or such personal records and antecedents as were likely to make them a menace to our peace and order or to the wholesome and essential relationships of life. In this bill it is proposed to turn away from tests of character and of quality and to impose tests which exclude and restrict; for the new tests here embodied are not tests of quality or of character or of personal fitness, but tests of opportunity. Those who come seeking opportunity are not to be admitted unless they have already had one of the chief of the opportunities they seek, the opportunity of education. The object of such provision is restriction, not selection.

If the people of this country have made up their minds to limit the number of immigrants by arbitrary tests and so reverse the policy of all the generations of Americans that have gone before them, it is their right to do so. I am their servant, and have no license to stand in their way. But I do not believe that they have. I respectfully submit that no one can quote their mandate to that effect. Has any political party ever avowed a policy of restriction in this fundamental matter, gone to the country on it, and been commissioned to control its legislation? Does this bill rest upon the conscious and universal assent and desire of the American people? I doubt it. It is because I doubt it that I make bold to dissent from it. I am willing to abide by the verdict, but not until it has been rendered. Let the platforms of parties speak out upon this policy and the people pronounce their wish. The matter is too fundamental to be settled otherwise.

I have no pride of opinion in this question. I am not foolish enough to profess to know the wishes and ideals of America better than the body of her chosen representatives know them. I only want instruction direct from those whose fortunes, with ours and all men's, are involved.

GERMAN SUBMARINE WARFARE

29. *Extract from a Communication of Secretary Bryan.*
*February 10, 1915*¹

(Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 1, p. 54)

It is of course not necessary to remind the German Government that the sole right of a belligerent in dealing with

¹The German decree of February 6, 1915, establishing a war zone around the British Isles, is published in Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European war Series, No. 1, p. 52.

neutral vessels on the high seas is limited to visit and search, unless a blockade is proclaimed and effectively maintained, which this Government does not understand to be proposed in this case. To declare or exercise a right to attack and destroy any vessel entering a prescribed area of the high seas without first certainly determining its belligerent nationality and the contraband character of its cargo would be an act so unprecedented in naval warfare that this Government is reluctant to believe that the Imperial Government of Germany in this case contemplates it as possible. The suspicion that enemy ships are using neutral flags improperly can create no just presumption that all ships traversing a prescribed area are subject to the same suspicion. It is to determine exactly such questions that this Government understands the right of visit and search to have been recognized.

This Government has carefully noted the explanatory statement issued by the Imperial German Government at the same time with the proclamation of the German Admiralty, and takes this occasion to remind the Imperial German Government very respectfully that the Government of the United States is open to none of the criticisms for unneutral action to which the German Government believe the governments of certain of other neutral nations have laid themselves open; that the Government of the United States has not consented to or acquiesced in any measures which may have been taken by the other belligerent nations in the present war which operate to restrain neutral trade, but has, on the contrary, taken in all such matters a position which warrants it in holding those governments responsible in the proper way for any untoward effects upon American shipping which the accepted principles of international law do not justify; and that it, therefore, regards itself as free in the present instance to take with a clear conscience and

upon accepted principles the position indicated in this note.

If the commanders of German vessels of war should act upon the presumption that the flag of the United States was not being used in good faith and should destroy on the high seas an American vessel or the lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for the Government of the United States to view the act in any other light than as an indefensible violation of neutral rights which it would be very hard indeed to reconcile with the friendly relations now so happily subsisting between the two Governments.

If such a deplorable situation should arise, the Imperial German Government can readily appreciate that the Government of the United States would be constrained to hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas.

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SUBMARINE WARFARE AND RESTRAINTS ON COMMERCE

30. *Extract from a Communication of Secretary Bryan.*
February 20, 1915

(Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 1, p. 59)

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Germany and Great Britain to agree:

1. That neither will sow any floating mines, whether upon the high seas or in territorial waters; that neither will plant on the high seas anchored mines except within cannon range of harbors for defensive purposes only; and that all mines

shall bear the stamp of the Government planting them and be so constructed as to become harmless if separated from their moorings.

2. That neither will use submarines to attack merchant vessels of any nationality except to enforce the right of visit and search.

3. That each will require their respective merchant vessels not to use neutral flags for the purpose of *disguise* or *ruse de guerre*.

Germany to agree:

That all importations of food or foodstuffs from the United States (and from such other neutral countries as may ask it) into Germany shall be consigned to agencies to be designated by the United States Government; that these American agencies shall have entire charge and control without interference on the part of the German Government, of the receipt and distribution of such importations, and shall distribute them solely to retail dealers bearing licenses from the German Government entitling them to receive and furnish such food and foodstuffs to noncombatants only; that any violation of the terms of the retailers' licenses shall work a forfeiture of their rights to receive such food and foodstuffs for this purpose; and that such food and foodstuffs will not be requisitioned by the German Government for any purpose whatsoever or be diverted to the use of the armed forces of Germany.

Great Britain to agree:

That food and foodstuffs will not be placed upon the absolute contraband list and that shipments of such commodities will not be interfered with or detained by British authorities if consigned to agencies designated by the United States Government in Germany for the receipt and distribution of such cargoes to licensed German retailers for distribution solely to the noncombatant population.

In submitting this proposed basis of agreement this Government does not wish to be understood as admitting or denying any belligerent or neutral right established by the principles of international law, but would consider the agreement, if acceptable to the interested powers, a *modus vivendi* based upon expediency rather than legal right and as not binding upon the United States either in its present form or in a modified form until accepted by this Government.

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY

31. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.**April 8, 1915**(New York Times, April 9, 1915)*

. . . These are days of great perplexity, when a great cloud of trouble hangs and broods over the greater part of the world. It seems as if great, blind material forces had been released which had for long been held in leash and restraint. And yet, underneath that you can see the strong impulses of great ideals.

It would be impossible for men to go through what men are going through on the battlefields of Europe—to go through the present dark night of their terrible struggle—if it were not that they saw, or thought that they saw, the broadening of light where the morning sun should come up, and believed that they were standing, each on his side of the contest, for some eternal principle for right.

Then, all about them, all about us, there sits the silent, waiting tribunal which is going to utter the ultimate judgment upon this struggle, the great tribunal of the opinion of the world, and I fancy I see, I hope that I see, I pray that it may be that I do truly see great spiritual forces lying

waiting for the outcome of this thing to assert themselves, and asserting themselves even now to enlighten our judgment and steady our spirits. No man is wise enough to pronounce judgment, but we can all hold our spirits in readiness to accept the truth when it dawns on us and is revealed to us in the outcome of this titanic struggle.

You will see that it is only in such general terms that one can speak in the midst of a confused world, because, as I have already said, no man has the key to this confusion. No man can see the outcome, but every man can keep his own spirit prepared to contribute to the net result when the outcome displays itself.

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32. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

April 19, 1915

(New York Times, April 20, 1915)

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In a peculiar degree the United States seems to be reborn from generation to generation, because renewed out of all the sources of human energies in the world. There is here a great melting pot in which we must compound a precious metal. That metal is the metal of nationality, and if you will not think I am merely playing upon words, I would like to spell the word "metal" in two ways, for it is just the mettle of this nation that we are now most interested in.

There are many tests by which a nation makes proof of its greatness, but it seems to me the supreme test is self-possession, the power to resist excitement, to think calmly, to think in moments of difficulty as clearly as it would think in moments of ease — to be absolutely master of itself and of its fortunes.

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Such ideals cannot be maintained with steadiness of view amidst contest and excitement, and what I am constantly hoping is that every great influence — such as you ladies exercise, for example — will be exercised to produce the sober second thought upon every critical matter that arises.

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I cannot speak, ladies, as you know, in more than general terms. Indeed, it is indiscreet for me to speak at all, but I can ask you to rally to the cause which is dearer in my estimation than any other cause, and that is the cause of righteousness as ministered to by those who hold their minds quiet and judge according to principle.

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33. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

April 20, 1915

(From the official printed text; for the entire address see *Current History, New York Times*, II, 438)

I am deeply gratified by the generous reception you have accorded me. It makes me look back with a touch of regret to former occasions when I have stood in this place and enjoyed a greater liberty than is granted me today. There have been times when I stood in this spot and said what I really thought, and I cannot help praying that those days of indulgence may be accorded me again. I have come here today, of course, somewhat restrained by a sense of responsibility which I cannot escape. For I take The Associated Press very seriously. I know the enormous part that you play in the affairs not only of this country but the world. You deal in the raw material of opinion and, if my convictions have any validity, opinion ultimately governs the world.

It is, therefore, of very serious things that I think as I

face this body of men. I do not think of you, however, as members of The Associated Press. I do not think of you as men of different parties or of different racial derivations or of different religious denominations. I want to talk to you as to my fellow citizens of the United States. For there are serious things which as fellow citizens we ought to consider. The times behind us, gentlemen, have been difficult enough; the times before us are likely to be more difficult still, because, whatever may be said about the present condition of the world's affairs, it is clear that they are drawing rapidly to a climax, and at the climax the test will come, not only for the nations engaged in the present colossal struggle — it will come for them of course — but the test will come to us particularly.

Do you realize that, roughly speaking, we are the only great Nation at present disengaged? I am not speaking, of course, with disparagement of the greatness of those nations in Europe which are not parties to the present war, but I am thinking of their close neighborhood to it. I am thinking how their lives much more than ours touch the very heart and stuff of the business, whereas we have rolling between us and those bitter days across the water three thousand miles of cool and silent ocean. Our atmosphere is not yet charged with those disturbing elements which must permeate every nation of Europe. Therefore, is it not likely that the nations of the world will some day turn to us for the cooler assessment of the elements engaged? I am not now thinking so preposterous a thought as that we should sit in judgment upon them — no nation is fit to sit in judgment upon any other nation — but that we shall some day have to assist in reconstructing the processes of peace. Our resources are untouched; we are more and more becoming by the force of circumstances the mediating Nation of the world in respect to its finance. We must make up

our minds what are the best things to do and what are the best ways to do them. We must put our money, our energy, our enthusiasm, our sympathy into these things, and we must have our judgments prepared and our spirits chastened against the coming of that day.

So that I am not speaking in a selfish spirit when I say that our whole duty, for the present, at any rate, is summed up in this motto, "America first." Let us think of America before we think of Europe, in order that America may be fit to be Europe's friend when the day of tested friendship comes. The test of friendship is not now sympathy with the one side or the other, but getting ready to help both sides when the struggle is over. The basis of neutrality, gentlemen, is not indifference; it is not self-interest. The basis of neutrality is sympathy for mankind. It is fairness, it is good will, at bottom. It is impartiality of spirit and of judgment. I wish that all of our fellow citizens could realize that. There is in some quarters a disposition to create distempers in this body politic. Men are even uttering slanders against the United States, as if to excite her. Men are saying that if we should go to war upon either side there will be a divided America — an abominable libel of ignorance! America is not all of it vocal just now. It is vocal in spots, but I, for one, have a complete and abiding faith in that great silent body of Americans who are not standing up and shouting and expressing their opinions just now, but are waiting to find out and support the duty of America. I am just as sure of their solidity and of their loyalty and of their unanimity, if we act justly, as I am that the history of this country has at every crisis and turning point illustrated this great lesson.

We are the mediating Nation of the world. I do not mean that we undertake not to mind our own business and to mediate where other people are quarreling. I mean the

word in a broader sense. We are compounded of the nations of the world. We mediate their blood, we mediate their traditions, we mediate their sentiments, their tastes, their passions; we are ourselves compounded of those things. We are, therefore, able to understand all nations; we are able to understand them in the compound, not separately, as partisans, but unitedly as knowing and comprehending and embodying them all. It is in that sense that I mean that America is a mediating Nation. The opinion of America, the action of America, is ready to turn, and free to turn, in any direction. Did you ever reflect upon how almost every other nation has through long centuries been almost every other nation, has through long centuries been headed in one direction? That is not true of the United States. The United States has no racial momentum. It has no history back of it which makes it run all its energies and all its ambitions in one particular direction. And America is particularly free in this, that she has no hampering ambitions as a world power. We do not want a foot of anybody's territory. If we have been obliged by circumstances, or have considered ourselves to be obliged by circumstances, in the past, to take territory which we otherwise would not have thought of taking, I believe I am right in saying that we have considered it our duty to administer that territory, not for ourselves but for the people living in it, and to put this burden upon our consciences — not to think that this thing is ours for our use, but to regard ourselves as trustees of the great business for those to whom it does really belong, trustees ready to hand it over to the *cestui que trust* at any time when the business seems to make that possible and feasible. That is what I mean by saying we have no hampering ambitions. We do not want anything that does not belong to us. Is not a nation in that position free to serve other nations,

and is not a nation like that ready to form some part of the assessing opinion of the world?

My interest in the neutrality of the United States is not the petty desire to keep out of trouble. . . . But I am interested in neutrality because there is something so much greater to do than fight; there is something, there is a distinction waiting for this Nation that no nation has ever yet got. That is the distinction of absolute self-control and self-mastery. . . . Now, I covet for America this splendid courage of reserve moral force. . . .

. . . The world ought to know the truth, but the world ought not at this period of unstable equilibrium to be disturbed by rumor, ought not to be disturbed by imaginative combinations of circumstances, or, rather, by circumstances stated in combination which do not belong in combination. You gentlemen, and gentlemen engaged like you, are holding the balances in your hand. This unstable equilibrium rests upon the scales that are in your hands. For the food of opinion, as I began by saying, is the news of the day. I have known many a man to go off at a tangent on information that was not reliable. Indeed, that describes the majority of men. The world is held stable by the man who waits for the next day to find out whether the report was true or not.

We can not afford, therefore, to let the rumors of irresponsible persons and origins get into the atmosphere of the United States. We are trustees for what I venture to say is the greatest heritage that any nation ever had, the love of justice and righteousness and human liberty. For, fundamentally, those are the things to which America is addicted and to which she is devoted. There are groups of selfish men in the United States, there are coteries, where sinister things are purposed, but the great heart of the

American people is just as sound and true as it ever was. And it is a single heart; it is the heart of America. It is not a heart made up of sections selected out of other countries.

What I try to remind myself of every day when I am almost overcome by perplexities, what I try to remember, is what the people at home are thinking about. I try to put myself in the place of the man who does not know all the things that I know and ask myself what he would like the policy of this country to be. Not the talkative man, not the partisan man, not the man who remembers first that he is a Republican or Democrat, or that his parents were German or English, but the man who remembers first that the whole destiny of modern affairs centers largely upon his being an American first of all. If I permitted myself to be a partisan in this present struggle I would be unworthy to represent you. If I permitted myself to forget the people who are not partisans, I would be unworthy to be your spokesman. I am not sure that I am worthy to represent you, but I do claim this degree of worthiness — that before everything else I love America.

34. *Extract from a Communication of Secretary Bryan to the German Ambassador. April 21, 1915*¹

(Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 1, p. 74)

In the first place, this Government has at no time and in no manner yielded any one of its rights as a neutral to any of the present belligerents. It has acknowledged, as a matter of course, the right of visit and search and the right to

¹ In reply to the German note dated April 4, 1915; see Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 1, p. 73.

apply the rules of contraband of war to articles of commerce. It has, indeed, insisted upon the use of visit and search as an absolutely necessary safeguard against mistaking neutral vessels for vessels owned by an enemy and against mistaking legal cargoes for illegal. It has admitted also the right of blockade if actually exercised and effectively maintained. These are merely the well-known limitations which war places upon neutral commerce on the high seas. But nothing beyond these has it conceded. I call Your Excellency's attention to this, notwithstanding it is already known to all the world as a consequence of the publication of our correspondence in regard to these matters with several of the belligerent nations, because I can not assume that you have official cognizance of it.

In the second place, this Government attempted to secure from the German and British Governments mutual concessions with regard to the measures those Governments respectively adopted for the interruption of trade on the high seas.¹ This it did, not of right, but merely as exercising the privileges of a sincere friend of both parties and as indicating its impartial good will. The attempt was unsuccessful; but I regret that Your Excellency did not deem it worthy of mention in modification of the impressions you expressed. We had hoped that this act on our part had shown our spirit in these times of distressing war as our diplomatic correspondence had shown our steadfast refusal to acknowledge the right of any belligerent to alter the accepted rules of war at sea in so far as they affect the rights and interests of neutrals.

In the third place, I note with sincere regret that, in discussing the sale and exportation of arms by citizens of the United States to the enemies of Germany, Your Excellency

¹ See the proposal dated February 20, 1915, *infra*, statement No. 30, p. 245.

seems to be under the impression that it was within the choice of the Government of the United States, notwithstanding its professed neutrality and its diligent efforts to maintain it in other particulars, to inhibit this trade, and that its failure to do so manifested an unfair attitude toward Germany. This Government holds, as I believe Your Excellency is aware, and as it is constrained to hold in view of the present indisputable doctrines of accepted international law, that any change in its own laws of neutrality during the progress of a war which would affect unequally the relations of the United States with the nations at war would be an unjustifiable departure from the principle of strict neutrality by which it has consistently sought to direct its actions, and I respectfully submit that none of the circumstances urged in Your Excellency's memorandum alters the principle involved. The placing of an embargo on the trade in arms at the present time would constitute such a change and be a direct violation of the neutrality of the United States. It will, I feel assured, be clear to Your Excellency that, holding this view and considering itself in honor bound by it, it is out of the question for this Government to consider such a course.

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THE MEANING OF AMERICANISM¹

35. *Address of President Wilson. May 10, 1915*

(From the official printed text)

It warms my heart that you should give me such a reception; but it is not of myself that I wish to think tonight, but of those who have just become citizens of the United States.

¹ Generally known as the "Too Proud to Fight" speech.

This is the only country in the world which experiences this constant and repeated rebirth. Other countries depend upon the multiplication of their own native people. This country is constantly drinking strength out of new sources by the voluntary association with it of great bodies of strong men and forward-looking women out of other lands. And so by the gift of the free will of independent people it is being constantly renewed from generation to generation by the same process by which it was originally created. It is as if humanity had determined to see to it that this great Nation, founded for the benefit of humanity, should not lack for the allegiance of the people of the world.

You have just taken an oath of allegiance to the United States. Of allegiance to whom? Of allegiance to no one, unless it be God — certainly not of allegiance to those who temporarily represent this great Government. You have taken an oath of allegiance to a great ideal, to a great body of principles, to a great hope of the human race. You have said, "We are going to America, not only to earn a living, not only to seek the things which it was more difficult to obtain where we were born, but to help forward the great enterprises of the human spirit — to let men know that everywhere in the world there are men who will cross strange oceans and go where a speech is spoken which is alien to them, if they can but satisfy their quest for what their spirits crave; knowing that whatever the speech there is but one longing and utterance of the human heart, and that is for liberty and justice." And while you bring all countries with you, you come with a purpose of leaving all other countries behind you — bringing what is best of their spirit, but not looking over your shoulders and seeking to perpetuate what you intended to leave behind in them. I certainly would not be one even to suggest that a man cease to love the home of his birth and the nation of his

origin — these things are very sacred and ought not to be put out of our hearts — but it is one thing to love the place where you were born and it is another thing to dedicate yourself to the place to which you go. You cannot dedicate yourself to America unless you become in every respect and with every purpose of your will thorough Americans. You cannot become thorough Americans if you think of yourselves in groups. America does not consist of groups. A man who thinks of himself as belonging to a particular national group in America has not yet become an American, and the man who goes among you to trade upon your nationality is no worthy son to live under the Stars and Stripes.

My urgent advice to you would be, not only always to think first of America, but always, also, to think first of humanity. You do not love humanity if you seek to divide humanity into jealous camps. Humanity can be welded together only by love, by sympathy, by justice, not by jealousy and hatred. I am sorry for the man who seeks to make personal capital out of the passions of his fellow-men. He has lost the touch and ideal of America, for America was created to unite mankind by those passions which lift and not by the passions which separate and debase. We came to America, either ourselves or in the persons of our ancestors, to better the ideals of men, to make them see finer things than they had seen before, to get rid of the things that divide and to make sure of the things that unite. It was but a historical accident no doubt that this great country was called the "United States;" and yet I am very thankful that it has the word "united" in its title, and the man who seeks to divide man from man, group from group, interest from interest in this great Union is striking at its very heart.

It is a very interesting circumstance to me, in thinking

of those of you who have just sworn allegiance to this great Government, that you were drawn across the ocean by some beckoning finger of hope, by some belief, by some vision of a new kind of justice, by some expectation of a better kind of life. No doubt you have been disappointed in some of us. Some of us are very disappointing. No doubt you have found that justice in the United States goes only with a pure heart and a right purpose, as it does everywhere else in the world. No doubt what you found here did not seem touched for you, after all, with the complete beauty of the ideal which you had conceived beforehand. But remember this: If we had grown at all poor in the ideal, you brought some of it with you. A man does not go out to seek the thing that is not in him. A man does not hope for the thing that he does not believe in, and if some of us have forgotten what America believed in, you, at any rate, imported in your own hearts a renewal of the belief. That is the reason that I, for one, make you welcome. If I have in any degree forgotten what America was intended for, I will thank God if you will remind me. I was born in America. You dreamed dreams of what America was to be, and I hope you brought the dreams with you. No man that does not see visions will ever realize any high hope or undertake any high enterprise. Just because you brought dreams with you, America is more likely to realize the dreams such as you brought. You are enriching us if you came expecting us to be better than we are.

See, my friends, what that means. It means that Americans must have a consciousness different from the consciousness of every other nation in the world. I am not saying this with even the slightest thought of criticism of other nations. You know how it is with a family. A family gets centered on itself if it is not careful and is less

interested in the neighbors than it is in its own members. So a nation that is not constantly renewed out of new sources is apt to have the narrowness and prejudice of a family; whereas, America must have this consciousness, that on all sides it touches elbows and touches hearts with all the nations of mankind. The example of America must be a special example. The example of America must be the example not merely of peace because it will not fight, but of peace because peace is the healing and elevating influence of the world and strife is not. There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right.

You have come into this great Nation voluntarily seeking something that we have to give, and all that we have to give is this: We cannot exempt you from work. No man is exempt from work anywhere in the world. We cannot exempt you from the strife and the heart-breaking burden of the struggle of the day—that is common to mankind everywhere; we cannot exempt you from the loads that you must carry. We can only make them light by the spirit in which they are carried. That is the spirit of hope, it is the spirit of liberty, it is the spirit of justice.

When I was asked, therefore, by the Mayor and the committee that accompanied him to come up from Washington to meet this great company of newly admitted citizens, I could not decline the invitation. I ought not to be away from Washington, and yet I feel that it has renewed my spirit as an American to be here. In Washington men tell you so many things every day that are not so, and I like to come and stand in the presence of a great body of my fellow-citizens, whether they have been my fellow-citizens a long time or a short time, and drink, as it were,

out of the common fountains with them and go back feeling what you have so generously given me the sense of your support and of the living vitality in your hearts of its great ideals which made America the hope of the world.

GERMAN SUBMARINE WARFARE: FIRST LUSITANIA NOTE

36. *Communication of Secretary Bryan to Ambassador Gerard. May 13, 1915*

(Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 1, p. 75)

In view of recent acts of the German authorities in violation of American rights on the high seas which culminated in the torpedoing and sinking of the British steamship *Lusitania* on May 7, 1915, by which over 100 American citizens lost their lives, it is clearly wise and desirable that the Government of the United States and the Imperial German Government should come to a clear and full understanding as to the grave situation which has resulted.

The sinking of the British passenger steamer *Falaba* by a German submarine on March 28, through which Leon C. Thrasher, an American citizen, was drowned; the attack on April 28 on the American vessel *Cushing* by a German aeroplane; the torpedoing on May 1 of the American vessel *Gulflight* by a German submarine, as a result of which two or more American citizens met their death; and, finally, the torpedoing and sinking of the steamship *Lusitania*, constitutes a series of events which the Government of the United States has observed with growing concern, distress, and amazement.

Recalling the humane and enlightened attitude hitherto assumed by the Imperial German Government in matters

of international right, and particularly with regard to the freedom of the seas; having learned to recognize the German views and the German influence in the field of international obligation as always engaged upon the side of justice and humanity; and having understood the instructions of the Imperial German Government to its naval commanders to be upon the same plane of humane action prescribed by the naval codes of other nations, the Government of the United States was loath to believe — it can not now bring itself to believe — that these acts, so absolutely contrary to the rules, the practices, and the spirit of modern warfare, could have the countenance or sanction of that great Government. It feels it to be its duty, therefore, to address the Imperial German Government concerning them with the utmost frankness and in the earnest hope that it is not mistaken in expecting action on the part of the Imperial German Government which will correct the unfortunate impressions which have been created and vindicate once more the position of that Government with regard to the sacred freedom of the seas.

The Government of the United States has been apprised that the Imperial German Government considered themselves to be obliged by the extraordinary circumstances of the present war and the measures adopted by their adversaries in seeking to cut Germany off from all commerce, to adopt methods of retaliation which go much beyond the ordinary methods of warfare at sea, in the proclamation of a war zone from which they have warned neutral ships to keep away. This Government has already taken occasion to inform the Imperial German Government that it can not admit the adoption of such measures or such a warning of danger to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships

of belligerent nationality ; and that it must hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for any infringement of those rights, intentional or incidental. It does not understand the Imperial German Government to question those rights. It assumes, on the contrary, that the Imperial Government accept, as of course, the rule that the lives of noncombatants, whether they be of neutral citizenship or citizens of one of the nations at war, can not lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unarmed merchantman, and recognize also, as all other nations do, the obligation to take the usual precaution of visit and search to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent nationality or is in fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral flag.

The Government of the United States, therefore, desires to call the attention of the Imperial German Government with the utmost earnestness to the fact that the objection to their present method of attack against the trade of their enemies lies in the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and humanity, which all modern opinion regards as imperative. It is practically impossible for the officers of a submarine to visit a merchantman at sea and examine her papers and cargo. It is practically impossible for them to make a prize of her ; and, if they can not put a prize crew on board of her, they can not sink her without leaving her crew and all on board of her to the mercy of the sea in her small boats. These facts it is understood the Imperial German Government frankly admit. We are informed that in the instances of which we have spoken time enough for even that poor measure of safety was not given, and in at least two of the cases cited not so much as a warning was received. Manifestly submarines can not be used against merchantmen, as the last

few weeks have shown, without an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity.

American citizens act within their indisputable rights in taking their ships and in traveling wherever their legitimate business calls them upon the high seas, and exercise those rights in what should be the well-justified confidence that their lives will not be endangered by acts done in clear violation of universally acknowledged international obligations, and certainly in the confidence that their own Government will sustain them in the exercise of their rights.

There was recently published in the newspapers of the United States, I regret to inform the Imperial German Government, a formal warning, purporting to come from the Imperial German Embassy at Washington, addressed to the people of the United States, and stating, in effect, that any citizen of the United States who exercised his right of free travel upon the seas would do so at his peril if his journey should take him within the zone of waters within which the Imperial German Navy was using submarines against the commerce of Great Britain and France, notwithstanding the respectful but very earnest protest of his Government, the Government of the United States. I do not refer to this for the purpose of calling the attention of the Imperial German Government at this time to the surprising irregularity of a communication from the Imperial German Embassy at Washington addressed to the people of the United States through the newspapers, but only for the purpose of pointing out that no warning that an unlawful and inhumane act will be committed can possibly be accepted as an excuse or palliation for that act or as an abatement of the responsibility for its commission.

Long acquainted as this Government has been with the character of the Imperial German Government and with the high principles of equity by which they have in the past

been actuated and guided, the Government of the United States can not believe that the commanders of the vessels which committed these acts of lawlessness did so except under a misapprehension of the orders issued by the Imperial German naval authorities. It takes it for granted that, at least within the practical possibilities of every such case, the commanders even of submarines were expected to do nothing that would involve the lives of noncombatants or the safety of neutral ships, even at the cost of failing of their object of capture or destruction. It confidently expects, therefore, that the Imperial German Government will disavow the acts of which the Government of the United States complains, that they will make reparation so far as reparation is possible for injuries which are without measure, and that they will take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the principles of warfare for which the Imperial German Government have in the past so wisely and so firmly contended.

The Government and the people of the United States look to the Imperial German Government for just, prompt, and enlightened action in this vital matter with the greater confidence because the United States and Germany are bound together not only by special ties of friendship but also by the explicit stipulations of the treaty of 1828 between the United States and the Kingdom of Prussia.

Expressions of regret and offers of reparation in case of the destruction of neutral ships sunk by mistake, while they may satisfy international obligations, if no loss of life results, can not justify or excuse a practice the natural and necessary effect of which is to subject neutral nations and neutral persons to new and immeasurable risks.

The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of main-

taining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment.

IDEALS OF SERVICE FOR THE NAVY

37. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

May 17, 1915

(From the official printed text; for the entire address see *Current History, New York Times*, II, 443)

This is not an occasion upon which, it seems to me, that it would be wise for me to make many remarks, but I would deprive myself of a great gratification if I did not express my pleasure in being here, my gratitude for the splendid reception which has been accorded me as the representative of the nation, and my profound interest in the Navy of the United States. . . .

I think it is a natural, instinctive judgment of the people of the United States that they express their power most appropriately in an efficient navy, and their interest in their ships is partly, I believe, because that Navy is expected to express their character, not within our own borders where that character is understood, but outside our borders where it is hoped we may occasionally touch others with some slight vision of what America stands for.

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I like to image in my thought this idea: These quiet ships lying in the river have no suggestion of bluster about them, no intimation of aggression. They are commanded by men thoughtful of the duty of citizens as well as the duty of officers, men acquainted with the traditions of the great service to which they belong, men who know by touch with the people of the United States what sort of purposes they ought to entertain and what sort of discretion they ought

to exercise in order to use those engines of force as engines to promote the interests of humanity.

The interesting and inspiring thing about America, gentlemen, is that she asks nothing for herself except what she has a right to ask for humanity itself. We want no nation's property. We mean to question no nation's honor. We do not wish to stand selfishly in the way of the development of any nation. We want nothing that we cannot get by our own legitimate enterprise and by the inspiration of our own example; and, standing for these things, it is not pretension on our part to say that we are privileged to stand for what every nation would wish to stand for, and speak for those things which all humanity must desire.

When I think of the flag which those ships carry, the only touch of color about them, the only thing that moves as if it had a subtle spirit in it in their solid structure, it seems to me I see alternate strips of parchment upon which are written the rights of liberty and justice, and stripes of blood spilt to vindicate those rights; and, then, in the corner a prediction of the blue serene into which every nation may swim which stands for these things.

The mission of America is the only thing that a sailor or soldier should think about. He has nothing to do with the formulation of her policy. He is to support her policy whatever it is; but he is to support her policy in the spirit of herself, and the strength of our policy is that we who for the time being administer the affairs of this Nation do not originate her spirit. We attempt to embody it; we attempt to realize it in action; we are dominated by it, we do not dictate it.

So with every man in arms who serves the Nation; he stands and waits to do the thing which the Nation desires. Those who represent America seem sometimes to forget her programs, but the people never forget them. It is as star-

ting as it is touching to see how whenever you touch a principle you touch the hearts of the people of the United States. They listen to your debates of policy, they determine which party they will prefer to power, they choose and prefer as between men, but their real affection, their real force, their real irresistible momentum, is for the ideas which men embody. . . . When a crisis occurs in this country, gentlemen, it is as if you put your hand on the pulse of a dynamo, it is as if the things which you were in connection with were spiritually bred, as if you had nothing to do with them except, if you listen truly, to speak the things that you hear.

These things now brood over the river; this spirit now moves with the men who represent the Nation in the Navy; these things will move upon the waters in the manœuvres — no threat lifted against any man, against any nation, against any interest, but just a great solemn evidence that the force of America is the force of moral principle, that there is nothing else that she loves and that there is nothing else for which she will contend.

RELATIONS WITH MEXICO

38. *Statement of President Wilson. June 2, 1915*

(*New York Times*, June 3, 1915)

For more than two years revolutionary conditions have existed in Mexico. The purpose of the revolution was to rid Mexico of men who ignored the Constitution of the republic and used their power in contempt of the right of its people, and with these purposes the people of the United States instinctively and generously sympathized. But the leaders of the revolution, in the very hour of their success, have disagreed and turned their arms against one another.

All professing the same objects, they are, nevertheless, unable or unwilling to co-operate. A central authority at Mexico City is no sooner set up than it is undermined and its authority denied by those who were expected to support it.

Mexico is apparently no nearer a solution of her tragical troubles than she was when the revolution was first kindled. And she has been swept by civil war as if by fire. Her crops are destroyed, her fields lie unseeded, her work cattle are confiscated for the use of the armed factions, her people flee to the mountains to escape being drawn into unavailing bloodshed, and no man seems to see or lead the way to peace and settled order. There is no proper protection, either for her own citizens or for the citizens of other nations resident and at work within her territory. Mexico is starving and without a Government.

In these circumstances the people and Government of the United States cannot stand indifferently by and do nothing to serve their neighbor. They want nothing for themselves in Mexico. Least of all do they desire to settle her affairs for her, or claim any right to do so. But neither do they wish to see utter ruin come upon her, and they deem it their duty as friends and neighbors to lend any aid they properly can to any instrumentality which promises to be effective in bringing about a settlement which will embody the real objects of the revolution — constitutional government and the rights of the people.

Patriotic Mexicans are sick at heart and cry out for peace and for every self-sacrifice that may be necessary to procure it. Their people cry out for food and will presently hate as much as they fear every man in their country or out of it who stands between them and their daily bread.

It is time, therefore, that the Government of the United States should frankly state the policy which, in these extraor-

dinary circumstances, it becomes its duty to adopt. It must presently do what it has not hitherto done or felt at liberty to do, lend its active moral support to some man or group of men, if such may be found, who can rally the suffering people of Mexico to their support in an effort to ignore, if they cannot unite, the warring factions of the country, return to the Constitution of the republic so long in abeyance, and set up a Government at Mexico City which the great powers of the world can recognize and deal with — a Government with whom the program of the revolution will be a business and not merely a platform.

I, therefore, publicly and very solemnly, call upon the leaders of factions in Mexico to act, to act together, and to act promptly for the relief and redemption of their prostrate country.

I feel it to be my duty to tell them that, if they cannot accommodate their differences and unite for this great purpose within a very short time, this Government will be constrained to decide what means should be employed by the United States in order to help Mexico save herself and serve her people.

GERMAN SUBMARINE WARFARE: SECOND LUSITANIA NOTE

39. *Extract from a Communication of Acting Secretary Lansing to Ambassador Gerard. June 9, 1915*¹

(Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 2, 171)

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The Government of the United States notes with gratifica-

¹ In reply to the German notes of May 28 and June 1, 1915. See Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 2, pp. 169, 170.

tion the full recognition by the Imperial German Government, in discussing the case of the *Cushing* and the *Gulflight*, of the principle of the freedom of all parts of the open sea to neutral ships and the frank willingness of the Imperial German Government to acknowledge and meet its liability where the fact of attack upon neutral ships "which have not been guilty of any hostile act" by German aircraft or vessels of war is satisfactorily established; and the Government of the United States will in due course lay before the Imperial German Government, as it requests, full information concerning the attack on the steamer *Cushing*.

With regard to the sinking of the steamer *Falaba*, by which an American citizen lost his life, the Government of the United States is surprised to find the Imperial German Government contending that an effort on the part of a merchantman to escape capture and secure assistance alters the obligation of the officer seeking to make the capture in respect of the safety of the lives of those on board the merchantman, although the vessel had ceased her attempt to escape when torpedoed. These are not new circumstances. They have been in the minds of statesmen and of international jurists throughout the development of naval warfare, and the Government of the United States does not understand that they have ever been held to alter the principles of humanity upon which it has insisted. Nothing but actual forcible resistance or continued efforts to escape by flight when ordered to stop for the purpose of visit on the part of the merchantman has ever been held to forfeit the lives of her passengers or crew. The Government of the United States, however, does not understand that the Imperial German Government is seeking in this case to relieve itself of liability, but only intends to set forth the circumstances which led the commander of the submarine to allow himself to be hurried into the course which he took.

Your Excellency's note, in discussing the loss of American lives resulting from the sinking of the steamship *Lusitania*, adverts at some length to certain information which the Imperial German Government has received with regard to the character and outfit of that vessel, and Your Excellency expresses the fear that this information may not have been brought to the attention of the Government of the United States. It is stated in the note that the *Lusitania* was undoubtedly equipped with masked guns, supplied with trained gunners and special ammunition, transporting troops from Canada, carrying a cargo not permitted under the laws of the United States to a vessel also carrying passengers, and serving, in virtual effect, as an auxiliary to the naval forces of Great Britain. Fortunately, these are matters concerning which the Government of the United States is in a position to give the Imperial German Government official information. Of the facts alleged in Your Excellency's note, if true, the Government of the United States would have been bound to take official cognizance in performing its recognized duty as a neutral power and in enforcing its national laws. It was its duty to see to it that the *Lusitania* was not armed for offensive action, that she was not serving as a transport, that she did not carry a cargo prohibited by the statutes of the United States, and that, if in fact she was a naval vessel of Great Britain, she should not receive clearance as a merchantman; and it performed that duty and enforced its statutes with scrupulous vigilance through its regularly constituted officials. It is able, therefore, to assure the Imperial German Government that it has been misinformed. If the Imperial German Government should deem itself to be in possession of convincing evidence that the officials of the Government of the United States did not perform these duties with thoroughness the Government of the United

States sincerely hopes that it will submit that evidence for consideration.

Whatever may be the contentions of the Imperial German Government regarding the carriage of contraband of war on board the *Lusitania* or regarding the explosion of that material by the torpedo, it need only be said that in view of this Government these contentions are irrelevant to the question of the legality of the methods used by the German naval authorities in sinking the vessel.

But the sinking of passenger ships involves principles of humanity which throw into the background any special circumstances of detail that may be thought to affect the cases, principles which lift it, as the Imperial German Government will no doubt be quick to recognize and acknowledge, out of the class of ordinary subjects of diplomatic discussion or of international controversy. Whatever be the other facts regarding the *Lusitania*, the principal fact is that a great steamer, primarily and chiefly a conveyance for passengers, and carrying more than a thousand souls who had no part or lot in the conduct of the war, was torpedoed and sunk without so much as a challenge or a warning, and that men, women, and children were sent to their death in circumstances unparalleled in modern warfare. The fact that more than one hundred American citizens were among those who perished made it the duty of the Government of the United States to speak of these things and once more, with solemn emphasis, to call the attention of the Imperial German Government to the grave responsibility which the Government of the United States conceives that it has incurred in this tragic occurrence, and to the indisputable principle upon which that responsibility rests. The Government of the United States is contending for something much greater than mere rights of property or privileges of

commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity, which every Government honors itself in respecting and which no Government is justified in resigning on behalf of those under its care and authority. Only her actual resistance to capture or refusal to stop when ordered to do so for the purpose of visit could have afforded the commander of the submarine any justification for so much as putting the lives of those on board the ship in jeopardy. This principle the Government of the United States understands the explicit instructions issued on August 3, 1914, by the Imperial German Admiralty to its commanders at sea to have recognized and embodied, as do the naval codes of all other nations, and upon it every traveler and seaman had a right to depend. It is upon this principle of humanity as well as upon the law founded upon this principle that the United States must stand.

The Government of the United States is happy to observe that Your Excellency's note closes with the intimation that the Imperial German Government is willing, now as before, to accept the good offices of the United States in an attempt to come to an understanding with the Government of Great Britain by which the character and conditions of the war upon the sea may be changed. The Government of the United States would consider it a privilege thus to serve its friends and the world. It stands ready at any time to convey to either Government any intimation or suggestion the other may be willing to have it convey and cordially invites the Imperial German Government to make use of its services in this way at its convenience. The whole world is concerned in anything that may bring about even a partial accommodation of interests or in any way mitigate the terrors of the present distressing conflict.

In the meantime, whatever arrangement may happily

be made between the parties to the war, and whatever may in the opinion of the Imperial German Government have been the provocation or the circumstantial justification for the past acts of its commanders at sea, the Government of the United States confidently looks to see the justice and humanity of the Government of Germany vindicated in all cases where Americans have been wronged or their rights as neutrals invaded.

The Government of the United States therefore very earnestly and very solemnly renews the representations of its note transmitted to the Imperial German Government on the 15th of May, and relies in these representations upon the principles of humanity, the universally recognized understandings of international law, and the ancient friendship of the German nation.

The Government of the United States can not admit that the proclamation of a war zone from which neutral ships have been warned to keep away may be made to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights either of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality. It does not understand the Imperial German Government to question those rights. It understands it, also, to accept as established beyond question the principle that the lives of noncombatants can not lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unresisting merchantman, and to recognize the obligation to take sufficient precaution to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent nationality or is in fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral flag. The Government of the United States therefore deems it reasonable to expect that the Imperial German Government will adopt the measures necessary to put these principles into practice in respect of the safeguarding of American

lives and American ships, and asks for assurances that this will be done.

GERMAN SUBMARINE WARFARE: THIRD LUSITANIA NOTE

40. *Communication of Secretary Lansing to Ambassador Gerard. July 21, 1915*

(Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 2, p. 178)

The note of the Imperial German Government, dated the 8th of July, 1915,¹ has received the careful consideration of the Government of the United States, and it regrets to be obliged to say that it has found it very unsatisfactory, because it fails to meet the real differences between the two Governments and indicates no way in which the accepted principles of law and humanity may be applied in the grave matter in controversy, but purposes, on the contrary, arrangements for a partial suspension of those principles which virtually set them aside.

The Government of the United States notes with satisfaction that the Imperial German Government recognizes without reservation the validity of the principles insisted on in the several communications which this Government has addressed to the Imperial German Government with regard to its announcement of a war zone and the use of submarines against merchantmen on the high seas—the principle that the high seas are free, that the character and cargo of a merchantman must first be ascertained before she can lawfully be seized or destroyed, and that the lives of noncombatants may in no case be put in jeopardy unless the vessel resists or seeks to escape after being sum-

¹ Published in Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 2, p. 175.

moned to submit to examination; for a belligerent act of retaliation is *per se* an act beyond the law, and the defense of an act as retaliatory is an admission that it is illegal.

The Government of the United States is, however, keenly disappointed to find that the Imperial German Government regards itself as in large degree exempt from the obligation to observe these principles, even where neutral vessels are concerned, by what it believes the policy and practice of the Government of Great Britain to be in the present war with regard to neutral commerce. The Imperial German Government will readily understand that the Government of the United States can not discuss the policy of the Government of Great Britain with regard to neutral trade except with that Government itself, and that it must regard the conduct of other belligerent governments as irrelevant to any discussion with the Imperial German Government of what this Government regards as grave and unjustifiable violations of the rights of American citizens by German naval commanders. Illegal and inhuman acts, however justifiable they may be thought to be against an enemy who is believed to have acted in contravention of law and humanity, are manifestly indefensible when they deprive neutrals of their acknowledged rights, particularly when they violate the right to life itself. If a belligerent can not retaliate against an enemy without injuring the lives of neutrals, as well as their property, humanity, as well as justice and a due regard for the dignity of neutral powers, should dictate that the practice be discontinued. If persisted in it would in such circumstances constitute an unpardonable offense against the sovereignty of the neutral nation affected. The Government of the United States is not unmindful of the extraordinary conditions created by this war or of the radical alterations of circumstance and method of attack produced by the use of instrumentalities of naval

warfare which the nations of the world can not have had in view when the existing rules of international law were formulated, and it is ready to make every reasonable allowance for these novel and unexpected aspects of war at sea ; but it can not consent to abate any essential or fundamental right of its people because of a mere alteration of circumstance. The rights of neutrals in time of war are based upon principle, not upon expediency, and the principles are immutable. It is the duty and obligation of belligerents to find a way to adapt the new circumstances to them.

The events of the past two months have clearly indicated that it is possible and practicable to conduct such submarine operations as have characterized the activity of the Imperial German Navy within the so-called war zone in substantial accord with the accepted practices of regulated warfare. The whole world has looked with interest and increasing satisfaction at the demonstration of that possibility by German naval commanders. It is manifestly possible, therefore, to lift the whole practice of submarine attack above the criticism which it has aroused and remove the chief causes of offense.

In view of the admission of illegality made by the Imperial Government when it pleaded the right of retaliation in defense of its acts, and in view of the manifest possibility of conforming to the established rules of naval warfare, the Government of the United States can not believe that the Imperial Government will longer refrain from disavowing the wanton act of its naval commander in sinking the *Lusitania* or from offering reparation for the American lives lost, so far as reparation can be made for a needless destruction of human life by an illegal act.

The Government of the United States, while not indifferent to the friendly spirit in which it is made, can not ac-

cept the suggestion of the Imperial German Government that certain vessels be designated and agreed upon which shall be free on the seas now illegally proscribed. The very agreement would, by implication, subject other vessels to illegal attack and would be a curtailment and therefore an abandonment of the principles for which this Government contends and which in times of calmer counsels every nation would concede as of course.

The Government of the United States and the Imperial German Government are contending for the same great object, have long stood together in urging the very principles, upon which the Government of the United States now so solemnly insists. They are both contending for the freedom of the seas. The Government of the United States will continue to contend for that freedom, from whatever quarter violated, without compromise and at any cost. It invites the practical co-operation of the Imperial German Government at this time when co-operation may accomplish most and this great common object be most strikingly and effectively achieved.

The Imperial German Government expresses the hope that this object may be in some measure accomplished even before the present war ends. It can be. The Government of the United States not only feels obliged to insist upon it, by whomsoever violated or ignored, in the protection of its own citizens, but is also deeply interested in seeing it made practicable between the belligerents themselves, and holds itself ready at any time to act as the common friend who may be privileged to suggest a way.

In the meantime the very value which this Government sets upon the long and unbroken friendship between the people and Government of the United States and the people and Government of the German nation impels it to press very solemnly upon the Imperial German Government the

necessity for a scrupulous observance of neutral rights in this critical matter. Friendship itself prompts it to say to the Imperial Government that repetition by the commanders of German naval vessels of acts in contravention of those rights must be regarded by the Government of the United States, when they affect American citizens, as deliberately unfriendly.

RELATIONS WITH MEXICO: LATIN AMERICAN AID

41. *Communication of Secretary Lansing and the diplomatic representatives at Washington of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Uruguay to all generals, governors, and other leaders known to be exercising civil or military authority in Mexico. August 11, 1915*

(*American Journal of International Law*, X, 364)

Inspired by the most sincere spirit of American fraternity, and convinced that they rightly interpret the earnest wish of the entire continent [the above mentioned representatives] have met informally at the suggestion of the Secretary of State of the United States to consider the Mexican situation and to ascertain whether their friendly and disinterested help could be successfully employed to reestablish peace and constitutional order in our sister Republic.

In the heat of the frightful struggle which for so long has steeped in blood the Mexican soil, doubtless all may well have lost sight of the dissolving effects of the strife upon the most vital conditions of the national existence, not only upon the life and liberty of the inhabitants, but

on the prestige and security of the country. We can not doubt, however — no one can doubt — that in the presence of a sympathetic appeal from their brothers of America, recalling to them these disastrous effects, asking them to save their motherland from an abyss — no one can doubt, we repeat — that the patriotism of the men who lead or aid in any way the bloody strife will not remain unmoved; no one can doubt that each and every one of them, measuring in his own conscience his share in the responsibilities of past misfortune and looking forward to his share in the glory of the pacification and reconstruction of the country, will respond, nobly and resolutely, to this friendly appeal and give their best efforts to opening the way to some saving action.

We, the undersigned, believe that if the men directing the armed movements in Mexico — whether political or military chiefs — should agree to meet, either in person or by delegates, far from the sound of cannon, and with no other inspiration save the thought of their afflicted land, there to exchange ideas and to determine the fate of the country — from such action would undoubtedly result the strong and unyielding agreement requisite to the creation of a provisional government, which should adopt the first steps necessary to the constitutional reconstruction of the country — and to issue the first and most essential of them all, the immediate call to general elections.

An adequate place within the Mexican frontiers, which for the purpose might be neutralized, should serve as the seat of the conference; and in order to bring about a conference of this nature the undersigned, or any of them, will willingly, upon invitation, act as intermediaries to arrange the time, place, and other details of such conference, if this action can in any way aid the Mexican people.

The undersigned expect a reply to this communication

within a reasonable time; and consider that such a time would be ten days after the communication is delivered, subject to prorogation for cause.

THE PURPOSE OF THE UNITED STATES

42. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

September 28, 1915

(From the official printed text; for the entire address see *New York Times*, September 29, 1915)

. . . There have been other nations as rich as we; there have been other nations as powerful; there have been other nations as spirited; but I hope we shall never forget that we created this Nation, not to serve ourselves, but to serve mankind.

. . . I hope I may say without even an implication of criticism upon any other great people in the world that it has always seemed to me that the people of the United States wished to be regarded as devoted to the promotion of particular principles of human right. The United States were founded, not to provide free homes, but to assert human rights. This flag meant a great enterprise of the human spirit. . . .

THE SPIRIT OF A PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM

43. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

October 6, 1915

(*New York Times*, October 7, 1915)

. . . I think the whole nation is convinced that we ought to be prepared, not for war, but for defense, and very ade-

quately prepared, and that the preparation for defense is not merely a technical matter, that it is not a matter that the Army and Navy alone can take care of, but a matter in which we must have the co-operation of the best brains and knowledge of the country, outside the official service of the Government, as well as inside.

For my part, I feel that it is only in the spirit of a true democracy that we get together to lend such voluntary aid, the sort of aid that comes from interest, from a knowledge of the varied circumstances that are involved in handling a nation.

I do not have to expound it to you; you know as well as I do the spirit of America. The spirit of America is one of peace, but one of independence. It is a spirit that is profoundly concerned with peace, because it can express itself best only in peace. It is the spirit of peace and goodwill and of human freedom; but it is also the spirit of a nation that is self-conscious, that knows and loves its mission in the world, and that knows that it must command the respect of the world.

So it seems to me that we are not working as those who would change anything of America, but only as those who would safeguard everything in America.

PRESERVATION OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE

44. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*
October 11, 1915

(From the official printed text; for the entire address see *New York Times*, October 12, 1915)

Neutrality is a negative word. It is a word that does not

express what America ought to feel. America has a heart and that heart throbs with all sorts of intense sympathies, but America has schooled its heart to love the things that America believes in and it ought to devote itself only to the things that America believes in; and, believing that America stands apart in its ideals, it ought not to allow itself to be drawn, so far as its heart is concerned, into anybody's quarrel. Not because it does not understand the quarrel, not because it does not in its head assess the merits of the controversy, but because America has promised the world to stand apart and maintain certain principles of action which are grounded in law and in justice. We are not trying to keep out of trouble; we are trying to preserve the foundations upon which peace can be rebuilt. Peace can be rebuilt only upon the ancient and accepted principles of international law, only upon those things which remind nations of their duties to each other, and, deeper than that, of their duties to mankind and to humanity.

America has a great cause which is not confined to the American Continent. It is the cause of humanity itself. I do not mean that in anything I say even to imply a judgment upon any nation or upon any policy, for my object here this afternoon is not to sit in judgment upon anybody but ourselves and to challenge you to assist all of us who are trying to make America more than ever conscious of her own principles and her own duty. I look forward to the necessity in every political agitation in the years which are immediately at hand of calling upon every man to declare himself, where he stands. Is it America first or is it not?

. . . I would not be afraid upon the test of "America first" to take a census of all the foreign-born citizens of the United States, for I know that the vast majority of them came here because they believed in America; and their belief in America has made them better citizens than some people

who were born in America. They can say that they have bought this privilege with a great price. They have left their homes, they have left their kindred, they have broken all the nearest and dearest ties of human life in order to come to a new land, take a new rootage, begin a new life, and so by self-sacrifice express their confidence in a new principle; whereas, it cost us none of these things. We were born into this privilege; we were rocked and cradled in it; we did nothing to create it; and it is, therefore, the greater duty on our part to do a great deal to enhance it and preserve it. I am not deceived as to the balance of opinion among the foreign-born citizens of the United States, but I am in a hurry for an opportunity to have a line-up and let the men who are thinking first of other countries stand on one side and all those that are for America first, last, and all the time on the other side.

I would not feel any exhilaration in belonging to America if I did not feel that she was something more than a rich and powerful nation. I should not feel proud to be in some respects and for a little while her spokesman if I did not believe that there was something else than physical force behind her. I believe that the glory of America is that she is a great spiritual conception and that in the spirit of her institutions dwells not only her distinction but her power. The one thing that the world cannot permanently resist is the moral force of great and triumphant convictions.

BRITISH RESTRAINTS ON COMMERCE

45. *Extract from a Communication of Secretary Lansing to Ambassador W. H. Page. October 21, 1915*

(Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 3, p. 37)

I believe it has been conclusively shown that the methods sought to be employed by Great Britain to obtain and use evidence of enemy destination of cargoes bound for neutral ports and to impose a contraband character upon such cargoes are without justification; that the blockade, upon which such methods are partly founded, is ineffective, illegal, and indefensible; that the judicial procedure offered as a means of reparation for an international injury is inherently defective for the purpose; and that in many cases jurisdiction is asserted in violation of the law of nations. The United States, therefore, can not submit to the curtailment of its neutral rights by these measures, which are admittedly retaliatory, and therefore illegal, in conception and in nature, and intended to punish the enemies of Great Britain for alleged illegalities on their part. The United States might not be in a position to object to them if its interests and the interests of all neutrals were unaffected by them, but, being affected, it can not with complacency suffer further subordination of its rights and interests to the plea that the exceptional geographic position of the enemies of Great Britain require or justify oppressive and illegal practices.

The Government of the United States desires, therefore, to impress most earnestly upon His Majesty's Government that it must insist that the relations between it and His Majesty's Government be governed, not by a policy of expediency, but by those established rules of international

conduct upon which Great Britain in the past has held the United States to account when the latter nation was a belligerent engaged in a struggle for national existence. It is of the highest importance to neutrals not only of the present day but of the future that the principles of international right be maintained unimpaired.

This task of championing the integrity of neutral rights, which have received the sanction of the civilized world against the lawless conduct of belligerents arising out of the bitterness of the great conflict which is now wasting the countries of Europe, the United States unhesitatingly assumes, and to the accomplishment of that task it will devote its energies, exercising always that impartiality which from the outbreak of the war it has sought to exercise in its relations with the warring nations.

PREPAREDNESS FOR DEFENSE

46. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

November 4, 1915

(From the official printed text; for the entire address see *Current History, New York Times*, III, 488)

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A year and a half ago our thought would have been almost altogether of great domestic questions. They are many and of vital consequence. We must and shall address ourselves to their solution with diligence, firmness, and self-possession, notwithstanding we find ourselves in the midst of a world disturbed by great disaster and ablaze with terrible war; but our thought is now inevitably of new things about which formerly we gave ourselves little concern. We are thinking now chiefly of our relations with the rest of the world,—not our commercial relations,—about those we have thought and planned always,—but about

our political relations, our duties as an individual and independent force in the world to ourselves, our neighbors, and the world itself.

Our principles are well known. It is not necessary to avow them again. We believe in political liberty and founded our great government to obtain it, the liberty of men and of peoples,—of men to choose their own lives and of peoples to choose their own allegiance. Our ambition, also, all the world has knowledge of. It is not only to be free and prosperous ourselves, but also to be the friend and thoughtful partisan of those who are free or who desire freedom the world over. If we have had aggressive purposes and covetous ambitions, they were the fruit of our thoughtless youth as a nation and we have put them aside. We shall, I confidently believe, never again take another foot of territory by conquest. We shall never in any circumstances seek to make an independent people subject to our dominion; because we believe, we passionately believe, in the right of every people to choose their own allegiance and be free of masters altogether. For ourselves we wish nothing but the full liberty of self-development; and with ourselves in this great matter we associate all the peoples of our own hemisphere. We wish not only for the United States but for them the fullest freedom of independent growth and of action, for we know that throughout this hemisphere the same aspirations are everywhere being worked out, under diverse conditions but with the same impulse and ultimate object.

. . . Within a year we have witnessed what we did not believe possible, a great European conflict involving many of the greatest nations of the world. The influences of a great war are everywhere in the air. All Europe is embattled. Force everywhere speaks out with a loud and imperious voice in a titanic struggle of governments, and

from one end of our own dear country to the other men are asking one another what our own force is, how far we are prepared to maintain ourselves against any interference with our national action or development.

In no man's mind, I am sure, is there even raised the question of the willful use of force on our part against any nation or any people. No matter what military or naval force the United States might develop, statesmen throughout the whole world might rest assured that we were gathering that force, not for attack in any quarter, not for aggression of any kind, not for the satisfaction of any political or international ambition, but merely to make sure of our own security. We have it in mind to be prepared, not for war, but only for defense; and with the thought constantly in our minds that the principles we hold most dear can be achieved by the slow processes of history only in the kindly and wholesome atmosphere of peace, and not by the use of hostile force. The mission of America in the world is essentially a mission of peace and good-will among men. She has become the home and asylum of men of all creeds and races. Within her hospitable borders they have found homes and congenial associations and freedom and a wide and cordial welcome, and they have become part of the bone and sinew and spirit of America itself. America has been made up out of the nations of the world and is the friend of the nations of the world.

But we feel justified in preparing ourselves to vindicate our right to independent and unmolested action by making the force that is in us ready for assertion.

And we know that we can do this in a way that will be itself an illustration of the American spirit. In accordance with our American traditions we want and shall work for only an army adequate to the constant and legitimate uses of times of international peace. But we do want to

feel that there is a great body of citizens who have received at least the most rudimentary and necessary forms of military training; that they will be ready to form themselves into a fighting force at the call of the nation; and that the nation has the munitions and supplies with which to equip them without delay should it be necessary to call them into action. We wish to supply them with the training they need, and we think we can do so without calling them at any time too long away from their civilian pursuits.¹

What we all wish to accomplish is that the forces of the nation should indeed be part of the nation and not a separate professional force, and the chief cost of the system would not be in the enlistment or in the training of the men, but in the providing of ample equipment in case it should be necessary to call all forces into the field.

Moreover, it has been American policy time out of mind to look to the Navy as the first and chief line of defense. The Navy of the United States is already a very great and efficient force. Not rapidly, but slowly, with careful attention, our naval force has been developed until the Navy of the United States stands recognized as one of the most efficient and notable of the modern time. All that is needed in order to bring it to a point of extraordinary force and efficiency as compared with the other navies of the world is that we should hasten our pace in the policy we have long been pursuing, and that chief of all we should have a definite policy of development, not made from year to year but looking well into the future and planning for a definite consummation. . . .

No thoughtful man feels any panic haste in this matter.

¹ At this point the President elaborated the features of the administration's plans for the army.

The country is not threatened from any quarter. She stands in friendly relations with all the world. Her resources are known and her self-respect and her capacity to care for her own citizens and her own rights. There is no fear amongst us. Under the new-world conditions we have become thoughtful of the things which all reasonable men consider necessary for security and self-defense on the part of every nation confronted with the great enterprise of human liberty and independence. That is all.

Is the plan we propose sane and reasonable and suited to the needs of the hour? Does it not conform to the ancient traditions of America? Has any better plan been proposed than this programme that we now place before the country? In it there is no pride of opinion. It represents the best professional and expert judgment of the country. But I am not so much interested in programmes as I am in safeguarding at every cost the good faith and honor of the country. . . .

. . . For the time being, I speak as the trustee and guardian of a nation's rights, charged with the duty of speaking for that nation in matters involving her sovereignty,—a nation too big and generous to be exacting and yet courageous enough to defend its rights and the liberties of its people wherever assailed or invaded. I would not feel that I was discharging the solemn obligation I owe the country were I not to speak in terms of the deepest solemnity of the urgency and necessity of preparing ourselves to guard and protect the rights and privileges of our people, our sacred heritage of the fathers who struggled to make us an independent nation.

The only thing within our own borders that has given us grave concern in recent months has been that voices have been raised in America professing to be the voices of Americans which were not in deed and in truth American,

but which spoke alien sympathies, which came from men who loved other countries better than they loved America, men who were partisans of other causes than that of America and had forgotten that their chief and only allegiance was to the great government under which they live. These voices have not been many, but they have been very loud and very clamorous. They have proceeded from a few who were bitter and who were grievously misled. America has not opened its doors in vain to men and women out of other nations. The vast majority of those who have come to take advantage of her hospitality have united their spirits with hers as well as their fortunes. These men who speak alien sympathies are not their spokesmen but are the spokesmen of small groups whom it is high time that the nation should call to a reckoning. The chief thing necessary in America in order that she should let all the world know that she is prepared to maintain her own great position is that the real voice of the nation should sound forth unmistakably and in majestic volume, in the deep unison of a common, unhesitating national feeling. I do not doubt that upon the first occasion, upon the first opportunity, upon the first definite challenge, that voice will speak forth in tones which no man can doubt and with commands which no man dare gainsay or resist.

May I not say, while I am speaking of this, that there is another danger that we should guard against? We should rebuke not only manifestations of racial feeling here in America where there should be none, but also every manifestation of religious and sectarian antagonism. It does not become America that within her borders, where every man is free to follow the dictates of his conscience and worship God as he pleases, men should raise the cry of church against church. To do that is to strike at the very spirit and heart of America. We are a God-fearing

people. We agree to differ about methods of worship, but we are united in believing in Divine Providence and in worshipping the God of Nations. We are the champions of religious right here and everywhere that it may be our privilege to give it our countenance and support. The government is conscious of the obligation and the nation is conscious of the obligation. Let no man create divisions where there are none.

Here is the nation God has builded by our hands. What shall we do with it? Who is there who does not stand ready at all times to act in her behalf in a spirit of devoted and disinterested patriotism? We are yet only in the youth and first consciousness of our power. The day of our country's life is still but in its fresh morning. Let us lift our eyes to the great tracts of life yet to be conquered in the interests of righteous peace. Come, let us renew our allegiance to America, conserve her strength in its purity, make her chief among those who serve mankind, self-reverenced, self-commanded, mistress of all forces of quiet counsel, strong above all others in good will and the might of invincible justice and right.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF FOREIGN POLICY

47. *Extract from the Annual Message of the President.*
December 7, 1915

(*Congressional Record*, LIII, 95)

Gentlemen of the Congress, since I last had the privilege of addressing you on the state of the Union the war of nations on the other side of the sea, which had then only begun to disclose its portentous proportions, has extended its threatening and sinister scope until it has swept within its flame some portion of every quarter of the globe, not excepting our own hemisphere, has altered the whole face

of international affairs, and now presents a prospect of reorganization and reconstruction such as statesmen and peoples have never been called upon to attempt before.

We have stood apart, studiously neutral. It was our manifest duty to do so. Not only did we have no part of interest in the policies which seem to have brought the conflict on; it was necessary, if a universal catastrophe was to be avoided, that a limit should be set to the sweep of destructive war and that some part of the great family of nations should keep the processes of peace alive, if only to prevent collective economic ruin and the breakdown throughout the world of the industries by which its populations are fed and sustained. It was manifestly the duty of the self-governed nations of this hemisphere to redress, if possible, the balance of economic loss and confusion in the other, if they could do nothing more. In the day of readjustment and recuperation we earnestly hope and believe that they can be of infinite service.

In this neutrality, to which they were bidden not only by their separate life and their habitual detachment from the politics of Europe but also by a clear perception of international duty, the states of America have become conscious of a new and more vital community of interest and moral partnership in affairs, more clearly conscious of the many common sympathies and interests and duties which bid them stand together.

There was a time in the early days of our own great nation and of the republics fighting their way to independence in Central and South America when the government of the United States looked upon itself as in some sort the guardian of the republics to the south of her as against any encroachments or efforts at political control from the other side of the water; felt it its duty to play the part even without invitation from them; and I think that

we can claim that the task was undertaken with a true and disinterested enthusiasm for the freedom of the Americas and the unmolested self-government of her independent peoples. But it was always difficult to maintain such a rôle without offense to the pride of the peoples whose freedom of action we sought to protect, and without provoking serious misconceptions of our motives, and every thoughtful man of affairs must welcome the altered circumstances of the new day in whose light we now stand, when there is no claim of guardianship or thought of wards, but, instead, a full and honourable association as of partners between ourselves and our neighbours, in the interest of all America, north and south. Our concern for the independence and prosperity of the states of Central and South America is not altered. We retain unabated the spirit that has inspired us throughout the whole life of our government and which was so frankly put into words by President Monroe. We still mean always to make a common cause of national independence and of political liberty in America. But that purpose is now better understood so far as it concerns ourselves. It is known not to be a selfish purpose. It is known to have in it no thought of taking advantage of any government in this hemisphere or playing its political fortunes for our own benefit. All the governments of America stand, so far as we are concerned, upon a footing of genuine equality and unquestioned independence.

We have been put to the test in the case of Mexico, and we have stood the test. Whether we have benefited Mexico by the course we have pursued remains to be seen. Her fortunes are in her own hands. But we have at least proved that we will not take advantage of her in her distress and undertake to impose upon her an order and government of our own choosing. Liberty is often a fierce and

intractable thing, to which no bounds can be set, and to which no bounds of a few men's choosing ought ever to be set. Every American who has drunk at the true fountains of principle and tradition must subscribe without reservation to the high doctrine of the Virginia Bill of Rights, which in the great days in which our government was set up was everywhere amongst us accepted as the creed of free men. That doctrine is, "That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community"; that "of all the various modes and forms of government, that is the best which is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety, and is most effectually secured against the danger of maladministration; and that, when any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these purposes a majority of the community hath an indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal." We have unhesitatingly applied that heroic principle to the case of Mexico, and now hopefully await the rebirth of the troubled Republic, which had so much of which to purge itself and so little sympathy from any outside quarter in the radical but necessary process. We will aid and befriend Mexico, but we will not coerce her; and our course with regard to her ought to be sufficient proof to all America that we seek no political suzerainty or selfish control.

The moral is, that the states of America are not hostile rivals but co-operating friends, and that their growing sense of community of interest, alike in matters political and in matters economic, is likely to give them a new significance as factors in international affairs and in the political history of the world. It presents them as in a very deep and true sense a unit in world affairs, spiritual partners,

standing together because thinking together, quick with common sympathies and common ideals. Separated they are subject to all the cross currents of the confused politics of a world of hostile rivalries; united in spirit and purpose they cannot be disappointed of their peaceful destiny.

This is Pan-Americanism. It has none of the spirit of empire in it. It is the embodiment, the effectual embodiment, of the spirit of law and independence and liberty and mutual service. A very notable body of men recently met in the City of Washington, at the invitation and as the guests of this Government, whose deliberations are likely to be looked back to as marking a memorable turning point in the history of America. They were representative spokesmen of the several independent states of this hemisphere and were assembled to discuss the financial and commercial relations of the republics of the two continents which nature and political fortune have so intimately linked together. I earnestly recommend to your perusal the reports of their proceedings and of the actions of their committees. You will get from them, I think, a fresh conception of the ease and intelligence and advantage with which Americans of both continents may draw together in practical cooperation and of what the material foundations of this hopeful partnership of interest must consist,—of how we should build them and of how necessary it is that we should hasten their building.

There is, I venture to point out, an especial significance just now attaching to this whole matter of drawing the Americas together in bonds of honourable partnership and mutual advantage because of the economic readjustments which the world must inevitably witness within the next generation, when peace shall have at last resumed its healthful tasks. In the performance of these tasks I believe the Americas to be destined to play their parts together.

I am interested to fix your attention on this prospect now because unless you take it within your view and permit the full significance of it to command your thought I cannot find the right light in which to set forth the particular matter that lies at the very front of my whole thought as I address you to-day. I mean national defense.

No one who really comprehends the spirit of the great people for whom we are appointed to speak can fail to perceive that their passion is for peace, their genius best displayed in the practice of the arts of peace. Great democracies are not belligerent. They do not seek or desire war. Their thought is of individual liberty and of the free labour that supports life and the uncensored thought that quickens it. Conquest and domination are not in our reckoning, or agreeable to our principles. But just because we demand unmolested development and the undisturbed government of our own lives upon our own principles of right and liberty, we resent, from whatever quarter it may come, the aggression we ourselves will not practice. We insist upon security in prosecuting our self-chosen lines of national development. We do more than that. We demand it also for others. We do not confine our enthusiasm for individual liberty and free national development to the incidents and movements of affairs which affect only ourselves. We feel it wherever there is a people that tries to walk in these difficult paths of independence and right. From the first we have made common cause with all partisans of liberty on this side the sea, and have deemed it as important that our neighbors should be free from all outside domination as that we ourselves should be; have set America aside as a whole for the uses of independent nations and political free men.

Out of such thoughts grow all our policies. We regard war merely as a means of asserting the rights of a people

against aggression. And we are as fiercely jealous of coercive or dictatorial power within our own nation as of aggression from without. We will not maintain a standing army except for uses which are as necessary in times of peace as in times of war; and we shall always see to it that our military peace establishment is no larger than is actually and continuously needed for the uses of days in which no enemies move against us. But we do believe in a body of free citizens ready and sufficient to take care of themselves and of the governments which they have set up to serve them. In our constitutions themselves we have commanded that "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed," and our confidence has been that our safety in times of danger would lie in the rising of the nation to take care of itself, as the farmers rose at Lexington.

But war has never been a mere matter of men and guns. It is a thing of disciplined might. If our citizens are ever to fight effectively upon a sudden summons, they must know how modern fighting is done, and what to do when the summons comes to render themselves immediately available and immediately effective. And the government must be their servant in this matter, must supply them with the training they need to take care of themselves and of it. The military arm of their government, which they will not allow to direct them, they may properly use to serve them and make their independence secure,—and not their own independence merely but the rights also of those with whom they have made common cause, should they also be put in jeopardy. They must be fitted to play the great rôle in the world, and particularly in this hemisphere, for which they are qualified by principle and by chastened ambition to play.

It is with these ideals in mind that the plans of the

Department of War for more adequate national defense were conceived which will be laid before you, and which I urge you to sanction and put into effect as soon as they can be properly scrutinized and discussed. They seem to me the essential first steps, and they seem to me for the present sufficient.

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THE PAN-AMERICAN PROGRAM OF THE ADMINISTRATION

48. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*
January 6, 1916

(*New York Times*, January 7, 1916)

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The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by the United States on her own authority. It has always been maintained, and always will be maintained, upon her own responsibility. But the Monroe Doctrine demanded merely that European Governments should not attempt to extend their political systems to this side of the Atlantic. It did not disclose the use which the United States intended to make of her power on this side of the Atlantic. It was a hand held up in warning, but there was no promise in it of what America was going to do with the implied and partial protectorate which she apparently was trying to set up on this side of the water, and I believe you will sustain me in the statement that it has been fears and suspicions on this score which have hitherto prevented the greater intimacy and confidence and trust between the Americas. The states of America have not been certain what the United States would do with her power. That doubt must be removed. And latterly there has been a very frank

interchange of views between the authorities in Washington and those who represented the other states of this hemisphere, an interchange of views charming and hopeful, because based upon an increasingly sure appreciation of the spirit in which they were undertaken. These gentlemen have seen that, if America is to come into her own, into her legitimate own, in a world of peace and order, she must establish the foundations of amity, so that no one will hereafter doubt them.

I hope and I believe that this can be accomplished. These conferences have enabled me to foresee how it will be accomplished. It will be accomplished, in the first place, by the states of America uniting in guaranteeing to each other absolute political independence and territorial integrity. In the second place, and as a necessary corollary to that, guaranteeing the agreement to settle all pending boundary disputes as soon as possible and by amiable process; by agreeing that all disputes among themselves, should they unhappily arise, will be handled by patient, impartial investigation and settled by arbitration; and the agreement necessary to the peace of the Americas, that no state of either continent will permit revolutionary expeditions against another state to be fitted out on its territory, and that they will prohibit the exportation of the munitions of war for the purpose of supplying revolutionists against neighboring Governments.¹

You see what our thought is, gentlemen, not only the international peace of America, but the domestic peace of America. If American states are constantly in ferment, if any of them are constantly in ferment, there will be a standing threat to their relations with one another. It is

¹ This paragraph contains the gist of proposals made by Secretary Lansing to the Latin American governments earlier in the year. The complete text of the proposals was not published.

just as much to our interest to assist each other to the orderly processes within our own borders as it is to orderly processes in our controversies with one another. These are very practical suggestions which have sprung up in the minds of thoughtful men, and I, for my part, believe that they are going to lead the way to something that America has prayed for for many a generation. For they are based, in the first place, so far as the stronger states are concerned, upon the handsome principle of self-restraint and respect for the rights of everybody. They are based upon the principles of absolute political equality among the states, equality of right, not equality of indulgence.

They are based, in short, upon the solid, eternal foundations of justice and humanity. No man can turn away from these things without turning away from the hope of the world. These are things, ladies and gentlemen, for which the world has hoped and waited with prayerful heart. God grant that it may be granted to America to lift this light on high for the illumination of the world.

ARMED MERCHANTMEN

49. *Extract from a Communication of Secretary Lansing to the British Ambassador.*¹ January 18, 1916

(Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 3, p. 162)

. . . It is matter of the deepest interest to my Government to bring to an end, if possible, the dangers to life which attend the use of submarines as at present employed in destroying enemy commerce on the high seas, since on any merchant vessel of belligerent nationality there may

¹ The same note was sent to the diplomatic representatives at Washington, of Belgium, France, Italy, Japan and Russia.

be citizens of the United States who have taken passage or are members of the crew, in the exercise of their recognized rights as neutrals. I assume that your excellency's Government are equally solicitous to protect their nationals from the exceptional hazards which are presented by their passage on a merchant vessel through those portions of the high seas in which undersea craft of their enemy are operating.

While I am fully alive to the appalling loss of life among noncombatants, regardless of age or sex, which has resulted from the present method of destroying merchant vessels without removing the persons on board to places of safety, and while I view that practice as contrary to those humane principles which should control belligerents in the conduct of their naval operations, I do not feel that a belligerent should be deprived of the proper use of submarines in the interruption of enemy commerce since those instruments of war have proven their effectiveness in this particular branch of warfare on the high seas.

In order to bring submarine warfare within the general rules of international law and the principles of humanity without destroying its efficiency in the destruction of commerce, I believe that a formula may be found which, though it may require slight modifications of the practice generally followed by nations prior to the employment of submarines, will appeal to the sense of justice and fairness of all the belligerents in the present war.

Your excellency will understand that in seeking a formula or rule of this nature I approach it of necessity from the point of view of a neutral, but I believe that it will be equally efficacious in preserving the lives of all noncombatants on merchant vessels of belligerent nationality.

My comments on this subject are predicated on the following propositions:

1. A noncombatant has a right to traverse the high seas in a merchant vessel entitled to fly a belligerent flag and to rely upon the observance of the rules of international law and principles of humanity if the vessel is approached by a naval vessel of another belligerent.

2. A merchant vessel of enemy nationality should not be attacked without being ordered to stop.

3. An enemy merchant vessel, when ordered to do so by a belligerent submarine, should immediately stop.

4. Such vessel should not be attacked after being ordered to stop unless it attempts to flee or to resist, and in case it ceases to flee or resist, the attack should discontinue.

5. In the event that it is impossible to place a prize crew on board of an enemy merchant vessel or convoy it into port, the vessel may be sunk, provided the crew and passengers have been removed to a place of safety.

In complying with the foregoing propositions which, in my opinion, embody the principal rules, the strict observance of which will insure the life of a noncombatant on a merchant vessel which is intercepted by a submarine, I am not unmindful of the obstacles which would be met by under-sea craft as commerce destroyers.

Prior to the year 1915 belligerent operations against enemy commerce on the high seas had been conducted with cruisers carrying heavy armaments. Under these conditions international law appeared to permit a merchant vessel to carry an armament for defensive purposes without losing its character as a private commercial vessel. This right seems to have been predicated on the superior defensive strength of ships of war, and the limitation of armament to have been dependent on the fact that it could not be used effectively in offense against enemy naval vessels, while it could defend the merchantmen against the generally inferior armament of piratical ships and privateers.

The use of the submarine, however, has changed these relations. Comparison of the defensive strength of a cruiser and a submarine shows that the latter, relying for protection on its power to submerge, is almost defenseless in point of construction. Even a merchant ship carrying a small caliber gun would be able to use it effectively for offense against a submarine. Moreover, pirates and sea rovers have been swept from the main trade channels of the seas, and privateering has been abolished. Consequently, the placing of guns on merchantmen at the present day of submarine warfare can be explained only on the ground of a purpose to render merchantmen superior in force to submarines and to prevent warning and visit and search by them. Any armament, therefore, on a merchant vessel would seem to have the character of an offensive armament.

If a submarine is required to stop and search a merchant vessel on the high seas and, in case it is found that she is of enemy character and that conditions necessitate her destruction, to remove to a place of safety all persons on board, it would not seem just or reasonable that the submarine should be compelled, while complying with these requirements, to expose itself to almost certain destruction by the guns on board the merchant vessel.

It would, therefore, appear to be a reasonable and reciprocally just arrangement if it could be agreed by the opposing belligerents that submarines should be caused to adhere strictly to the rules of international law in the matter of stopping and searching merchant vessels, determining their belligerent nationality, and removing the crews and passengers to places of safety before sinking the vessels as prizes of war, and that merchant vessels of belligerent nationality should be prohibited and prevented from carrying any armament whatsoever.

In presenting this formula as a basis for conditional declarations by the belligerent Governments, I do so in the full conviction that your Government will consider primarily the humane purpose of saving the lives of innocent people rather than the insistence upon a doubtful legal right which may be denied on account of new conditions.

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I should add that my Government is impressed with the reasonableness of the argument that a merchant vessel carrying an armament of any sort, in view of the character of submarine warfare and the defensive weakness of under-sea craft, should be held to be an auxiliary cruiser and so treated by a neutral as well as by a belligerent Government, and is seriously considering instructing its officials accordingly.

THE DANGERS THAT THREATEN THE UNITED STATES

50. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*
*January 29, 1916*¹

(House Document No. 803, 64th Congress, 1st Session, p. 23)

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. . . The times are such, gentlemen, that it is necessary that we should take common counsel together regarding them.

I suppose that this country has never found itself before in so singular a position. The present situation of the world would, only a twelvemonth ago, even after the European war had started, have seemed incredible, and yet

¹ The Cleveland preparedness speech is typical of the others delivered at this time. For those delivered at New York, Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, Chicago, Des Moines, Topeka, Kansas City and St. Louis, see 64th Congress, 1st session, House Document No. 803.

now the things that no man anticipated have happened. The titanic struggle continues. The difficulties of the world's affairs accumulate. . . .

What are the elements of the case? In the first place, and most obviously, two-thirds of the world are at war. It is not merely a European struggle; nations in the Orient have become involved, as well as nations in the West, and everywhere there seems to be creeping even upon the nations disengaged the spirit and the threat of war. All the world outside of America is on fire.

Do you wonder that men's imaginations take color from the situation? Do you wonder that there is a great reaction against war? Do you wonder that the passion for peace grows stronger as the spectacle grows more tremendous and more overwhelming? Do you wonder, on the other hand, that men's sympathies become deeply engaged on the one side or the other? For no small things are happening. This is a struggle which will determine the history of the world, I dare say, for more than a century to come. The world will never be the same again after this war is over. The change may be for weal or it may be for woe, but it will be fundamental and tremendous.

And in the meantime we, the people of the United States, are the one great disengaged power, the one neutral power, finding it exceedingly difficult to be neutral, because, like men everywhere else, we are human; we have the deep passions of mankind in us; we have sympathies that are as easily stirred as the sympathies of any other people; we have interests which we see being drawn slowly into the maelstrom of this tremendous upheaval. . . .

. . . And all the while the nations themselves that were engaged seemed to be looking to us for some sort of action, not hostile in character but sympathetic in character. Hardly a single thing has occurred in Europe which has in

any degree shocked the sensibilities of mankind that the Government of the United States has not been called upon by the one side or the other to protest and intervene with its moral influence, if not with its physical force. It is as if we were the great audience before whom this stupendous drama is being played out, and we are asked to comment upon the turns and crises of the plot. And not only are we the audience, and challenged to be the umpire so far as the opinion of the world is concerned, but all the while our own life touches these matters at many points of vital contact.

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 . . . And America has done more than care for her own people and think of her own fortunes in these great matters. She has said ever since the time of President Monroe that she was the champion of freedom and the separate sovereignty of peoples throughout the Western Hemisphere. She is trustee for these ideals, and she is pledged, deeply and permanently pledged, to keep these momentous promises.

She not only, therefore, must play her part in keeping this conflagration from spreading to the people of the United States, she must also keep this conflagration from spreading on this side of the sea. These are matters in which our very life and our whole pride are imbedded and rooted, and we can never draw back from them. . . .

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 I merely want to leave you with this solemn impression, that I know that we are daily treading amid the most intricate dangers, and that the dangers that we are treading amongst are not of our making and are not under our control, and that no man in the United States knows what a single week or a single day or a single hour may bring forth. These are solemn things to say to you but I would be unworthy of my office if I did not come out and tell you with

absolute frankness just exactly what I understand the situation to be.

. . . You have laid upon me this double obligation: "We are relying upon you, Mr. President, to keep us out of this war, but we are relying upon you, Mr. President, to keep the honor of the nation unstained."

Do you not see that a time may come when it is impossible to do both of these things? Do you not see that if I am to guard the honor of the Nation I am not protecting it against itself, for we are not going to do anything to stain the honor of our own country; I am protecting it against things that I cannot control, the action of others. And where the action of others may bring us I cannot foretell. You may count upon my heart and resolution to keep you out of the war, but you must be ready if it is necessary that I should maintain your honor.

ARMED MERCHANTMEN

51. *Extract from a Letter of President Wilson to Senator Stone, of Missouri. February 24, 1916*

(*Congressional Record*, LIII, 3318)

. . . Our duty is clear. No nation, no group of nations, has the right, while war is in progress, to alter or disregard the principles which all nations have agreed upon in mitigation of the horrors and sufferings of war; and if the clear rights of American citizens should very unhappily be abridged or denied by any such action, we should, it seems to me, have in honor no choice as to what our own course should be.

For my own part, I can not consent to any abridgement of the rights of American citizens in any respect. The

honor and self-respect of the Nation is involved. We covet peace, and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honor. To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might be called upon to vindicate them would be a deep humiliation indeed. It would be an implicit, all but an explicit, acquiescence in the violation of the rights of mankind everywhere and of whatever nation or allegiance. It would be a deliberate abdication of our hitherto proud position as spokesmen, even amid the turmoil of war, for the law and the right. It would make everything this Government has attempted and everything that it has accomplished during this terrible struggle of nations meaningless and futile.

It is important to reflect that if in this instance we allowed expediency to take the place of principle the door would inevitably be opened to still further concessions. Once accept a single abatement of right, and many other humiliations would certainly follow, and the whole fine fabric of international law might crumble under our hands piece by piece. What we are contending for in this matter is of the very essence of the things that have made America a sovereign nation. She can not yield them without conceding her own impotency as a Nation and making virtual surrender of her independent position among the nations of the world.

BASES OF AMERICAN POLICY

52. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*
February 26, 1916

(*Congressional Record*, LIII, 3308)

The point in national affairs, gentlemen, never lies along the lines of expediency. It always rests in the field of

principle. The United States was not founded upon any principle of expediency; it was founded upon a profound principle of human liberty and of humanity, and whenever it bases its policy upon any other foundations than those it builds on the sand and not upon the solid rock. . . . It seems to me that if you do not think of the things that lie beyond and away from and disconnected from this scene in which we attempt to think and conclude, you will inevitably be led astray. I would a great deal rather know what they are talking about around quiet firesides all over this country than what they are talking about in the cloak-rooms of Congress. I would a great deal rather know what the men on the trains and by the wayside and in the shops and on the farms are thinking about and yearning for than hear any of the vociferous proclamations of policy which it is so easy to hear and so easy to read by picking up any scrap of printed paper. There is only one way to hear these things, and that is constantly to go back to the fountains of American action. Those fountains are not to be found in any recently discovered sources.

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America ought to keep out of this war. She ought to keep out of this war at the sacrifice of everything except this single thing upon which her character and history are founded, her sense of humanity and justice. If she sacrifices that, she has ceased to be America; she has ceased to entertain and to love the traditions which have made us proud to be Americans; and when we go about seeking safety at the expense of humanity, then I, for one, will believe that I have always been mistaken in what I have conceived to be the spirit of American history.

You never can tell your direction except by long measurements. You can not establish a line by two posts; you have got to have three at least to know whether they are straight

with anything, and the longer your line the more certain your measurement. There is only one way in which to determine how the future of the United States is going to be projected, and that is by looking back and seeing which way the lines ran which led up to the present moment of power and of opportunity. . . . Then we shall be certain what the lines of the future are, because we shall know we are steering by the lines of the past. We shall know that no temporary convenience, no temporary expediency will lead us either to be rash or to be cowardly. . . . Valor is self-respecting. Valor is circumspect. Valor strikes only when it is right to strike. Valor withholds itself from all small implications and entanglements and waits for the great opportunity when the sword will flash as if it carried the light of heaven upon its blade.

EFFECTS OF RUMOUR ON MEXICAN POLICY

53. *Statement by President Wilson. March 25, 1916*

(*New York Times*, March 26, 1916)

As has already been announced, the expedition into Mexico was ordered under an agreement with the *de facto* Government of Mexico for the single purpose of taking the bandit Villa, whose forces had actually invaded the territory of the United States, and is in no sense intended as an invasion of that republic or as an infringement of its sovereignty.

I have, therefore, asked the several news services to be good enough to assist the Administration in keeping this view of the expedition constantly before both the people of this country and the distressed and sensitive people of Mexico, who are very susceptible, indeed, to impressions received from the American press not only, but also very ready to believe that those impressions proceed from the

views and objects of our Government itself. Such conclusions, it must be said, are not unnatural, because the main, if not the only, source of information for the people on both sides of the border is the public press of the United States.

In order to avoid the creation of erroneous and dangerous impressions in this way I have called upon the several news agencies to use the utmost care not to give news stories regarding this expedition the color of war, to withhold stories of troop movements and military preparations which might be given that interpretation, and to refrain from publishing unverified rumors of unrest in Mexico.

I feel that it is most desirable to impress upon both our own people and the people of Mexico the fact that the expedition is simply a necessary punitive measure, aimed solely at the elimination of the marauders who raided Columbus and who infest an unprotected district near the border, which they use as a base in making attacks upon the lives and property of our citizens within our own territory. It is the purpose of our commanders to co-operate in every possible way with the forces of General Carranza in removing this cause of irritation to both Governments, and retire from Mexican territory so soon as that object is accomplished.

It is my duty to warn the people of the United States that there are persons all along the border who are actively engaged in originating and giving as wide currency as they can to rumors of the most sensational and disturbing sort, which are wholly unjustified by the facts. The object of this traffic in falsehood is obvious. It is to create intolerable friction between the Government of the United States and the *de facto* Government of Mexico for the purpose of bringing about intervention in the interest of certain American owners of Mexican properties. This

object can not be attained so long as sane and honorable men are in control of this Government, but very serious conditions may be created, unnecessary bloodshed may result, and the relations between the two republics may be very much embarrassed.

The people of the United States should know the sinister and unscrupulous influences that are afoot, and should be on their guard against crediting any story coming from the border; and those who disseminate the news should make it a matter of patriotism and of conscience to test the source and authenticity of every report they receive from that quarter.

STATUS OF ARMED MERCHANTMEN

54. *Extract from a Memorandum by the Department of State. March 25, 1916*

(Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 3, p. 190)

The *status* of an armed merchant vessel as a warship in neutral waters may be determined, in the absence of documentary proof or conclusive evidence of previous aggressive conduct, by presumption derived from all the circumstances of the case.

The *status* of such vessel as a warship on the high seas must be determined only upon conclusive evidence of aggressive purpose, in the absence of which it is to be presumed that the vessel has a private and peaceable character, and it should be so treated by an enemy warship.

In brief, a neutral Government may proceed upon the presumption that an armed merchant vessel of belligerent nationality is armed for aggression, while a belligerent should proceed on the presumption that the vessel is armed

for protection. Both of these presumptions may be overcome by evidence — the first by secondary or collateral evidence, since the fact to be established is negative in character; the second by primary and direct evidence, since the fact to be established is positive in character.

THE TRADITIONS OF AMERICA

55. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

April 17, 1916

(New York Times, April 18, 1916)

Tradition is a handsome thing in proportion as we live up to it. If we fall away from the tradition of the fathers, we have dishonored them. If we forget the tradition of the fathers, we have changed our character; we have lost an old impulse; we have become unconscious of the principles in which the life of the nation itself is rooted and grounded. . . . No other nation was ever born into the world with the purpose of serving the rest of the world just as much as it served itself.

The purpose of this nation was in one sense to afford an asylum to men of all classes and kinds who desired to be free and to take part in the administration of a self-governed Commonwealth. It was founded in order that men of every sort should have proof given that a Commonwealth of that sort was practicable, not only, but could win its standing of distinction and power among the nations of the world, and America will have forgotten her traditions whenever upon any occasion she fights merely for herself under such circumstances as will show that she has forgotten to fight for all mankind. And the only excuse that America can ever have for the assertion of her physical

force is that she asserts it in behalf of the interest of humanity.

What a splendid thing it is to have so singular a tradition — a tradition of unselfishness! When America ceases to be unselfish, she will cease to be America. When she forgets the traditions of devotion to human rights in general, which gave spirit and impulse to her founders, she will have lost her title deeds to her own nationality.

GERMAN SUBMARINE WARFARE: SUSSEX ULTIMATUM

56. *Extract from a Communication of Secretary Lansing to Ambassador Gerard. April 18, 1916*

(Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 3, p. 241)

A careful, detailed, and scrupulously impartial investigation¹ by naval and military officers of the United States has conclusively established the fact that the *Sussex* was torpedoed without warning or summons to surrender and that the torpedo by which she was struck was of German manufacture. . . .

The Government of the United States, after having given careful consideration to the note of the Imperial Government of the 10th of April, regrets to state that the impression made upon it by the statements, and proposals contained in that note is that the Imperial Government has failed to

¹ The United States asked on March 27, 1916, for information from the German Government concerning the sinking of the *Sussex*. The German reply, dated April 10, 1916, is published in Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 3, p. 238. The Department of State, however, conducted an independent investigation and its evidence accompanied the note here published.

appreciate the gravity of the situation which has resulted, not alone from the attack on the *Sussex* but from the whole method and character of submarine warfare as disclosed by the unrestrained practice of the commanders of German undersea craft during the past twelvemonth and more in the indiscriminate destruction of merchant vessels of all sorts, nationalities, and destinations. If the sinking of the *Sussex* had been an isolated case the Government of the United States might find it possible to hope that the officer who was responsible for that act had willfully violated his orders or had been criminally negligent in taking none of the precautions they prescribed, and that the ends of justice might be satisfied by imposing upon him an adequate punishment, coupled with a formal disavowal of the act and payment of a suitable indemnity by the Imperial Government. But, though the attack upon the *Sussex* was manifestly indefensible and caused a loss of life so tragical as to make it stand forth as one of the most terrible examples of the inhumanity of submarine warfare as the commanders of German vessels are conducting it, it unhappily does not stand alone.

On the contrary, the Government of the United States is forced by recent events to conclude that it is only one instance, even though one of the most extreme and most distressing instances, of the deliberate method and spirit of indiscriminate destruction of merchant vessels of all sorts, nationalities, and destinations which have become more and more unmistakable as the activity of German undersea vessels of war has in recent months been quickened and extended.

The Imperial Government will recall that when, in February, 1915, it announced its intention of treating the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland as embraced within the seat of war and of destroying all merchant ships

owned by its enemies that might be found within that zone of danger, and warned all vessels, neutral as well as belligerent, to keep out of the waters thus proscribed or to enter them at their peril, the Government of the United States earnestly protested. It took the position that such a policy could not be pursued without constant gross and palpable violations of the accepted law of nations, particularly if submarine craft were to be employed as its instruments, inasmuch as the rules prescribed by that law, rules founded on the principles of humanity and established for the protection of the lives of noncombatants at sea, could not in the nature of the case be observed by such vessels. It based its protest on the ground that persons of neutral nationality and vessels of neutral ownership would be exposed to extreme and intolerable risks; and that no right to close any part of the high seas could lawfully be asserted by the Imperial Government in the circumstances then existing. The law of nations in these matters, upon which the Government of the United States based that protest, is not of recent origin or founded upon merely arbitrary principles set up by convention. It is based, on the contrary, upon manifest principles of humanity and has long been established with the approval and by the express assent of all civilized nations.

The Imperial Government, notwithstanding, persisted in carrying out the policy announced, expressing the hope that the dangers involved, at any rate to neutral vessels, would be reduced to a minimum by the instructions which it had issued to the commanders of its submarines, and assuring the Government of the United States that it would take every possible precaution both to respect the rights of neutrals and to safeguard the lives of noncombatants.

In pursuance of this policy of submarine warfare against the commerce of its adversaries, thus announced and thus

entered upon in despite of the solemn protest of the Government of the United States, the commanders of the Imperial Government's undersea vessels have carried on practices of such ruthless destruction which have made it more and more evident as the months have gone by that the Imperial Government has found it impracticable to put any such restraints upon them as it had hoped and promised to put. Again and again the Imperial Government has given its solemn assurances to the Government of the United States that at least passenger ships would not be thus dealt with, and yet it has repeatedly permitted its undersea commanders to disregard those assurances with entire impunity. As recently as February last it gave notice that it would regard all armed merchantmen owned by its enemies as part of the armed naval forces of its adversaries and deal with them as with men-of-war, thus, at least by implication, pledging itself to give warning to vessels which were not armed and to accord security of life to their passengers and crews; but even this limitation their submarine commanders have recklessly ignored.

Vessels of neutral ownership, even vessels of neutral ownership bound from neutral port to neutral port, have been destroyed along with vessels of belligerent ownership in constantly increasing numbers. Sometimes the merchantmen attacked have been warned and summoned to surrender before being fired on or torpedoed; sometimes their passengers and crews have been vouchsafed the poor security of being allowed to take to the ship's boats before the ship was sent to the bottom. But again and again no warning has been given, no escape even to the ship's boats allowed to those on board. Great liners like the *Lusitania* and *Arabic* and mere passenger boats like the *Sussex* have been attacked without a moment's warning, often before they have even become aware that they were in the pres-

ence of an armed ship of the enemy, and the lives of non-combatants, passengers, and crew have been destroyed wholesale and in a manner which the Government of the United States can not but regard as wanton and without the slightest color of justification. No limit of any kind has in fact been set to their indiscriminate pursuit and destruction of merchantmen of all kinds and nationalities within the waters which the Imperial Government has chosen to designate as lying within the seat of war. The roll of Americans who have lost their lives upon ships thus attacked and destroyed has grown month by month until the ominous toll has mounted into the hundreds.

The Government of the United States has been very patient. At every stage of this distressing experience of tragedy after tragedy it has sought to be governed by the most thoughtful consideration of the extraordinary circumstances of an unprecedented war and to be guided by sentiments of very genuine friendship for the people and Government of Germany. It has accepted the successive explanations and assurances of the Imperial Government as of course given in entire sincerity and good faith, and has hoped, even against hope, that it would prove to be possible for the Imperial Government so to order and control the acts of its naval commanders as to square its policy with the recognized principles of humanity as embodied in the law of nations. It has made every allowance for unprecedented conditions and has been willing to wait until the facts became unmistakable and were susceptible of only one interpretation.

It now owes it to a just regard for its own rights to say to the Imperial Government that that time has come. It has become painfully evident to it that the position which it took at the very outset is inevitable, namely, the use of submarines for the destruction of an enemy's commerce,

is, of necessity, because of the very character of the vessels employed and the very methods of attack which their employment of course involves, utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity, the long-established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals, and the sacred immunities of noncombatants.

If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines without regard to what the Government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether. This action the Government of the United States contemplates with the greatest reluctance but feels constrained to take in behalf of humanity and the rights of neutral nations.

57. *Extract from an Address of the President.*

April 19, 1916

(Congressional Record, LIII, 6422)

I have deemed it my duty, therefore, to say to the Imperial German Government¹ that if it is still its purpose to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines, notwithstanding

¹ See *infra*, statement No. 56, p. 321.

the now demonstrated impossibility of conducting that warfare in accordance with what the Government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue; and that unless the Imperial German Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels this Government can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the Government of the German Empire altogether.

This decision I have arrived at with the keenest regret; the possibility of the action contemplated I am sure all thoughtful Americans will look forward to with unaffected reluctance. But we cannot forget that we are in some sort and by the force of circumstances the responsible spokesman of the rights of humanity, and that we can not remain silent while those rights seem in process of being swept utterly away in the maelstrom of this terrible war. We owe it to a due regard of our own rights as a nation, to our sense of duty as a representative of the rights of neutrals the world over, and to a just conception of the rights of mankind to take this stand now with the utmost solemnity and firmness.

58. *Extract from a Communication of Secretary Lansing to Ambassador Gerard. May 8, 1916*

(Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 3, p. 306)

. . . Accepting the Imperial Government's declaration ¹

¹ The German reply to the *Sussex* ultimatum, dated May 4, 1916, is published in Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, European War Series, No. 3, p. 302.

of its abandonment of the policy which has so seriously menaced the good relations between the two countries, the Government of the United States will rely upon a scrupulous execution henceforth of the now altered policy of the Imperial Government, such as will remove the principal danger to an interruption of the good relations existing between the United States and Germany.

The Government of the United States feels it necessary to state that it takes it for granted that the Imperial German Government does not intend to imply that the maintenance of its newly announced policy is in any way contingent upon the course or result of diplomatic negotiations between the Government of the United States and any other belligerent Government, notwithstanding the fact that certain passages in the Imperial Government's note of the 4th instant might appear to be susceptible of that construction. In order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the Government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government that it can not for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other Government affecting the rights of neutrals and noncombatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative.

EFFECT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS UPON
AMERICAN POLICY59. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.**May 15, 1916**(Congressional Record, LIII, Appendix, 962)*

. . . In domestic matters I think I can in most cases come pretty near a guess where the thought of America is going, but in foreign affairs the chief element is where action is going on in other quarters of the world and not where thought is going in the United States. . . .

Thoughts may be bandits. Thoughts may be raiders. Thoughts may be invaders. Thoughts may be disturbers of international peace; and when you reflect upon the importance of this country keeping out of the present war, you will know what tremendous elements we are all dealing with.¹ We are all in the same boat. If somebody does not keep the processes of peace going, if somebody does not keep their passions disengaged, by what impartial judgment and suggestion is the world to be aided to a solution when the whole thing is over? If you are in a conference in which you know nobody is disinterested, how are you going to make a plan? I tell you this, gentlemen, the only thing that saves the world is the little handful of disinterested men that are in it.

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¹ The reference is to the European War, but it also indicates the President's views on rumours regarding Mexico. See *infra*, Statement No. 53, p. 312.

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

60. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

May 27, 1916

(*Congressional Record*, LIII, 8854)

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This great war that broke so suddenly upon the world two years ago, and which has swept within its flame so great a part of the civilized world, has affected us very profoundly, and we are not only at liberty, it is perhaps our duty, to speak very frankly of it and of the great interests of civilization which it affects.

With its causes and its objects we are not concerned. The obscure fountains from which its stupendous flood has burst forth we are not interested to search for or explore. But so great a flood, spread far and wide to every quarter of the globe, has of necessity engulfed many a fair province of right that lies very near to us.

Our own rights as a nation, the liberties, the privileges, and the property of our people have been profoundly affected. We are not mere disconnected lookers-on.

The longer the war lasts the more deeply do we become concerned that it should be brought to an end and the world be permitted to resume its normal life and course again. And when it does come to an end we shall be as much concerned as the nations at war to see peace assume an aspect of permanence, give promise of days from which the anxiety of uncertainty shall be lifted, bring some assurance that peace and war shall always hereafter be reckoned part of the common interest of mankind.

We are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own

also. We are partners with the rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the affair of the nations of Europe and of Asia.

One observation on the causes of the present war we are at liberty to make, and to make it may throw some light forward upon the future as well as backward upon the past. It is plain that this war could have come only at it did, suddenly and out of secret counsels, without warning to the world, without discussion, without any of the deliberate movements of counsel with which it would seem natural to approach so stupendous a contest.

It is probable that if it had been foreseen just what would happen, just what alliances would be formed, just what forces arrayed against one another, those who brought the great contest on would have been glad to substitute conference for force.

If we ourselves had been afforded some opportunity to apprise the belligerents of the attitude which it would be our duty to take, of the policies and practices against which we would feel bound to use all our moral and economic strength, and in certain circumstances even our physical strength also, our own contribution to the counsel which might have averted the struggle would have been considered worth weighing and regarding.

And the lesson which the shock of being taken by surprise in a matter so deeply vital to all the nations of the world has made poignantly clear is, that the peace of the world must henceforth depend upon a new and more wholesome diplomacy.

Only when the great nations of the world have reached some sort of agreement as to what they hold to be fundamental to their common interest, and as to some feasible method of acting in concert when any nation or group of nations seeks to disturb those fundamental things, can we

feel that civilization is at last in a way of justifying its existence and claiming to be finally established.

It is clear that nations must in the future be governed by the same high code of honor that we demand of individuals.

We must, indeed, in the very same breath with which we avow this conviction admit that we have ourselves upon occasion in the past been offenders against the law of diplomacy which we thus forecast; but our conviction is not the less clear, but rather the more clear on that account.

If this war has accomplished nothing else for the benefit of the world, it has at least disclosed a great moral necessity and set forward the thinking of the statesmen of the world by a whole age.

Repeated utterances of the leading statesmen of most of the great nations now engaged in war have made it plain that their thought has come to this, that the principle of public right must henceforth take precedence over the individual interests of particular nations, and that the nations of the world must in some way band themselves together to see that that right prevails as against any sort of selfish aggression; that henceforth alliance must not be set up against alliance, understanding against understanding, but that there must be a common agreement for a common object, and that at the heart of that common object must lie the inviolable rights of peoples and of mankind.

The nations of the world have become each other's neighbors. It is to their interest that they should understand each other. In order that they may understand each other, it is imperative that they should agree to cooperate in a common cause, and that they should so act that the guiding principle of that common cause shall be even-handed and impartial justice.

This is undoubtedly the thought of America. This is what we ourselves will say when there comes proper occasion to say it. In the dealings of nations with one another arbitrary force must be rejected, and we must move forward to the thought of the modern world, the thought of which peace is the very atmosphere. That thought constitutes a chief part of the passionate conviction of America.

We believe these fundamental things: First, that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live. Like other nations, we have ourselves no doubt once and again offended against that principle when for a little while controlled by selfish passion, as our franker historians have been honorable enough to admit; but it has become more and more our rule of life and action. Second, that the small states of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon. And, third, that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin in aggression and disregard of the rights of peoples and nations.

So sincerely do we believe in these things that I am sure that I speak the mind and wish of the people of America when I say that the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible association of nations formed in order to realize these objects and make them secure against violation.

There is nothing that the United States wants for itself that any other nation has. We are willing, on the contrary, to limit ourselves along with them to a prescribed course of duty and respect for the rights of others which will check any selfish passion of our own, as it will check any aggressive impulses of theirs.

If it should ever be our privilege to suggest or initiate a

movement for peace among the nations now at war, I am sure that the people of the United States would wish their Government to move along these lines:

First, such a settlement with regard to their own immediate interests as the belligerents may agree upon. We have nothing material of any kind to ask for ourselves, and are quite aware that we are in no sense or degree parties to the present quarrel. Our interest is only in peace and its future guarantees.

Second, an universal association of the nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world — a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence.

PURPOSES OF THE UNITED STATES

61. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

May 30, 1916

(*Congressional Record*, LIII, 9029)

But what are the purposes of America? Do you not see that there is another significance in the fact that we are made up out of all the peoples of the world? The significance of that fact is that we are not going to devote our nationality to the same mistaken aggressive purposes that some other nationalities have been devoted to; that because we are made up, and consciously made up, out of all the great family of mankind, we are champions of the rights of mankind.

We are not only ready to cooperate, but we are ready

to fight against any aggression, whether from without or from within. But we must guard ourselves against the sort of aggression which would be unworthy of America. We are ready to fight for our rights when those rights are coincident with the rights of man and humanity. It was to set those rights up, to vindicate them, to offer a home to every man who believed in them, that America was created and her Government set up. We have kept our doors open because we did not think we in conscience could close them against men who wanted to join their force with ours in vindicating the claim of mankind to liberty and justice.

America does not want any additional territory. She does not want any selfish advantage over any other nation in the world, but she does wish every nation in the world to understand what she stands for and to respect what she stands for; and I can not conceive of any men of any blood or origin failing to feel an enthusiasm for the things that America stands for, or failing to see that they are indefinitely elevated above any purpose of aggression or selfish advantage.

I said the other evening in another place¹ that one of the principles which America held dear was that small and weak States had as much right to their sovereignty and independence as large and strong States. She believes that because strength and weakness have nothing to do with her principles. Her principles are for the rights and liberties of mankind, and this is the haven which we have offered to those who believe that sublime and sacred creed of humanity.

And I also said that I believed that the people of the United States were ready to become partners in any alliance of the nations that would guarantee public right above selfish aggression. Some of the public prints have

¹ *Infra*, Statement No. 60, p. 325.

reminded me, as if I needed to be reminded, of what Gen. Washington warned us against. He warned us against entangling alliances. I shall never myself consent to an entangling alliance, but I would gladly assent to a disentangling alliance — an alliance which would disentangle the peoples of the world from those combinations in which they seek their own separate and private interests and unite the people of the world to preserve the peace of the world upon a basis of common right and justice. There is liberty there, not limitation. There is freedom, not entanglement. There is the achievement of the highest things for which the United States has declared its principle.

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62. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

June 13, 1916

(*New York Times*, June 14, 1916)

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. . . In your case there are many extraordinary possibilities, because, gentlemen, no man can certainly tell you what the immediate future is going to be either in the history of this country or in the history of the world. It is not by accident that the present great war came in Europe. Every element was there, and the contest had to come sooner or later, and it is not going to be by accident that the results are worked out, but by purpose — by the purpose of the men who are strong enough to have guiding minds and indomitable wills when the time for decision and settlement comes. And the part that the United States is to play has this distinction in it, that it is to be in any event a disinterested part. There is nothing that the United States wants that it has to get by war, but there are a great many things that the United States has to do. It has to see

that its life is not interfered with by anybody else who wants something.

These are days when we are making preparation, when the thing most commonly discussed around every sort of table, in every sort of circle, in the shops and in the streets, is preparedness, and undoubtedly, gentlemen, that is the present imperative duty of America, to be prepared. But we ought to know what we are preparing for. I remember hearing a wise man say once that the old maxim that "everything comes to the man who waits" is all very well provided he knows what he is waiting for; and preparedness might be a very hazardous thing if we did not know what we wanted to do with the force that we mean to accumulate and to get into fighting shape.

America, fortunately, does know what she wants to do with her force. America came into existence for a particular reason. When you look about upon those beautiful hills, and up this stately stream, and then let your imagination run over the whole body of this great country from which you youngsters are drawn, far and wide, you remember that while it had aboriginal inhabitants, while there were people living here, there was no civilization which we displaced. It was as if in the Province of God a continent had been kept unused and waiting for a peaceful people who loved liberty and the rights of men more than they loved anything else, to come and set up an unselfish commonwealth. It is a very extraordinary thing. You are so familiar with American history . . . that it does not seem strange to you, but it is a very strange history. There is none other like it in the whole annals of mankind — of men gathering out of every civilized nation of the world on an unused continent and building up a polity exactly to suit themselves, not under the domination of any ruling dynasty or of the ambitions of any royal family; doing what they

pleased with their own life on a free space of land which God had made rich with every resource which was necessary for the civilization they meant to build up. There is nothing like it.

Now, what we are preparing to do is to see that nobody mars that and that, being safe itself against interference from the outside, all of its force is going to be behind its moral idea, and mankind is going to know that when America speaks she means what she says. . . .

You have read a great deal in the books about the pride of the old Roman citizen, who always felt like drawing himself to his full height when he said, "I am a Roman," but as compared with the pride that must have risen to his heart, our pride has a new distinction, not the distinction of the mere imperial power of a great empire, not the distinction of being the masters of the world, but the distinction of carrying certain lights for the world that the world has never so distinctly seen before, certain guiding lights of liberty and principle and justice. We have drawn our people, as you know, from all parts of the world, and we have been somewhat disturbed recently, gentlemen, because some of those — though I believe a very small number — whom we have drawn into our citizenship have not taken into their hearts the spirit of America and have loved other countries more than they loved the country of their adoption; and we have talked a great deal about Americanism. It ought to be a matter of pride with us to know what Americanism really consists in.

Americanism consists in utterly believing in the principles of America and putting them first as above anything that might by chance come into competition with it. And I, for my part, believe that the American test is a spiritual test. If a man has to make excuses for what he has done as an American, I doubt his Americanism. He ought to know

at every step of his action that the motive that lies behind what he does is a motive which no American need be ashamed of for a moment. Now, we ought to put this test to every man we know. We ought to let it be known that nobody who does not put America first can consort with us.

But we ought to set them the example. We ought to set them the example by thinking American thoughts, by entertaining American purposes, and those thoughts and purposes will stand the test of example anywhere in the world, for they are intended for the betterment of mankind.

. . . You have heard of the Monroe Doctrine, gentlemen. You know that we are already spiritual partners with both continents of this hemisphere and that America means something which is bigger even than the United States, and that we stand here with the glorious power of this country, ready to swing it out into the field of action whenever liberty and independence and political integrity are threatened anywhere in the Western Hemisphere. And we are ready — nobody has authorized me to say this, but I am sure of it — we are ready to join with the other nations of the world in seeing that the kind of justice prevails anywhere that we believe in.

. . . I am an American, but I do not believe that any of us loves a blustering nationality, a nationality with a chip on its shoulder, a nationality with its elbows out and its swagger on.

We love that quiet, self-respecting, unconquerable spirit which does not strike until it is necessary to strike, and then strikes to conquer. . . .

So my conception of America is a conception of infinite dignity, along with quiet, unquestionable power. I ask you, gentlemen, to join with me in that conception, and let us all in our several spheres be soldiers together to realize it.

JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

63. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.**June 29, 1916*

(From the official printed text; for the entire address see *Congressional Record*, LIII, Appendix, 1302)

In the first place, I believe, and I summon you to show your belief in the same thing, that it is the duty of every American in everything that he does, in his business and out of it, to think first, not of himself or of any interest which he may be called upon to sacrifice, but of the country which we serve. "America first" means nothing until you translate it into what you do. So I believe most profoundly in the duty of every American to exalt the national consciousness by purifying his own motives and exhibiting his own devotion.

I believe, in the second place, that America, the country that we put first in our thoughts, should be ready in every point of policy and of action to vindicate at whatever cost the principles of liberty, of justice, and of humanity to which we have been devoted from the first. You cheer the sentiment, but do you realize what it means? It means that you have not only got to be just to your fellowmen but that as a nation you have got to be just to other nations. It comes high. It is not an easy thing to do. It is easy to think first of the material interest of America, but it is not easy to think first of what America, if she loves justice, ought to do in the field of international affairs. I believe that at whatever cost America should be just to other peoples and treat other peoples as she demands that they should treat her. She has a right to demand that they treat her with justice and respect, and she has a right to insist that they treat her in that fashion, but she can not with dignity or self-respect

insist upon that unless she is willing to act in the same fashion toward them. That I am ready to fight for at any cost to myself.

Then, in the third place, touching ourselves more intimately, my fellow-citizens, this is what I believe: If I understand the life of America, the central principle of it is this, that no small body of persons, no matter how influential, shall be trusted to determine the policy and development of America. . . .

. . . The theory of government which I decline to subscribe to is that the vitality of the nation comes out of closed councils where a few men determine the policy of the country.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE OPINION OF MANKIND

64. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

June 30, 1916

(Congressional Record, LIII, Appendix, 1395)

Of course it is our duty to prepare this Nation to take care of its honor and of its institutions. Why debate any part of that, except the detail, except the plan itself, which is always debatable?

Of course it is the duty of the Government, which it will never overlook, to defend the territory and people of this country. It goes without saying that it is the duty of the administration to have constantly in mind with the utmost sensitiveness every point of national honor.

But, gentlemen, after you have said and accepted these obvious things your program of action is still to be formed. When will you act and how will you act?

The easiest thing is to strike. The brutal thing is the impulsive thing. No man has to think before he takes aggressive action; but before a man really conserves the honor by realizing the ideals of the Nation he has to think exactly what he will do and how he will do it.

Do you think the glory of America would be enhanced by a war of conquest in Mexico? Do you think that any act of violence by a powerful nation like this against a weak and destructive neighbor would reflect distinction upon the annals of the United States?

Do you think that it is our duty to carry self-defense to a point of dictation into the affairs of another people? The ideals of America are written plain upon every page of American history.

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We have the evidence of a very competent witness, namely, the first Napoleon, who said that as he looked back in the last days of his life upon so much as he knew of human history he had to record the judgment that force had never accomplished anything that was permanent.

Force will not accomplish anything that is permanent, I venture to say, in the great struggle which is going on on the other side of the sea. The permanent things will be accomplished afterwards, when the opinion of mankind is brought to bear upon the issues, and the only thing that will hold the world steady is this same silent, insistent, all-powerful opinion of mankind.

Force can sometimes hold things steady until opinion has time to form, but no force that was ever exerted, except in response to that opinion, was ever a conquering and predominant force.

I think the sentence in American history that I myself am proudest of is that in the introductory sentences of the Declaration of Independence, where the writers say that a due

respect for the opinion of mankind demands that they state the reasons for what they are about to do.

I venture to say that a decent respect for the opinions of mankind demanded that those who started the present European war should have stated their reasons; but they did not pay any heed to the opinion of mankind, and the reckoning will come when the settlement comes.

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THE PURPOSE OF THE UNITED STATES

65. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

July 4, 1916

(*Congressional Record*, LIII, Appendix, 1395)

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. . . America did not come into existence to make one more great nation in the family of nations, to show its strength and to exercise its mastery. America opened her doors to everybody who wanted to be free and to have the same opportunity that everybody else had to make the most of his faculties and his opportunities, and America will retain its greatness only so long as it retains and seeks to realize those ideals. No man ought to suffer injustice in America. No man ought in America to fail to see the dictates of humanity.

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SERVICE OF AMERICA IN FOREIGN TRADE

66. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

July 10, 1916

(*Congressional Record*, LIII, Appendix, 1480)

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These are days of incalculable change, my fellow citizens. It is impossible for anybody to predict anything that is

certain in detail with regard to the future either of this country or of the world in the large movements of business; but one thing is perfectly clear, and that is that the United States will play a new part, and that it will be a part of unprecedented opportunity and of greatly increased responsibilities. The United States has had a very singular history in respect of its business relationships with the rest of the world. I have always believed — and I think you have always believed — that there is more business genius in the United States than anywhere else in the world, and yet America has apparently been afraid of touching too intimately the great processes of international exchange. America of all countries in the world has been timid; has not until recently — has not until within the last two or three years — provided itself with the fundamental instrumentalities for playing a large part in the trade of the world. America, which ought to have had the broadest vision of any nation, has raised up an extraordinary number of provincial thinkers, men who thought provincially about business, men who thought that the United States was not ready to take her competitive part in the struggle for peaceful conquest of the world. For anybody who reflects philosophically upon the history of this country, that is the most amazing fact about it.

But the time for provincial thinkers has gone by. We must play a great part in the world whether we choose it or not. Do you know the significance of this single fact that within the last year or two we have, speaking in large terms, ceased to be a debtor Nation and become a creditor Nation; that we have more of the surplus gold of the world than we ever had before, and that our business hereafter is to be to lend and to help and to promote the great peaceful enterprises of the world? We have got to finance the world in some important degree, and those who finance

the world must understand it and rule it with their spirits and with their minds. We can not cabin and confine ourselves any longer, and so I said that I came here to congratulate you upon the great rôle that lies ahead of you to play. This is a salesmanship congress, and hereafter salesmanship will have to be closely related in its outlook and scope to statesmanship, to international statesmanship. It will have to be touched with an intimate comprehension of the conditions of business and enterprise throughout the round globe, because America will have to place her goods by running her intelligence ahead of her goods. No amount of mere push, no amount of mere hustling, or, to speak in the western language, no amount of mere rustling, no amount of mere active enterprise will suffice.

There have been two ways of doing business in the world outside of the lands in which the great manufactures have been made. One has been to try to force the tastes of the manufacturing country on the country in which the markets were being sought, and the other way has been to study the tastes and needs of the countries where the markets were being sought and suit your goods to those tastes and needs, and the latter method has beaten the former method. . . . That is statesmanship because that is relating your international activities to the conditions which exist in other countries.

. . . You can not force yourself upon anybody who is not obliged to take you. The only way in which you can be sure of being accepted is by being sure that you have got something to offer that is worth taking, and the only way you can be sure of that is by being sure that you wish to adapt it to the use and the service of the people to whom you are trying to sell.

I was trying to expound in another place the other day

the long way and the short way to get together. The long way is to fight. I hear some gentlemen say that they want to help Mexico, and the way they propose to help her is to overwhelm her with force. That is the long way to help Mexico, as well as the wrong way, because after the fighting you have a nation full of justified suspicion and animated by well-founded hostility and hatred, and then will you help them? Then will you establish cordial business relationships with them? Then will you go in as neighbors and enjoy their confidence? On the contrary, you will have shut every door as if it were of steel against you. What makes Mexico suspicious of us is that she does not believe as yet that we want to serve her. She believes that we want to possess her, and she has justification for the belief in the way in which some of our fellow citizens have tried to exploit her privileges and possessions. For my part, I will not serve the ambitions of these gentlemen, but I will try to serve all America, so far as intercourse with Mexico is concerned, by trying to serve Mexico herself. There are some things that are not debatable. Of course, we have to defend our border. That goes without saying. Of course, we must make good our own sovereignty, but we must respect the sovereignty of Mexico. I am one of those — I have sometimes suspected that there were not many of them — who believe, absolutely believe, the Virginia Bill of Rights, which was the model of the old Bill of Rights, which says that a people has a right to do anything they please with their own country and their own government. I am old-fashioned enough to believe that, and I am going to stand by the belief. . . .

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REVIEW OF FOUR YEARS OF FOREIGN POLICY

67. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

September 2, 1916

(Congressional Record, LIII, Appendix, 1985)

In foreign affairs we have been guided by principles clearly conceived and consistently lived up to. Perhaps they have not been fully comprehended because they have hitherto governed international affairs only in theory, not in practice. They are simple, obvious, easily stated, and fundamental to American ideals.

We have been neutral not only because it was the fixed and traditional policy of the United States to stand aloof from the politics of Europe and because we had had no part either of action or of policy in the influences which brought on the present war, but also because it was manifestly our duty to prevent, if it were possible, the indefinite extension of the fires of heat and desolation kindled by that terrible conflict and seek to serve mankind by reserving our strength and our resources for the anxious and difficult days of restoration and healing which must follow, when peace will have to build its house anew.

The rights of our own citizens of course became involved; that was inevitable. Where they did this was our guiding principle: That property rights can be vindicated by claims for damages, and no modern nation can decline to arbitrate such claims; but the fundamental rights of humanity cannot be. The loss of life is irreparable. Neither can direct violations of a nation's sovereignty await vindication in suits for damages. The nation that violates these essential rights must expect to be checked and called to account by direct

challenge and resistance. It at once makes the quarrel in part our own. These are plain principles and we have never lost sight of them or departed from them, whatever the stress or the perplexity of circumstance or the provocation to hasty resentment. The record is clear and consistent throughout and stands distinct and definite for any one to judge who wishes to know the truth about it.

The seas were not broad enough to keep the infection of the conflict out of our own politics. The passions and intrigues of certain active groups and combinations of men amongst us who were born under foreign flags injected the poison of disloyalty into our own most critical affairs, laid violent hands upon many of our industries, and subjected us to the shame of divisions of sentiment and purpose in which America was contemned and forgotten. It is part of the business of this year of reckoning and settlement to speak plainly and act with unmistakable purpose in rebuke of these things, in order that they may be forever hereafter impossible. I am the candidate of a party, but I am above all things else an American citizen. I neither seek the favour nor fear the displeasure of that small alien element amongst us which puts loyalty to any foreign power before loyalty to the United States.

While Europe was at war our own continent, one of our own neighbours, was shaken by revolution. In that matter, too, principle was plain and it was imperative that we should live up to it if we were to deserve the trust of any real partisan of the right as free men see it. We have professed to believe, and we do believe, that the people of small and weak states have the right to expect to be dealt with exactly as the people of big and powerful states would be. We have acted upon that principle in dealing with the people of Mexico.

Our recent pursuit of bandits into Mexican territory was

no violation of that principle. We ventured to enter Mexican territory only because there were no military forces in Mexico that could protect our border from hostile attack and our own people from violence, and we have committed there no single act of hostility or interference even with the sovereign authority of the Republic of Mexico herself. It was a plain case of the violation of our own sovereignty which could not wait to be vindicated by damages and for which there was no other remedy. The authorities of Mexico were powerless to prevent it.

Many serious wrongs against the property, many irreparable wrongs against the persons, of Americans have been committed within the territory of Mexico herself during this confused revolution, wrongs which could not be effectually checked so long as there was no constituted power in Mexico which was in a position to check them. We could not act directly in that matter ourselves without denying Mexicans the right to any revolution at all which disturbed us and making the emancipation of her own people await our own interest and convenience.

For it is their emancipation that they are seeking,—blindly, it may be, and as yet ineffectually, but with profound and passionate purpose and within their unquestionable right, apply what true American principle you will,—any principle that an American would publicly avow. The people of Mexico have not been suffered to own their own country or direct their own institutions. Outsiders, men out of other nations and with interests too often alien to their own, have dictated what their privileges and opportunities should be and who should control their land, their lives, and their resources,—some of them Americans, pressing for things they could never have got in their own country. The Mexican people are entitled to attempt their liberty from

such influences; and so long as I have anything to do with the action of our great Government I shall do everything in my power to prevent any one standing in their way. I know that this is hard for some persons to understand; but it is not hard for the plain people of the United States to understand. It is hard doctrine only for those who wish to get something for themselves out of Mexico. There are men, and noble women, too, not a few, of our own people, thank God! whose fortunes are invested in great properties in Mexico who yet see the case with true vision and assess its issues with true American feeling. The rest can be left for the present out of the reckoning until this enslaved people has had its day of struggle towards the light. I have heard no one who was free from such influences propose interference by the United States with the internal affairs of Mexico. Certainly no friend of the Mexican people has proposed it.

The people of the United States are capable of great sympathies and a noble pity in dealing with problems of this kind. As their spokesman and representative, I have tried to act in the spirit they would wish me show. The people of Mexico are striving for the rights that are fundamental to life and happiness,—fifteen million oppressed men, overburdened women, and pitiful children in virtual bondage in their own home of fertile lands and inexhaustible treasure! Some of the leaders of the revolution may often have been mistaken and violent and selfish, but the revolution itself was inevitable and is right. The unspeakable Huerta betrayed the very comrades he served, traitorously overthrew the government of which he was a trusted part, impudently spoke for the very forces that had driven his people to the rebellion with which he had pretended to sympathize. The men who overcame him and drove him out represent at least

the fierce passion of reconstruction which lies at the very heart of liberty; and so long as they represent, however imperfectly, such a struggle for deliverance, I am ready to serve their ends when I can. So long as the power of recognition rests with me the Government of the United States will refuse to extend the hand of welcome to any one who obtains power in a sister republic by treachery and violence. No permanency can be given the affairs of any republic by a title based upon intrigue and assassination. I declared that to be the policy of this Administration within three weeks after I assumed the presidency. I here again vow it. I am more interested in the fortunes of oppressed men and pitiful women and children than in any property rights whatever. Mistakes I have no doubt made in this perplexing business, but not in purpose or object.

More is involved than the immediate destinies of Mexico and the relations of the United States with a distressed and distracted people. All America looks on. Test is now being made of us whether we be sincere lovers of popular liberty or not and are indeed to be trusted to respect national sovereignty among our weaker neighbors. We have undertaken these many years to play big brother to the republics of this hemisphere. This is the day of our test whether we mean, or have ever meant, to play that part for our own benefit wholly or also for theirs. Upon the outcome of that test (its outcome in their minds, not in ours) depends every relationship of the United States with Latin America, whether in politics or in commerce and enterprise. These are great issues and lie at the heart of the gravest tasks of the future, tasks both economic and political and very intimately inwrought with many of the most vital of the new issues of the politics of the world. The republics of America have in the last three years been drawing together in a new spirit of accommodation, mutual understanding,

and cordial cooperation. Much of the politics of the world in the years to come will depend upon their relationships with one another. It is a barren and provincial statesmanship that loses sight of such things!

The future, the immediate future, will bring us squarely face to face with many great and exacting problems which will search us through and through whether we be able and ready to play the part in the world that we mean to play. It will not bring us into their presence slowly, gently, with ceremonious introduction, but suddenly and at once, the moment the war in Europe is over. They will be new problems, most of them; many will be old problems in a new setting and with new elements which we have never dealt with or reckoned the force and meaning of before. They will require for their solution new thinking, fresh courage and resourcefulness, and in some matters radical reconsiderations of policy. We must be ready to mobilize our resources alike of brains and of materials.

It is not a future to be afraid of. It is, rather, a future to stimulate and excite us to the display of the best powers that are in us. We may enter it with confidence when we are sure that we understand it,—and we have provided ourselves already with the means of understanding it.

Look first at what it will be necessary that the nations of the world should do to make the days to come tolerable and fit to live and work in; and then look at our part in what is to follow and our own duty of preparation. For we must be prepared both in resources and in policy.

There must be a just and settled peace, and we here in America must contribute the full force of our enthusiasm and of our authority as a nation to the organization of that peace upon world-wide foundations that cannot easily be shaken. No nation should be forced to take sides in any quarrel in which its own honour and integrity and the for-

tunes of its own people are not involved ; but no nation can any longer remain neutral as against any wilful disturbance of the peace of the world. The effects of war can no longer be confined to the areas of battle. No nation stands wholly apart in interest when the life and interests of all nations are thrown into confusion and peril. If hopeful and generous enterprise is to be renewed, if the healing and helpful arts of life are indeed to be revived when peace comes again, a new atmosphere of justice and friendship must be generated by means the world has never tried before. The nations of the world must unite in joint guarantees that whatever is done to disturb the whole world's life must first be tested in the court of the whole world's opinion before it is attempted.

These are the new foundations the world must build for itself, and we must play our part in the reconstruction, generously and without too much thought of our separate interests. We must make ourselves ready to play it intelligently, vigorously, and well.

One of the contributions we must make to the world's peace is this: We must see to it that the people in our insular possessions are treated in their own lands as we would treat them here, and make the rule of the United States mean the same thing everywhere,—the same justice, the same consideration for the essential rights of men.

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THE GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO SERVE THE WORLD

68. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

September 4, 1916

(Congressional Record, LIII, Appendix, 2160)

. . . The commands of democracy are as imperative as its privileges and opportunities are wide and generous. Its compulsion is upon us. It will be great and lift a great light for the guidance of the nations only if we are great and carry that light high and for the guidance of our own feet. We are not worthy to stand here unless we ourselves be in deed and in truth real democrats and servants of mankind, ready to give our very lives for the freedom and justice and spiritual exaltation of the great nation which shelters and nurtures us.

69. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*¹

September 25, 1916

(From the official printed copy; for the entire address see New York Times, September 26, 1916)

. . . America has stood in the years past for that sort of political understanding among men which would let every man feel that his rights were the same as those of another and as good as those of another, and the mission of America in the field of the world's commerce is to be the same, that when an American comes into that competition he comes without any arms that would enable him to conquer by force, but only with those peaceful influences of intelligence, a desire to serve, a knowledge of what he is about, before

¹ Statements Nos. 69 to 78 inclusive are speeches delivered by Mr. Wilson in his campaign for the presidency in 1916.

which everything softens and yields and renders itself subject. That is the mission of America, and my interest, so far as my small part in American affairs is concerned, is to lend every bit of intelligence I have to this interesting, this vital, this all-important matter of releasing the intelligence of America for the service of mankind.

70. Extract from an Address of President Wilson.

October 5, 1916

(New York Times, October 6, 1916)

. . . We have never yet sufficiently formulated our program for America with regard to the part she is going to play in the world, and it is imperative that she should formulate it at once. But, in order to carry out a program, you must have a unification of spirit and purpose in America which no influence can invade.

In making that program what are we to say to ourselves? And what are we to say to the world? It is very important that the statesmen of other parts of the world should understand America. America has held off from the present conflict with which the rest of the world is ablaze, not because she was not interested, not because she was indifferent, but because the part she wanted to play was a different part from that.

The singularity of the present war is that its origin and objects never have been disclosed. They have obscure European roots which we do not know how to trace. So great a conflagration could not have broken out if the tinder had not been there, and the spark in danger of falling at any time. We were not the tinder. The spark did not come from us. It will take the long inquiry of history to explain this war.

But Europe ought not to misunderstand us. We are holding off, not because we do not feel concerned, but because when we exert the force of this nation we want to know what we are exerting it for. You know that we have always remembered and revered the advice of the great Washington, who advised us to avoid foreign entanglements. By that I understand him to mean avoid being entangled in the ambitions and the national purposes of other nations.

It does not mean — if I may be permitted to venture an interpretation of the meaning of that great man — that we are to avoid the entanglements of the world, for we are part of the world, and nothing that concerns the whole world can be indifferent to us. We want always to hold the force of America to fight for what? Not merely for the rights of property or of national ambition, but for the rights of mankind.

71. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

October 5, 1916

(New York Times, October 6, 1916)

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America up to the present time has been, as if by deliberate choice, confined and provincial, and it will be impossible for her to remain confined and provincial. Henceforth she belongs to the world and must act as part of the world, and all of the attitudes of America will henceforth be altered.

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The extraordinary circumstances that for the next decade, at any rate — after that it will be a matter of our own choice whether it continues or not — but for the next decade, at any rate, we have got to serve the world. That alters every commercial question, it alters every political question,

it alters every question of domestic development. The men who insist upon going on to do the old things in the old way are going to be at the tail end of the procession.

The sign of our destiny has at last become as wide as the horizon. And the thing that we have to be careful about is that we do this thing in a new way. It has hitherto been done by those who wanted to exploit the world. It has got to be done now in a way that will deserve the confidence of the world.

American character, as well as American enterprise, is going to be put to the test. American ideals are for the first time to be exhibited upon a world-wide scale, American purposes are going to be tested by the purposes of mankind, and not by the purposes of national ambition.

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72. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

October 7, 1916

(New York Times, October 8, 1916)

. . . We are indeed at a critical juncture in the affairs of the world, and the affairs of the world touch America very nearly. She does not stand apart. Her people are made up out of the peoples of the world. Her sympathies are as broad as the extended stocks of national Governments. There is nothing human that does not concern her.

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73. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

October 12, 1916

(New York Times, October 13, 1916)

I have said, and shall say again, that when the great present war is over it will be the duty of America to join with the other nations of the world in some kind of league for the maintenance of peace. Now, America was not a

party to this war, and the only terms upon which we will be admitted to a league, almost all the other powerful members of which were engaged in the war and made infinite sacrifices when we apparently made none, are the only terms which we desire, namely, that America shall not stand for national aggression, but shall stand for the just conceptions and bases of peace, for the competitions of merit alone, and for the generous rivalry of liberty.

Are we ready always to be the friends of justice, of fairness, of liberty, of peace, and of those accommodations which rest upon justice and peace? In these two trying years that have just gone by we have forborne, we have not allowed provocation to disturb our judgments, we have seen to it that America kept her poise when all the rest of the world seemed to have lost its poise.

Only upon the terms of retaining that poise and using the splendid force which always comes with poise can we hope to play the beneficent part in the history of the world which I have just now intimated.

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74. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

October 14, 1916

(New York Times, October 15, 1916)

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I want you to realize the part that the United States must play. It has been said, my fellow-citizens, been said with cruel emphasis in some quarters, that the people of the United States do not want to fight about anything. . . . But the people of the United States want to be sure what they are fighting about, and they want to be sure that they are fighting for the things that will bring to the world justice and peace. Define the elements; let us know that we are not fighting for the prevalence of this nation over that, for the

ambitions of this group of nations as compared with the ambitions of that group of nations; let us once be convinced that we are called in to a great combination to fight for the rights of mankind, and America will unite her force and spill her blood for the great things which she has always believed in and followed.

America is always ready to fight for things which are American. She does not permit herself to be embroiled, but she does know what it would be to be challenged. And when once she is challenged, there is not a man in the United States, I venture to say, so mean, so forgetful of the great heritage of this nation, that he would not give everything he possessed, including life itself, to stand by the honor of this nation.

What Europe is beginning to realize is that we are saving ourselves for something greater that is to come. We are saving ourselves in order that we may unite in that final league of nations in which it shall be understood that there is no neutrality where any nation is doing wrong, in that final league of nations which must, in the providence of God, come into the world where nation shall be leagued with nation in order to show all mankind that no man may lead any nation into acts of aggression without having all the other nations of the world leagued against it.

75. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

October 16, 1916

(New York Times, October 17, 1916)

So far America has concentrated her thought too much upon herself. So far she has thought too much of her internal development merely without forecasting what use she is going to make of the great power which she has accumu-

76. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*
October 26, 1916

. . . What I intend to preach from this time on is that America must show that as a member of the family of nations she has the same attitude toward the other nations that she wishes her people to have toward each other: That America is going to take this position, that she will lend her moral influence, not only, but her physical force, if other nations will join her, to see to it that no nation and no group of nations tries to take advantage of another nation or group of nations, and that the only thing ever fought for is the common rights of humanity.

Have you ever heard what started the present war? If you have, I wish you would publish it, because nobody else

has, so far as I can gather. Nothing in particular started it, but everything in general. There had been growing up in Europe a mutual suspicion, an interchange of conjectures about what this Government and that Government was going to do, an interlacing of alliances and understandings, a complex web of intrigue and spying, that presently was sure to entangle the whole of the family of mankind on that side of the water in its meshes.

Now, revive that after this war is over and sooner or later you will have just such another war, and this is the last war of the kind or of any kind that involves the world that the United States can keep out of.

I say that because I believe that the business of neutrality is over; not because I want it to be over, but I mean this, that war now has such a scale that the position of neutrals sooner or later becomes intolerable. Just as neutrality would be intolerable to me if I lived in a community where everybody had to assert his own rights by force and I had to go around among my neighbors and say: "Here, this cannot last any longer; let us get together and see that nobody disturbs the peace any more." That is what society is and we have not yet a society of nations.

We must have a society of nations, not suddenly, not by insistence, not by any hostile emphasis upon the demand, but by the demonstration of the needs of the time. The nations of the world must get together and say, "Nobody can hereafter be neutral as respects the disturbance of the world's peace for an object which the world's opinion can not sanction." The world's peace ought to be disturbed if the fundamental rights of humanity are invaded, but it ought not to be disturbed for any other thing that I can think of, and America was established in order to indicate, at any rate in one Government, the fundamental rights of man. America must hereafter be ready as a member of

the family of nations to exert her whole force, moral and physical, to the assertion of those rights throughout the round globe.

77. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

October 28, 1916

(New York Times, October 29, 1916)

We have peace, we have a peace founded upon the definite understanding that the United States, because it is powerful, self-possessed, because it has definite objects does not need to make a noise about them; because it knows that it can vindicate its right at any time, does not have to proclaim its right in terms of violent exaggeration. We have determined, whether we get the respect of the rest of the world or not, that we will deserve it by the way in which we act.

78. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

November 4, 1916

(New York Times, November 5, 1916)

The world will never be again what it has been. The United States will never be again what it has been. The United States was once in enjoyment of what we used to call splendid isolation. The three thousand miles of the Atlantic seemed to hold all European affairs at arm's length from us. The great spaces of the Pacific seemed to disclose no threat of influence upon our politics.

Now, from across the Atlantic and from across the Pacific we feel to the quick the influences which are affecting ourselves, and, in the meantime, whereas we used to be always in search of assistance and stimulation from out

of other countries, always in search of the capital of other countries to assist our investments, depending upon foreign markets for the sale of our securities, now we have bought in more than 50 per cent of those securities; we have become not the debtors but the creditors of the world, and in what other nations used to play in promoting industries which extended as wide as the world itself, we are playing the guiding part.

We can determine to a large extent who is to be financed and who is not to be financed. That is the reason I say that the United States will never be again what it has been. So it does not suffice to look, as some gentlemen are looking, back over their shoulders, to suggest that we do again what we did when we were provincial and isolated and unconnected with the great forces of the world, for now we are in the great drift of humanity which is to determine the politics of every country in the world.

With this outlook, is it worth while to stop to think of party advantage? Is it worth stopping to think of how we have voted in the past? We are now going to vote, if we be men with eyes open that can see the world, as those who wish to make a new America in a new world mean the same old thing for mankind that it meant when this great Republic was set up; mean hope and justice and righteous judgment and unselfish action. Why, my fellow-citizens, it is an unprecedented thing in the world that any nation in determining its foreign relations should be unselfish, and my ambition is to see America set the great example; not only a great example morally, but a great example intellectually.

Every man who has read and studied the great annals of this country may feel his blood warm as he feels these great forces of humanity growing stronger and stronger, not only, but knowing better and better from decade to decade how to concert action and unite their strength. In the days to come

men will no longer wonder how America is going to work out her destiny, for she will have proclaimed to them that her destiny is not divided from the destiny of the world; that her purpose is justice and love of mankind.

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

79. *Extract from a Communication of Secretary Lansing to the United States representatives at the capitals of the belligerent powers. December 18, 1916*

(*Congressional Record*, LIV, 633)

The President suggests that an early occasion be sought to call out from all the nations now at war such an avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guaranty against its renewal or the kindling of any similar conflict in the future as would make it possible frankly to compare them. He is indifferent as to the means taken to accomplish this. He would be happy himself to serve, or even to take the initiative in its accomplishment, in any way that might prove acceptable, but he has no desire to determine the method or the instrumentality. One way will be as acceptable to him as another if only the great object he has in mind be attained.

He takes the liberty of calling attention to the fact that the objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world. Each side desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and small states as secure against aggression or denial in the future as the rights and privileges of the great and powerful states now at war. Each wishes itself to be

made secure in the future, along with all other nations and peoples, against the recurrence of wars like this, and against aggression of selfish interference of any kind. Each would be jealous of the formation of any more rival leagues to preserve an uncertain balance of power amidst multiplying suspicions; but each is ready to consider the formation of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world. Before that final step can be taken, however, each deems it necessary first to settle the issues of the present war upon terms which will certainly safeguard the independence, the territorial integrity, and the political and commercial freedom of the nations involved.

In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world, the people and Government of the United States are as vitally and as directly interested as the Governments now at war. Their interest, moreover, in the means to be adopted to relieve the smaller and weaker peoples of the world of the peril of wrong and violence is as quick and ardent as that of any other people or Government. They stand ready, and even eager, to cooperate in the accomplishment of these ends, when the war is over, with every influence and resource at their command. But the war must first be concluded. The terms upon which it is to be concluded they are not at liberty to suggest; but the President does feel that it is his right and his duty to point out their intimate interests in its conclusion, lest it should presently be too late to accomplish the greater things which lie beyond its conclusion, lest the situation of neutral nations, now exceedingly hard to endure, be rendered altogether intolerable, and lest, more than all, an injury be done civilization itself which can never be atoned for or repaired.

The President therefore feels altogether justified in suggesting an immediate opportunity for a comparison of views as to the terms which must precede those ultimate arrange-

ments for the peace of the world, which all desire and in which the neutral nations as well as those at war are ready to play their full responsible part. If the contest must continue to proceed towards undefined ends by slow attrition, until the one group of belligerents or the other is exhausted, if million after million of human lives must continue to be offered up until on the one side or the other there are no more to offer, if resentments must be kindled that can never cool and despairs engendered from which there can be no recovery, hopes of peace and of the willing concert of free peoples will be rendered vain and idle.

The life of the entire world has been profoundly affected. Every part of the great family of mankind has felt the burden and terror of this unprecedented contest of arms. No nation in the civilized world can be said in truth to stand outside its influence or to be safe against its disturbing effects. And yet the concrete objects for which it is being waged have never been definitely stated.

The leaders of the several belligerents have, as has been said, stated those objects in general terms. But, stated in general terms, they seem the same on both sides. Never yet have the authoritative spokesmen of either side avowed the precise objects which would, if attained, satisfy them and their people that the war had been fought out. The world has been left to conjecture what definite results, what actual exchange of guaranties, what political or territorial changes or readjustments, what stage of military success even, would bring the war to an end.

It may be that peace is nearer than we know; that the terms which the belligerents on the one side and on the other would deem it necessary to insist upon are not so irreconcilable as some have feared; that an interchange of views would clear the way at least for conference and make the permanent concord of the nations a hope of the imme-

diate future, a concert of nations immediately practicable.

The President is not proposing peace; he is not even offering mediation. He is merely proposing that soundings be taken in order that we may learn, the neutral nations with the belligerents, how near the haven of peace may be for which all mankind longs with an intense and increasing longing. He believes that the spirit in which he speaks and the objects which he seeks will be understood by all concerned, and he confidently hopes for a response which will bring a new light into the affairs of the world.¹

FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE

80. *Address of President Wilson. January 22, 1917*

(*Congressional Record*, LIV, 1741)

Gentlemen of the Senate: On the eighteenth of December last I addressed an identic note to the Governments of the nations now at war requesting them to state, more definitely than they had yet been stated by either group of belligerents, the terms upon which they would deem it possible to make peace. I spoke on behalf of humanity and of the rights of all neutral nations like our own, many of whose most vital interests the war puts in constant jeopardy.

The Central Powers united in a reply which stated merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace. The Entente Powers have replied much more definitely and have stated, in general terms, indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details, the arrangements, guarantees and acts of reparation which they deem to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement.

We are that much nearer a definite discussion of the

¹ The replies of the various governments are published in the *Current History*, *New York Times*, V, 783-790.

peace which shall end the present war. We are that much nearer the discussion of the international concert which must thereafter hold the world at peace. In every discussion of the peace that must end this war it is taken for granted that that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again. Every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man must take that for granted.

I have sought this opportunity to address you because I thought that I owed it to you, as the council associated with me in the final determination of our international obligations, to disclose to you without reserve the thought and purpose that have been taking form in my mind in regard to the duty of our Government in the days to come when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a new plan the foundations of peace among the nations.

It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise. To take part in such a service will be the opportunity for which they have sought to prepare themselves by the very principles and purposes of their polity and the approved practices of their Government ever since the days when they set up a new nation in the high and honorable hope that it might in all that it was and did show mankind the way to liberty. They cannot in honor withhold the service to which they are now about to be challenged. They do not wish to withhold it. But they owe it to themselves and to the other nations of the world to state the conditions under which they will feel free to render it.

That service is nothing less than this, to add their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world. Such a settlement cannot now be long postponed. It is

right that before it comes this Government should frankly formulate the conditions upon which it would feel justified in asking our people to approve its formal and solemn adherence to a league for peace. I am here to attempt to state those conditions.

The present war must first be ended; but we owe it to candor and to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that so far as our participation in guarantees of future peace is concerned, it makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms it is ended. The treaties and agreements which bring it to an end must embody terms which will create a peace that is worth guaranteeing and preserving, a peace that will win the approval of mankind, not merely a peace that will serve the several interests and immediate aims of the nations engaged. We shall have no voice in determining what those terms shall be, but we shall, I feel sure, have a voice in determining whether they shall be made lasting or not by the guarantees of a universal covenant; and our judgment upon what is fundamental and essential as a condition precedent to permanency should be spoken now, not afterward, when it may be too late.

No covenant of cooperative peace that does not include the peoples of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe against war; and yet there is only one sort of peace that the peoples of America could join in guaranteeing. The elements of that peace must be elements that engage the confidence and satisfy the principles of the American Governments, elements consistent with their political faith and the practical convictions which the peoples of America have once for all embraced and undertaken to defend.

I do not mean to say that any American Government would throw any obstacle in the way of any terms of peace the Governments now at war might agree upon, or seek to upset them when made, whatever they might be. I only

take it for granted that mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves. Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or withstand it.

If the peace presently to be made is to endure it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind.

The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine whether it is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not only a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.

Fortunately we have received very explicit assurances on this point. The statesmen of both of the groups of nations now arrayed against one another have said, in terms that could not be misinterpreted, that it was no part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their antagonists. But the implications of these assurances may not be equally clear to all,—may not be the same on both sides of the water. I think it will be serviceable if I attempt to set forth what we understand them to be.

They imply, first of all, that it must be a peace without victory. It is not pleasant to say this. I beg that I may be permitted to put my own interpretation upon it and that it may be understood that no other interpretation was in my

thought. I am seeking only to face realities and to face them without soft concealments. Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last. Only a peace the very principle of which is equality and common participation in a common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance.

* The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it is to last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak. Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend. Equality of territory or of resources there of course cannot be; nor any sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the peoples themselves. But no one asks or expects anything more than an equality of rights. Mankind is looking now for freedom of life, not for equipoise of power.

And there is a deeper thing involved than even equality of right among organized nations. No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property. I take it for granted, for instance, if I may venture upon a single example, that statesmen every-

where are agreed that there should be a united, independent and autonomous Poland, and that henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own.

I speak of this, not because of any desire to exalt an abstract political principle which has always been held very dear by those who have sought to build up liberty in America, but for the same reason that I have spoken of the other conditions of peace which seem to me clearly indispensable, — because I wish frankly to uncover realities. Any peace which does not recognize and accept this principle will inevitably be upset. It will not rest upon the affections or the convictions of mankind. The ferment of spirit of whole populations will fight subtly and constantly against it, and all the world will sympathize. ♦ The world can be at peace only if its life is stable, and there can be no stability where the will is in rebellion, where there is not tranquillity of spirit and a sense of justice, of freedom and of right.

So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling towards a full development of its resources and of its powers should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea. Where this cannot be done by the cession of territory, it can no doubt be done by the neutralization of direct rights of way under the general guarantee which will assure the peace itself. With a right comity of arrangement no nation need be shut away from free access to the open paths of the world's commerce.

And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. The freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality, and cooperation. No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many of the rules of international practice hitherto sought to be established may be necessary in

order to make the seas indeed free and common in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind, but the motive for such changes is convincing and compelling. There can be no trust or intimacy between the peoples of the world without them. The free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is an essential part of the process of peace and of development. It need not be difficult either to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the governments of the world sincerely desire to come to an agreement concerning it.

It is a problem closely connected with the limitation of naval armaments and the cooperation of the navies of the world in keeping the seas at once free and safe. And the question of limiting naval armaments opens the wider and perhaps more difficult question of the limitation of armies and of all programs of military preparation. Difficult and delicate as these questions are, they must be faced with the utmost candor and decided in a spirit of real accommodation if peace is to come with healing in its wings, and come to stay. Peace cannot be had without concession and sacrifice. There can be no sense of safety and equality among the nations if great preponderating armaments are henceforth to continue here and there to be built up and maintained. The statesmen of the world must plan for peace and nations must adjust and accommodate their policy to it as they have planned for war and made ready for pitiless conquest and rivalry. The question of armaments, whether on land or sea, is the most immediately and intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of nations and of mankind.

I have spoken upon these great matters without reserve and with the utmost explicitness because it has seemed to me to be necessary if the world's yearning desire for peace was anywhere to find free voice and utterance. Perhaps

I am the only person in high authority amongst all the peoples of the world who is at liberty to speak and hold nothing back. I am speaking as an individual, and yet I am speaking also, of course, as the responsible head of a great Government, and I feel confident that I have said what the people of the United States would wish me to say.

May I not add that I hope and believe that I am in effect speaking for liberals and friends of humanity in every nation and of every program of liberty? I would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere who have as yet had no place or opportunity to speak their real hearts out concerning the death and ruin they see to have come already upon the persons and the homes they hold most dear.

And in holding out the expectation that the people and Government of the United States will join the other civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace upon such terms as I have named, I speak with the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this promise no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfilment, rather, of all that we have professed or striven for.

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences in-

truded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

I am proposing government by the consent of the governed; that freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference representatives of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty; and that moderation of armaments which makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of selfish violence.

These are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others.. And they are also the principles and policies of forward looking men and women everywhere, and of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.

SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH GERMANY

81. *Address of President Wilson. February 3, 1917*

(*Congressional Record*, LIV, 2578)

Gentlemen of the Congress: The Imperial German Government on the thirty-first of January announced to this Government and to the governments of the other neutral nations that on and after the first day of February, the present month, it would adopt a policy with regard to the use of submarines against all shipping seeking to pass through certain designated areas of the high seas to which it is clearly my duty to call your attention.

Let me remind the Congress that on the eighteenth of

April last, in view of the sinking on the twenty-fourth of March of the cross-channel passenger steamer *Sussex* by a German submarine, without summons or warning, and the consequent loss of the lives of several citizens of the United States who were passengers aboard her, this Government addressed a note to the Imperial German Government in which it made the following declaration:

“If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines without regard to what the Government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether.”

In reply to this declaration the Imperial German Government gave this Government the following assurance:

“The German Government is prepared to do its utmost to confine the operations of war for the rest of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents, thereby also insuring the freedom of the seas, a principle upon which the German Government believes now, as before, to be in agreement with the Government of the United States.

“The German Government, guided by this idea, notifies the Government of the United States that the German naval forces have received the following orders: In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law,

such vessels, both within and without the area declared as naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance.

“But,” it added, “neutrals can not expect that Germany, forced to fight for her existence, shall, for the sake of neutral interest, restrict the use of an effective weapon if her enemy is permitted to continue to apply at will methods of warfare violating the rules of international law. Such a demand would be incompatible with the character of neutrality, and the German Government is convinced that the Government of the United States does not think of making such a demand, knowing that the Government of the United States has repeatedly declared that it is determined to restore the principle of the freedom of the seas, from whatever quarter it has been violated.”

To this the Government of the United States replied on the eighth of May, accepting, of course, the assurances given, but adding:

“The Government of the United States feels it necessary to state that it takes it for granted that the Imperial German Government does not intend to imply that the maintenance of its newly announced policy is in any way contingent upon the course or result of diplomatic negotiations between the Government of the United States and any other belligerent Government, notwithstanding the fact that certain passages in the Imperial Government’s note of the 4th instant might appear to be susceptible of that construction. In order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the Government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government that it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slight-

est degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other Government affecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative."

To this note of the eighth of May the Imperial German Government made no reply.

On the thirty-first of January, the Wednesday of the present week, the German Ambassador handed to the Secretary of State, along with a formal note, a memorandum which contained the following statement:

"The Imperial Government, therefore, does not doubt that the Government of the United States will understand the situation thus forced upon Germany by the Entente Allies' brutal methods of war and by their determination to destroy the Central Powers, and that the Government of the United States will further realize that the now openly disclosed intentions of the Entente Allies give back to Germany the freedom of action which she reserved in her note addressed to the Government of the United States on May 4, 1916.

"Under these circumstances Germany will meet the illegal measures of her enemies by forcibly preventing after February 1, 1917, in a zone around Great Britain, France, Italy, and in the eastern Mediterranean, all navigation, that of neutrals included, from and to England and from and to France, etc., etc. All ships met within the zone will be sunk. All ships met within the zone will be sunk."

I think that you will agree with me that, in view of this declaration, which suddenly and without prior intimation of any kind deliberately withdraws the solemn assurance given in the Imperial Government's note of the fourth of May, 1916, this Government has no alternative consistent with the dignity and honor of the United States but to take the course which, in its note of the eighteenth of April, 1916, it announced that it would take in the event

that the German Government did not declare and effect an abandonment of the methods of submarine warfare which it was then employing and to which it now purposes again to resort.

I have, therefore, directed the Secretary of State to announce to his Excellency the German Ambassador that all diplomatic relations between the United States and the German Empire are severed, and that the American Ambassador at Berlin will immediately be withdrawn; and, in accordance with this decision, to hand to His Excellency his passports.¹

Notwithstanding this unexpected action of the German Government, this sudden and deeply deplorable renunciation of its assurances, given this Government at one of the most critical moments of tension in the relations of the two Governments, I refuse to believe that it is the intention of the German authorities to do in fact what they have warned us they will feel at liberty to do. I cannot bring myself to believe that they will indeed pay no regard to the ancient friendship between their people and our own or to the solemn obligations which have been exchanged between them and destroy American ships and take the lives of American citizens in the willful prosecution of the ruthless naval programme they have announced their intention to adopt. Only actual overt acts on their part can make me believe it even now.

If this inveterate confidence on my part in the sobriety and prudent foresight of their purpose should unhappily prove unfounded; if American ships and American lives should in fact be sacrificed by their naval commanders in heedless contravention of the just and reasonable understandings of international law and the obvious dictates of humanity, I shall take the liberty of coming again before the

¹ The German Ambassador left Washington, February 13, 1917.

Congress, to ask that authority be given me to use any means that may be necessary for the protection of our seamen and our people in the prosecution of their peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas. I can do nothing less. I take it for granted that all neutral governments will take the same course.

We do not desire any hostile conflict with the Imperial German Government. We are the sincere friends of the German people and earnestly desire to remain at peace with the Government which speaks for them. We shall not believe that they are hostile to us unless and until we are obliged to believe it; and we purpose nothing more than the reasonable defense of the undoubted rights of our people. We wish to serve no selfish ends. We seek merely to stand true alike in thought and in action to the immortal principles of our people which I sought to express in my address to the Senate only two weeks ago,—seek merely to vindicate our right to liberty and justice and an unmolested life. These are the bases of peace, not war. God grant that we may not be challenged to defend them by acts of willful injustice on the part of the Government of Germany!

ARMED NEUTRALITY

82. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

February 26, 1917

(Congressional Record, LIV, 4272)

Gentlemen of the Congress: I have again asked the privilege of addressing you, because we are moving through critical times, during which it seems to me to be my duty to keep in close touch with the houses of Congress so that neither counsel nor action shall run at cross purposes between us.

On the third of February I officially informed you of the

sudden and unexpected action of the Imperial German Government in declaring its intention to disregard the promises it had made to this Government in April last and undertake immediate submarine operations against all commerce, whether of belligerents or of neutrals, that should seek to approach Great Britain and Ireland, the Atlantic coasts of Europe, or the harbors of the eastern Mediterranean, and to conduct those operations without regard to the established restrictions of international practice, without regard to any considerations of humanity even, which might interfere with their object. That policy was forthwith put into practice. It has now been in active execution for nearly four weeks.

Its practical results are not fully disclosed. The commerce of other neutral nations is suffering severely, but not, perhaps, very much more severely than it was already suffering before the first of February, when the new policy of the Imperial Government was put into operation. We have asked the coöperation of the other neutral Governments to prevent these depredations, but so far none of them has thought it wise to join us in any common course of action. Our own commerce has suffered, is suffering, rather in apprehension than in fact, rather because so many of our ships are timidly keeping to their home ports than because American ships have been sunk.

In sum, therefore, the situation we find ourselves in with regard to the actual conduct of the German submarine warfare against commerce, and its effects upon our own ships and people, is substantially the same that it was when I addressed you on the third of February, except for the tying up of our shipping in our own ports because of the unwillingness of our ship-owners to risk their vessels at sea without insurance or adequate protection, and the very serious

congestion of our commerce which has resulted, a congestion which is growing rapidly more and more serious every day. This in itself might presently accomplish, in effect, what the new German submarine orders were meant to accomplish, so far as we are concerned. We can only say, therefore, that the overt act which I have ventured to hope the German commanders would in fact avoid has not occurred.

But, while this is happily true, it must be admitted that there have been certain additional indications and expressions of purpose on the part of the German press and the German authorities which have increased rather than lessened the impression that, if our ships and our people are spared, it will be because of fortunate circumstances or because the commanders of the German submarines which they may happen to encounter exercise an unexpected discretion and restraint rather than because of the instructions under which those commanders are acting. It would be foolish to deny that the situation is fraught with the gravest possibilities and dangers. No thoughtful man can fail to see that the necessity for definite action may come at any time, if we are in fact, and not in word merely, to defend our elementary rights as a neutral nation. It would be most imprudent to be unprepared.

I cannot in such circumstances be unmindful of the fact that the expiration of the term of the present Congress is immediately at hand, by constitutional limitation; and that it would in all likelihood require an unusual length of time to assemble and organize the Congress which is to succeed it.

I feel that I ought, in view of that fact, to obtain from you full and immediate assurance of the authority which I may need at any moment to exercise. No doubt I already possess that authority without special warrant of law, by the plain implication of my constitutional duties and powers; but I prefer, in the present circumstances, not to act upon gen-

eral implication. I wish to feel that the authority and the power of the Congress are behind me in whatever it may become necessary for me to do. We are jointly the servants of the people and must act together and in their spirit, so far as we can divine and interpret it.

No one doubts what it is our duty to do. We must defend our commerce and the lives of our people in the midst of the present trying circumstances, with discretion, but with clear and steadfast purpose. Only the method and the extent remain to be chosen, upon the occasion, if occasion should indeed arise. Since it has unhappily proved impossible to safeguard our neutral rights by diplomatic means against the unwarranted infringements they are suffering at the hands of Germany, there may be no recourse but to armed neutrality, which we shall know how to maintain and for which there is abundant American precedent.

It is devoutly to be hoped that it will not be necessary to put armed force anywhere into action. The American people do not desire it, and our desire is not different from theirs. I am sure that they will understand the spirit in which I am now acting, the purpose I hold nearest my heart and would wish to exhibit in everything I do. I am anxious that the people of the nations at war also should understand and not mistrust us. I hope that I need give no further proofs and assurances than I have already given throughout nearly three years of anxious patience that I am the friend of peace and mean to preserve it for America so long as I am able. I am not now proposing or contemplating war or any steps that lead to it. I merely request that you will accord me by your own vote and definite bestowal the means and the authority to safeguard in practice the right of a great people who are at peace and who are desirous of exercising none but the rights of peace to follow the pursuit of peace in quietness and goodwill,—rights recognized time

out of mind by all the civilized nations of the world. No course of my choosing or of theirs will lead to war. War can come only by the wilful acts and aggressions of others.

You will understand why I can make no definite proposals or forecasts of action now and must ask for your supporting authority in the most general terms. The form in which action may become necessary cannot yet be foreseen. I believe that the people will be willing to trust me to act with restraint, with prudence, and in the true spirit of amity and good faith that they have themselves displayed throughout these trying months; and it is in that belief that I request that you will authorize me to supply our merchant ships with defensive arms, should that become necessary, and with the means of using them, and to employ any other instrumentalities or methods that may be necessary and adequate to protect our ships and our people in their legitimate and peaceful pursuits on the seas. I request also that you will grant me at the same time, along with the powers I ask, a sufficient credit to enable me to provide adequate means of protection where they are lacking, including adequate insurance against the present war risks.

I have spoken of our commerce and of the legitimate errands of our people on the seas, but you will not be misled as to my main thought, the thought that lies beneath these phrases and gives them dignity and weight. It is not of material interests merely that we are thinking. It is, rather, of fundamental human rights, chief of all the right of life itself. I am thinking, not only of the rights of Americans to go and come about their proper business by way of the sea, but also of something much deeper, much more fundamental than that. I am thinking of those rights of humanity without which there is no civilization. My theme is of those great principles of compassion and of

protection which mankind has sought to throw about human lives, the lives of non-combatants, the lives of men who are peacefully at work keeping the industrial processes of the world quick and vital, the lives of women and children and of those who supply the labor which ministers to their sustenance. We are speaking of no selfish material right but of rights which our hearts support and whose foundation is that righteous passion for justice upon which all law, all structures alike of family, of state, and of mankind must rest, and upon the ultimate base of our existence and our liberty. I cannot imagine any man with American principles at his heart hesitating to defend these things.¹

GENERAL FOREIGN POLICY

83. *Extract from the Inaugural Address of President Wilson. March 5, 1917*

(From the official printed text; for the entire address see *New York Times*, March 6, 1917)

. . . We stand firm in armed neutrality, since it seems that in no other way we can demonstrate what it is we insist upon and cannot forego. We may even be drawn on, by circumstances, not by our own purpose or desire, to a more active assertion of our rights as we see them and a more immediate association with the great struggle itself. But nothing will alter our thought or our purpose. They are too clear to be obscured. They are too deeply rooted in the principles of our national life to be altered. We desire neither conquest nor advantage. We wish nothing that can be had only at the cost of another people. We have always professed un-

¹ For the action by Congress upon the request contained in this note, see *infra*, p. 141. For the President's comment on the action of the minority in the Senate, see *Current History, New York Times*, VI, 51.

selfish purpose and we covet the opportunity to prove that our professions are sincere.

, . . . We are provincials no longer. The tragical events of the thirty months of vital turmoil through which we have just passed have made us citizens of the world. There can be no turning back. Our own fortunes as a nation are involved, whether we would have it so or not.

And yet we are not the less Americans on that account. We shall be the more American if we but remain true to the principles in which we have been bred. They are not the principles of a province or of a single continent. We have known and boasted all along that they were the principles of a liberated mankind. These, therefore, are the things we shall stand for, whether in war or in peace:

That all nations are equally interested in the peace of the world and in the political stability of free peoples, and equally responsible for their maintenance;

That the essential principle of peace is the actual equality of nations in all matters of right or privilege;

That peace cannot securely or justly rest upon an armed balance of power;

That Governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed and that no other powers should be supported by the common thought, purpose, or power of the family of nations;

That the seas should be equally free and safe for the use of all peoples, under rules set up by common agreement and consent, and that, so far as practicable, they should be accessible to all upon equal terms;

That national armaments should be limited to the necessities of national order and domestic safety;

That the community of interest and of power upon which peace must henceforth depend imposes upon each nation the duty of seeing to it that all influences proceeding from its

own citizens meant to encourage or assist revolution in other states should be sternly and effectually suppressed and prevented.

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NECESSITY OF WAR WITH GERMANY

84. *Address of President Wilson. April 2, 1917*

(House Document No. 1, 65th Congress, 1st Session)

Gentlemen of the Congress: I have called the Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious, very serious, choices of policy to be made, and made immediately, which it was neither right nor constitutionally permissible that I should assume the responsibility of making.

On the third of February last I officially laid before you the extraordinary announcement of the Imperial German Government that on and after the first day of February it was its purpose to put aside all restraints of law or of humanity and use its submarines to sink every vessel that sought to approach either the ports of Great Britain and Ireland or the western coasts of Europe or any of the ports controlled by the enemies of Germany within the Mediterranean. That had seemed to be the object of the German submarine warfare earlier in the war, but since April of last year the Imperial Government had somewhat restrained the commanders of its undersea craft in conformity with its promise then given to us that passenger boats should not be sunk and that due warning would be given to all other vessels which its submarines might seek to destroy, when no resistance was offered or escape attempted, and care taken that their crews were given at least a fair chance to save their lives in their open boats. The precautions taken were meagre and haphazard enough, as was proved in distressing instance after instance in the progress of the cruel and

unmanly business, but a certain degree of restraint was observed. The new policy has swept every restriction aside. Vessels of every kind, whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, their destination, their errand, have been ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents. Even hospital ships and ships carrying relief to the sorely bereaved and stricken people of Belgium, though the latter were provided with safe conduct through the proscribed areas by the German Government itself and were distinguished by unmistakable marks of identity, have been sunk with the same reckless lack of compassion or of principle.

I was for a little while unable to believe that such things would in fact be done by any government that had hitherto subscribed to the humane practices of civilized nations. International law had its origin in the attempt to set up some law which would be respected and observed upon the seas, where no nation had right of dominion and where lay the free highways of the world. By painful stage after stage has that law been built up, with meagre enough results, indeed, after all was accomplished that could be accomplished, but always with a clear view, at least, of what the heart and conscience of mankind demanded. This minimum of right the German Government has swept aside under the plea of retaliation and necessity and because it had no weapons which it could use at sea except those which it is impossible to employ as it is employing them without throwing to the winds all scruples of humanity or of respect for the understandings that were supposed to underlie the intercourse of the world. I am not now thinking of the loss of property involved, immense and serious as that is, but only of the wanton and wholesale destruction of the lives of non-combatants, men, women, and children, engaged in

pursuits which have always, even in the darkest periods of modern history, been deemed innocent and legitimate. Property can be paid for; the lives of peaceful and innocent people cannot be. The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind.

It is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it. The choice we make for ourselves must be made with a moderation of counsel and a temperateness of judgment befitting our character and our motives as a nation. We must put excited feeling away. Our motive will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion.

When I addressed the Congress on the twenty-sixth of February last I thought that it would suffice to assert our neutral rights with arms, our right to use the seas against unlawful interference, our right to keep our people safe against unlawful violence. But armed neutrality, it now appears, is impracticable. Because submarines are in effect outlaws when used as the German submarines have been used against merchant shipping, it is impossible to defend ships against their attacks as the law of nations has assumed that merchantmen would defend themselves against privateers or cruisers, visible craft giving chase upon the open sea. It is common prudence in such circumstances, grim necessity indeed, to endeavor to destroy them before they have shown their own intention. They must be dealt with upon sight, if dealt with at all. The German Government

denies the right of neutrals to use arms at all within the areas of the sea which it has proscribed, even in the defense of rights which no modern publicist has ever before questioned their right to defend. The intimation is conveyed that the armed guards which we have placed on our merchant ships will be treated as beyond the pale of law and subject to be dealt with as pirates would be. Armed neutrality is ineffectual enough at best; in such circumstances and in the face of such pretensions it is worse than ineffectual: it is likely only to produce what it was meant to prevent; it is practically certain to draw us into the war without either the rights or the effectiveness of belligerents. There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making: we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the very roots of human life.

With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war.

What this will involve is clear. It will involve the utmost practicable cooperation in counsel and action with the governments now at war with Germany, and, as incident

to that, the extension to those governments of the most liberal financial credits, in order that our resources may so far as possible be added to theirs. It will involve the organization and mobilization of all the material resources of the country to supply the materials of war and serve the incidental needs of the nation in the most abundant and yet the most economical and efficient way possible. It will involve the immediate full equipment of the navy in all respects but particularly in supplying it with the best means of dealing with the enemy's submarines. It will involve the immediate addition to the armed forces of the United States already provided for by law in case of war at least five hundred thousand men, who should, in my opinion, be chosen upon the principle of universal liability to service, and also the authorization of subsequent additional increments of equal force so soon as they may be needed and can be handled in training. It will involve also, of course, the granting of adequate credits to the Government, sustained, I hope, so far as they can equitably be sustained by the present generation, by well conceived taxation.

I say sustained so far as may be equitable by taxation because it seems to me that it would be most unwise to base the credits which will now be necessary entirely on money borrowed. It is our duty, I most respectfully urge, to protect our people so far as we may against the very serious hardships and evils which would be likely to arise out of the inflation which would be produced by vast loans.

In carrying out the measures by which these things are to be accomplished we should keep constantly in mind the wisdom of interfering as little as possible in our own preparation and in the equipment of our own military forces with the duty,— for it will be a very practical duty,— of supplying the nations already at war with Germany with the materials which they can obtain only from us or by our

assistance. They are in the field and we should help them in every way to be effective there.

I shall take the liberty of suggesting, through the several executive departments of the Government, for the consideration of your committees, measures for the accomplishment of the several objects I have mentioned. I hope that it will be your pleasure to deal with them as having been framed after very careful thought by the branch of the Government upon which the responsibility of conducting the war and safeguarding the nation will most directly fall.

While we do these things, these deeply momentous things, let us be very clear, and make very clear to all the world what our motives and our objects are. My own thought has not been driven from its habitual and normal course by the unhappy events of the last two months, and I do not believe that the thought of the nation has been altered or clouded by them. I have exactly the same things in mind now that I had in mind when I addressed the Senate on the twenty-second of January last; the same that I had in mind when I addressed the Congress on the third of February and on the twenty-sixth of February. Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles. Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances. We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of

responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states.

We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old, unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as pawns and tools. Self-governed nations do not fill their neighbor states with spies or set the course of intrigue to bring about some critical posture of affairs which will give them an opportunity to strike and make conquest. Such designs can be successfully worked out only under cover and where no one has the right to ask questions. Cunningly contrived plans of deception or aggression, carried, it may be, from generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from the light only within the privacy of courts or behind the carefully guarded confidences of a narrow and privileged class. They are happily impossible where public opinion commands and insists upon full information concerning all the nation's affairs.

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and pre-

fer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.

Does not every American feel that assurance has been added to our hope for the future peace of the world by the wonderful and heartening things that have been happening within the last few weeks in Russia? Russia was known by those who knew it best to have been always in fact democratic at heart, in all the vital habits of her thought, in all the intimate relationships of her people that spoke their natural instinct, their habitual attitude towards life. The autocracy that crowned the summit of her political structure, long as it had stood and terrible as was the reality of its power, was not in fact Russian in origin, character, or purpose; and now it has been shaken off and the great, generous Russian people have been added in all their naïve majesty and might to the forces that are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice, and for peace. Here is a fit partner for a League of Honor.

One of the things that has served to convince us that the Prussian autocracy was not and could never be our friend is that from the very outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of government with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace within and without, our industries and our commerce. Indeed it is now evident that its spies were here even before the war began; and it is unhappily not a matter of conjecture but a fact proved in our courts of justice that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country have been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under the personal direction of official agents of the Imperial Government accredited to the Government of the United States. Even in checking these things and trying

to extirpate them we have sought to put the most generous interpretation possible upon them because we knew that their source lay, not in any hostile feeling or purpose of the German people towards us (who were, no doubt as ignorant of them as we ourselves were), but only in the selfish designs of a Government that did what it pleased and told its people nothing. But they have played their part in serving to convince us at last that that Government entertains no real friendship for us and means to act against our peace and security at its convenience. That it means to stir up enemies against us at our very doors the intercepted note to the German Minister at Mexico City is eloquent evidence.

We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we know that in such a government, following such methods, we can never have a friend; and that in the presence of its organized power, always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world. We are now about to accept gauge of battle with this natural foe to liberty and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretence about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included: for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been

made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them.

Just because we fight without rancor and without selfish object, seeking nothing for ourselves but what we shall wish to share with all free peoples, we shall, I feel confident, conduct our operations as belligerents without passion and ourselves observe with proud punctilio the principles of right and fair play we profess to be fighting for.

I have said nothing of the governments allied with the Imperial Government of Germany because they have not made war upon us or challenged us to defend our right and our honor. The Austro-Hungarian Government has, indeed, avowed its unqualified endorsement and acceptance of the reckless and lawless submarine warfare adopted now without disguise by the Imperial German Government, and it has therefore not been possible for this Government to receive Count Tarnowski, the Ambassador recently accredited to this Government by the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary; but that Government has not actually engaged in warfare against citizens of the United States on the seas, and I take the liberty, for the present at least, of postponing a discussion of our relations with the authorities at Vienna. We enter this war only where we are clearly forced into it because there are no other means of defending our rights.

It will be all the easier for us to conduct ourselves as belligerents in a high spirit of right and fairness because we act without animus, not in enmity towards a people or with the desire to bring any injury or disadvantage upon them, but only in armed opposition to an irresponsible government which has thrown aside all considerations of humanity and of right and is running amuck. We are, let me say again, the sincere friends of the German people, and shall desire nothing so much as the early re-establish-

ment of intimate relations of mutual advantage between us, — however hard it may be for them, for the time being, to believe that this is spoken from our hearts. We have borne with their present government through all these bitter months because of that friendship,— exercising a patience and forbearance which would otherwise have been impossible. We shall, happily, still have an opportunity to prove that friendship in our daily attitude and actions towards the millions of men and women of German birth and native sympathy who live amongst us and share our life, and we shall be proud to prove it towards all who are in fact loyal to their neighbors and to the Government in the hour of test. They are, most of them, as true and loyal Americans as if they had never known any other fealty or allegiance. They will be prompt to stand with us in rebuking and restraining the few who may be of a different mind and purpose. If there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression ; but, if it lifts its head at all, it will lift it only here and there and without countenance except from a lawless and malignant few.

It is a distressing and oppressive duty, Gentlemen of the Congress, which I have performed in thus addressing you. There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts,— for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedi-

cate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.

SPEAK, ACT, AND SERVE TOGETHER

85. *Extract from a Statement of President Wilson.*

April 15, 1917

(From the official printed text; for the entire statement see *Congressional Record* [Daily], LV, 711)

My Fellow Countrymen:

The entrance of our own beloved country into the grim and terrible war for democracy and human rights which has shaken the world creates so many problems of national life and action which call for immediate consideration and settlement that I hope you will permit me to address to you a few words of earnest counsel and appeal with regard to them.

We are rapidly putting our navy upon an effective war footing and are about to create and equip a great army, but these are the simplest parts of the great task to which we have addressed ourselves. There is not a single selfish element, so far as I can see, in the cause we are fighting for. We are fighting for what we believe and wish to be the rights of mankind and for the future peace and security of the world. To do this great thing worthily and successfully we must devote ourselves to the service without regard to profit or material advantage and with an energy and intelligence that will rise to the level of the enterprise itself. We must realize to the full how great the task is and how

many things, how many kinds and elements of capacity and service and self-sacrifice it involves.

These, then, are the things we must do, and do well, besides fighting,—the things without which mere fighting would be fruitless:

We must supply abundant food for ourselves and for our armies and our seamen not only but also for a large part of the nations with whom we have now made common cause, in whose support and by whose sides we shall be fighting;

We must supply ships by the hundreds out of our shipyards to carry to the other side of the sea, submarines or no submarines, what will every day be needed there, and abundant materials out of our fields and our mines and our factories with which not only to clothe and equip our own forces on land and sea but also to clothe and support our people for whom the gallant fellows under arms can no longer work, to help clothe and equip the armies with which we are cooperating in Europe and to keep the looms and manufactories there in raw materials; coal to keep the fires going in ships at sea and in the furnaces of hundreds of factories across the sea; steel out of which to make arms and ammunition both here and there; rails for worn out railways back of the fighting fronts; locomotives and rolling stock to take the place of those every day going to pieces; mules, horses, cattle for labor and for military service; everything with which the people of England and France and Italy and Russia have usually supplied themselves, but cannot now afford the men, the materials, or the machinery to make.

It is evident to every thinking man that our industries, on the farms, in the shipyards, in the mines, in the factories, must be made more prolific and more efficient than ever and that they must be more economically managed and bet-

ter adapted to the particular requirements of our task than they have been; and what I want to say is that the men and the women who devote their thought and their energy to these things will be serving the country and conducting the fight for peace and freedom just as truly and just as effectively as the men on the battlefield or in the trenches. The industrial forces of the country, men and women alike, will be a great national, a great international, service army,—a notable and honored host engaged in the service of the nation and the world, the efficient friends and saviors of free men everywhere. Thousands, nay, hundreds of thousands, of men otherwise liable to military service will of right and of necessity be excused from that service and assigned to the fundamental, sustaining work of the fields and factories and mines, and they will be as much part of the great patriotic forces of the nation as the men under fire.

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. . . Let every man and every woman assume the duty of careful, provident use and expenditure as a public duty, as a dictate of patriotism which no one can now expect ever to be excused or forgiven for ignoring.

In the hope that this statement of the needs of the nation and of the world in this hour of supreme crisis may stimulate those to whom it comes and remind all who need reminder of the solemn duties of a time such as the world has never seen before, I beg that all editors and publishers everywhere will give as prominent publication and as wide circulation as possible to this appeal. I venture to suggest, also, to all advertising agencies that they would perhaps render a very substantial and timely service to the country if they would give it widespread repetition. And I hope that clergymen will not think the theme of it an unworthy or in-

appropriate subject of comment and homily from their pulpits.

The supreme test of the nation has come. We must all speak, act, and serve together!

PURPOSES AND OBJECTS OF THE UNITED STATES

86. *A Letter of President Wilson to Representative Heflin, of Alabama. May 22, 1917*

(*Official Bulletin*, Washington, May 23, 1917)

It is incomprehensible to me how any frank or honest person could doubt or question my position with regard to the war and its objects. I have again and again stated the very serious and long-continued wrongs which the Imperial German Government has perpetrated against the rights, the commerce, and the citizens of the United States. The list is long and overwhelming. No nation that respected itself or the rights of humanity could have borne those wrongs any longer.

Our objects in going into the war have been stated with equal clearness. The whole of the conception, which I take to be the conception of our fellow countrymen with regard to the outcome of the war and the terms of its settlement I set forth with the utmost explicitness in an address to the Senate of the United States on the 22d of January last. Again, in my message to Congress on the 2d of April last, those objects were stated in unmistakable terms. I can conceive no purpose in seeking to becloud this matter except the purpose of weakening the hands of the Government and making the part which the United States is to play in this great struggle for human liberty an inefficient and hesitating part. We have entered the war for our own reasons and with our own objects clearly stated, and shall forget neither

the reasons nor the objects. There is no hate in our hearts for the German people, but there is a resolve which cannot be shaken even by misrepresentation to overcome the pretensions of the autocratic Government which acts upon purposes to which the German people have never consented.

CALL TO HIGH SERVICE

87. *Extract from an Address of President Wilson.*

May 30, 1917

(Official Bulletin, Washington, May 31, 1917)

When you reflect upon it, these men who died to preserve the Union died to preserve the instrument which we are now using to serve the world—a free nation espousing the cause of human liberty. In one sense the great struggle into which we have now entered is an American struggle because it is in the defense of American honor and American rights, but it is something even greater than that; it is a world struggle. It is the struggle of men who love liberty everywhere, and in this cause America will show herself greater than ever because she will rise to a greater thing. We have said in the beginning that we planted this great Government that men who wish freedom might have a place of refuge and a place where their hope could be realized, and now, having established such a Government, having preserved such a Government, having vindicated the power of such a Government, we are saying to all mankind: “We did not set this Government up in order that we might have a selfish and separate liberty, for we are now ready to come to your assistance and fight upon the field of the world the cause of human liberty.” In this thing America attains her full dignity and the full fruition of her great purpose.

No man can be glad that such things have happened as we have witnessed in these last fateful years, but perhaps it may be permitted to us to be glad that we have an opportunity to show the principles that we profess to be living principles that live in our hearts, and to have a chance by the pouring out of our blood and treasure to vindicate the thing which we have professed. For, my friends, the real fruition of life is to do the things we have said we wished to do. There are times when work seems empty and only action seems great. Such a time has come, and in the providence of God America will once more have an opportunity to show to the world that she was born to serve mankind.

WAR AIMS OF THE UNITED STATES

88. *Extract from a Communication of President Wilson to the Government of Russia. June 9, 1917*
(*Official Bulletin*, Washington, June 9, 1917)

In view of the approaching visit of the American delegation to Russia¹ to express the deep friendship of the American people for the people of Russia and to discuss the best and most practical means of co-operation between the two peoples in carrying the present struggle for the freedom of all peoples to a successful consummation, it seems opportune and appropriate that I should state again, in the light of this new partnership, the objects the United States has had in mind in entering the war. Those objects have been very much beclouded during the past few weeks by mistaken and misleading statements, and the issues at stake are too momentous, too tremendous, too significant, for the whole human race to permit any misinterpretations or mis-

¹ The American commission headed by Elihu Root had arrived in Russia and was formally received in Petrograd on June 15, 1917.

understandings, however slight, to remain uncorrected for a moment.

The position of America in this war is so clearly avowed that no man can be excused for mistaking it. She seeks no material profit or aggrandizement of any kind. She is fighting for no advantage or selfish object of her own, but for the liberation of peoples everywhere from the aggressions of autocratic force.

We are fighting for the liberty, the self-government, and the undictated development of all peoples, and every feature of the settlement that concludes this war must be conceived and executed for that purpose. Wrongs must first be righted and then adequate safeguard must be created to prevent their being committed again. We ought not to consider remedies merely because they have a pleasing and sonorous sound. Practical questions can be settled only by practical means. Phrases will not accomplish the result. Effective readjustments will, and whatever readjustments are necessary must be made.

But they must follow a principle, and that principle is plain. No people must be forced under sovereignty under which it does not wish to live. No territory must change hands except for the purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty. No indemnities must be insisted on except those that constitute payment for manifest wrongs done. No readjustments of power must be made except such as will tend to secure the future peace of the world and the future welfare and happiness of its peoples.

And then the free peoples of the world must draw together in some common covenant, some genuine and practical co-operation that will in effect combine their force to

secure peace and justice in the dealings of nations with one another.

The brotherhood of mankind must no longer be a fair but empty phrase; it must be given a structure of force and reality. The nations must realize their common life and effect a workable partnership to secure that life against the aggressions of autocratic and self-pleasing power.

For these things we can afford to pour out blood and treasure. For these are the things we have always professed to desire, and unless we pour out blood and treasure now and succeed we may never be able to unite or show conquering force again in the great cause of human liberty. The day has come to conquer or submit. If the forces of autocracy can divide us, they will overcome us; if we stand together, victory is certain, and the liberty which victory will secure. We can afford then to be generous, but we cannot afford then or now to be weak or omit any single guarantee of justice and security.

THE CASE AGAINST GERMANY

89. *Address of President Wilson. June 14, 1917*
(From the official printed text)

We meet to celebrate Flag Day because this flag which we honour and under which we serve is the emblem of our unity, our power, our thought and purpose as a nation. It has no other character than that which we give it from generation to generation. The choices are ours. It floats in majestic silence above the hosts that execute those choices, whether in peace or in war. And yet, though silent, it speaks to us, — speaks to us of the past, of the men and women who went before us and of the records they wrote upon it. We celebrate the day of its birth; and from its birth until now it has witnessed a great history, has floated on high the sym-

bol of great events, of a great plan of life worked out by a great people. We are about to carry it into battle, to lift it where it will draw the fire of our enemies. We are about to bid thousands, hundreds of thousands, it may be millions, of our men, the young, the strong, the capable men of the nation, to go forth and die beneath it on fields of blood far away,—for what? For some unaccustomed thing? For something for which it has never sought the fire before? American armies were never before sent across the seas. Why are they sent now? For some new purpose, for which this great flag has never been carried before, or for some old, familiar, heroic purpose for which it has seen men, its own men, die on every battlefield upon which Americans have borne arms since the Revolution?

These are questions which must be answered. We are Americans. We in our turn serve America, and can serve her with no private purpose. We must use her flag as she has always used it. We are accountable at the bar of history and must plead in utter frankness what purpose it is we seek to serve.

It is plain enough how we were forced into the war. The extraordinary insults and aggressions of the Imperial German Government left us no self-respecting choice but to take up arms in defense of our rights as a free people and of our honour as a sovereign government. The military masters of Germany denied us the right to be neutral. They filled our unsuspecting communities with vicious spies and conspirators and sought to corrupt the opinion of our people in their own behalf. When they found that they could not do that, their agents diligently spread sedition amongst us and sought to draw our own citizens from their allegiance,—and some of those agents were men connected with the official Embassy of the German Government itself here in our own capital. They sought by violence to de-

stroy our industries and arrest our commerce. They tried to incite Mexico to take up arms against us and to draw Japan into a hostile alliance with her,—and that, not by indirection, but by direct suggestion from the Foreign Office in Berlin. They impudently denied us the use of the high seas and repeatedly executed their threat that they would send to their death any of our people who ventured to approach the coasts of Europe. And many of our own people were corrupted. Men began to look upon their own neighbours with suspicion and to wonder in their hot resentment and surprise whether there was any community in which hostile intrigue did not lurk. What great nation in such circumstances would not have taken up arms? Much as we had desired peace, it was denied us, and not of our own choice. This flag under which we serve would have been dishonoured had we withheld our hand.

But that is only part of the story. We know now as clearly as we knew before we were ourselves engaged that we are not the enemies of the German people and that they are not our enemies. They did not originate or desire this hideous war or wish that we should be drawn into it; and we are vaguely conscious that we are fighting their cause, as they will some day see it, as well as our own. They are themselves in the grip of the same sinister power that has now at last stretched its ugly talons out and drawn blood from us. The whole world is at war because the whole world is in the grip of that power and is trying out the great battle which shall determine whether it is to be brought under its mastery or fling itself free.

The war was begun by the military masters of Germany, who proved to be also the masters of Austria-Hungary. These men have never regarded nations as peoples, men, women, and children of like blood and frame as themselves, for whom governments existed and in whom governments

had their life. They have regarded them merely as serviceable organizations which they could by force or intrigue bend or corrupt to their own purpose. They have regarded the smaller states, in particular, and the peoples who could be overwhelmed by force, as their natural tools and instruments of domination. Their purpose has long been avowed. The statesmen of other nations, to whom that purpose was incredible, paid little attention; regarded what German professors expounded in their classrooms and German writers set forth to the world as the goal of German policy as rather the dream of minds detached from practical affairs, as preposterous private conceptions of German destiny, than as the actual plans of responsible rulers; but the rulers of Germany themselves knew all the while what concrete plans, what well advanced intrigues lay back of what the professors and the writers were saying, and were glad to go forward unmolested, filling the thrones of Balkan states with German princes, putting German officers at the service of Turkey to drill her armies and make interest with her government, developing plans of sedition and rebellion in India and Egypt, setting their fires in Persia. The demands made by Austria upon Servia were a mere single step in a plan which compassed Europe and Asia, from Berlin to Bagdad. They hoped those demands might not arouse Europe, but they meant to press them whether they did or not, for they thought themselves ready for the final issue of arms.

Their plan was to throw a broad belt of German military power and political control across the very centre of Europe and beyond the Mediterranean into the heart of Asia; and Austria-Hungary was to be as much their tool and pawn as Servia or Bulgaria or Turkey or the ponderous states of the East. Austria-Hungary, indeed, was to become part of the central German Empire, absorbed and

dominated by the same forces and influences that had originally cemented the German states themselves. The dream had its heart at Berlin. It could have had a heart nowhere else! It rejected the idea of solidarity of race entirely. The choice of peoples played no part in it at all. It contemplated binding together racial and political units which could be kept together only by force,—Czechs, Magyars, Croats, Serbs, Roumanians, Turks, Armenians,—the proud states of Bohemia and Hungary, the stout little commonwealths of the Balkans, the indomitable Turks, the subtle peoples of the East. These peoples did not wish to be united. They ardently desired to direct their own affairs, would be satisfied only by undisputed independence. They could be kept quiet only by the presence or the constant threat of armed men. They would live under a common power only by sheer compulsion and await the day of revolution. But the German military statesmen had reckoned with all that and were ready to deal with it in their own way.

And they have actually carried the greater part of that amazing plan into execution! Look how things stand. Austria is at their mercy. It has acted, not upon its own initiative or upon the choice of its own people, but at Berlin's dictation ever since the war began. Its people now desire peace, but cannot have it until leave is granted from Berlin. The so-called Central Powers are in fact but a single Power. Servia is at its mercy, should its hands be but for a moment freed. Bulgaria has consented to its will, and Roumania is overrun. The Turkish armies, which Germans trained, are serving Germany, certainly not themselves, and the guns of German warships lying in the harbour at Constantinople remind Turkish statesmen every day that they have no choice but to take their orders from

Berlin. From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf the net is spread.

Is it not easy to understand the eagerness for peace that has been manifested from Berlin ever since the snare was set and sprung? Peace, peace, peace has been the talk of her Foreign Office for now a year and more; not peace upon her own initiative, but upon the initiative of the nations over which she now deems herself to hold the advantage. A little of the talk has been public, but most of it has been private. Through all sorts of channels it has come to me, and in all sorts of guises, but never with the terms disclosed which the German Government would be willing to accept. That government has other valuable pawns in its hands besides those I have mentioned. It still holds a valuable part of France, though with slowly relaxing grasp, and practically the whole of Belgium. Its armies press close upon Russia and overrun Poland at their will. It cannot go further; it dare not go back. It wishes to close its bargain before it is too late and it has little left to offer for the pound of flesh it will demand.

The military masters under whom Germany is bleeding see very clearly to what point Fate has brought them. If they fall back or are forced back an inch, their power both abroad and at home will fall to pieces like a house of cards. It is their power at home they are thinking about now more than their power abroad. It is that power which is trembling under their very feet; and deep fear has entered their hearts. They have but one chance to perpetuate their military power or even their controlling political influence. If they can secure peace now with the immense advantages still in their hands which they have up to this point apparently gained, they will have justified themselves before the German people: they will have gained by force what they prom-

ised to gain by it: an immense expansion of German power, an immense enlargement of German industrial and commercial opportunities. Their prestige will be secure, and with their prestige their political power. If they fail, their people will thrust them aside; a government accountable to the people themselves will be set up in Germany as it has been in England, in the United States, in France, and in all the great countries of the modern time except Germany. If they succeed they are safe and Germany and the world are undone; if they fail Germany is saved and the world will be at peace. If they succeed, America will fall within the menace. We and all the rest of the world must remain armed, as they will remain, and must make ready for the next step in their aggression; if they fail, the world may unite for peace and Germany may be of the union.

Do you not now understand the new intrigue, the intrigue for peace, and why the masters of Germany do not hesitate to use any agency that promises to effect their purpose, the deceit of the nations? Their present particular aim is to deceive all those who throughout the world stand for the rights of peoples and the self-government of nations; for they see what immense strength the forces of justice and of liberalism are gathering out of this war. They are employing liberals in their enterprise. They are using men, in Germany and without, as their spokesmen whom they have hitherto despised and oppressed, using them for their own destruction,—socialists, the leaders of labour, the thinkers they have hitherto sought to silence. Let them once succeed and these men, now their tools, will be ground to powder beneath the weight of the great military empire they will have set up; the revolutionists in Russia will be cut off from all succour or cooperation in western Europe and a counter revolution fostered and supported; Germany herself

will lose her chance of freedom; and all Europe will arm for the next, the final struggle.

The sinister intrigue is being no less actively conducted in this country than in Russia and in every country in Europe to which the agents and dupes of the Imperial German Government can get access. That government has many spokesmen here, in places high and low. They have learned discretion. They keep within the law. It is opinion they utter now, not sedition. They proclaim the liberal purposes of their masters; declare this a foreign war which can touch America with no danger to either her lands or her institutions; set England at the center of the stage and talk of her ambition to assert economic dominion throughout the world; appeal to our ancient tradition of isolation in the politics of the nations; and seek to undermine the government with false professions of loyalty to its principles.

But they will make no headway. The false betray themselves always in every accent. It is only friends and partisans of the German Government whom we have already identified who utter these thinly disguised disloyalties. The facts are patent to all the world, and nowhere are they more plainly seen than in the United States, where we are accustomed to deal with facts and not with sophistries; and the great fact that stands out above all the rest is that this is a People's War, a war for freedom and justice and self-government amongst all the nations of the world, a war to make the world safe for the peoples who live upon it and have made it their own, the German people themselves included; and that with us rests the choice to break through all these hypocrisies and patent cheats and masks of brute force and help set the world free, or else stand aside and let it be dominated a long age through by sheer weight of arms and the arbitrary choices of self-constituted masters, by the nation which can maintain the biggest armies and

the most irresistible armaments,—a power to which the world has afforded no parallel and in the face of which political freedom must wither and perish.

For us there is but one choice. We have made it. Woe be to the man or group of men that seeks to stand in our way in this day of high resolution when every principle we hold dearest is to be vindicated and made secure for the salvation of the nations. We are ready to plead at the bar of history, and our flag shall wear a new lustre. Once more we shall make good with our lives and fortunes the great faith to which we were born, and a new glory shall shine in the face of our people.

HOW THE WAR MAY BE ENDED

90. *Communication of Secretary Lansing to Pope Benedict XV. August 27, 1917*¹

(*Official Bulletin*, Washington, August 29, 1917)

Every heart that has not been blinded and hardened by this terrible war must be touched by this moving appeal of His Holiness the Pope, must feel the dignity and force of the humane and generous motives which prompted it, and must fervently wish that we might take the path of peace he so persuasively points out. But it would be folly to take it if it does not in fact lead to the goal he proposes. Our response must be based upon the stern facts and upon nothing else. It is not a mere cessation of arms he desires; it is a stable and enduring peace. This agony must not be gone through with again, and it must be a matter of very sober judgment what will insure us against it.

His Holiness in substance proposes that we return to the

¹ A reply to the note of Pope Benedict XV, dated August 1, 1917, addressed to the belligerents. For text see *Current History*, *New York Times*, VI, 392.

status quo ante bellum, and that then there be a general condonation, disarmament, and a concert of nations, based upon an acceptance of the principle of arbitration; that by a similar concert freedom of the seas be established; and that the territorial claims of France and Italy, the perplexing problems of the Balkan states, and the restitution of Poland be left to such conciliatory adjustments as may be possible in the new temper of such a peace, due regard being paid to the aspirations of the peoples whose political fortunes and affiliations will be involved.

It is manifest that no part of this program can be successfully carried out unless the restitution of the *status quo ante* furnishes a firm and satisfactory basis for it. The object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible government which, having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices and long-cherished principles of international action and honor; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier either of law or of mercy; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood—not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also, and of the helpless poor; and now stands balked, but not defeated, the enemy of four-fifths of the world. This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people. It is no business of ours how that great people came under its control or submitted with temporary zest to the domination of its purpose; but it is our business to see to it that the history of the rest of the world is no longer left to its handling.

To deal with such a power by way of peace upon the

plan proposed by His Holiness the Pope, would, so far as we can see, involve a recuperation of its strength and a renewal of its policy; would make it necessary to create a permanent hostile combination of nations against the German people, who are its instruments; and would result in abandoning the new-born Russia to the intrigue, the manifold subtle interference and the certain counter-revolution which would be attempted by all the malign influences to which the German Government has of late accustomed the world. Can peace be based upon a restitution of its power or upon any word of honor it could pledge in a treaty of settlement and accommodation?

Responsible statesmen must now everywhere see, if they never saw before, that no peace can rest securely upon political or economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and cripple or embarrass others, upon vindictive action of any sort or any kind of revenge or deliberate injury. The American people have suffered intolerable wrongs at the hands of the Imperial German Government, but they desire no reprisal upon the German people, who have themselves suffered all things in this war, which they did not choose. They believe that peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of governments — the rights of peoples great or small, weak or powerful — their equal right to freedom and security and self-government, and to a participation upon fair terms in the economic opportunities of the world, the German people of course included if they will accept equality and not seek domination.

The test, therefore, of every plan of peace is this: Is it based upon the faith of all the peoples involved, or merely upon the word of an ambitious and intriguing government, on the one hand, and of a group of free peoples, on the other? This is a test which goes to the root of the matter; and it is the test which must be applied. —

The purposes of the United States in this war are known to the whole world—to every people to whom the truth has been permitted to come. They do not need to be stated again. We seek no material advantage of any kind. We believe that the intolerable wrongs done in this war by the furious and brutal power of the Imperial German Government ought to be repaired, but not at the expense of the sovereignty of any people—rather a vindication of the sovereignty both of those that are weak and those that are strong. Punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues, we deem inexpedient and in the end worse than futile—no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring peace. That must be based upon justice and fairness and the common rights of mankind.

We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. Without such guarantees treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation could now depend on. We must await some new evidence of the purposes of the great peoples of the central powers. God grant it may be given soon, and in a way to restore the confidence of all peoples everywhere in the faith of nations and the possibility of a covenanted peace.

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